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Language, quite simply, is a window through which we can 
reach out and touch each other’s minds. Anyone can reach 
through it – regardless of race, regardless of belief. It is the most 
intimate act we can ever perform. We must be sure, always, to 
keep that window open.   
Altmann (1997), The Ascent of Babel 
 
The key to understand acquisition is not the famous poverty of 
the stimulus (…), but rather the opulence of the substrate.  
Feldman (2006), From Molecule to 
Metaphor. A Neural Theory of 
Language. 
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The Noun Phrase (henceforth also NP) is a linguistic category which is often considered 
to contain a structure more complex or intricate than that of a clause.  It is certainly not 
as easy to deal with as it might seem at first sight. This complexity is due to the fact that 
it can adopt different forms, that is, its basic prototypical form (the set Det + N) is just a 
minimal part of all the possible variations which can occur inside the Noun Phrase 
category. The present work deals with the English NP construction. I consider it 
important to highlight this because, as will be seen, not all languages follow the English 
NP model. Variety in the internal make up of NPs is, perhaps, not so surprising. In fact, 
reality is complex and varied, and humans live a reality and a context which is reflected 
in their use of language. Language develops out of language use and, at the same time, 
it is a reflection of our cognitive abilities. One of these abilities is categorization which, 
as Taylor puts it, is “to see similarity in diversity” (Taylor 1995). As a consequence, the 
formal characteristics of this system of communication have to be complex and varied. 
Contrary to the generative dogma, variety and gradual membership are taken as granted 
by Cognitive Grammar, which takes this as definitive for the structure of syntactic 
categories. 
This introduction aims to present the NP from a rather descriptive point of view 
with the purpose of presenting this variety of forms. First of all, a definition of the basic 
NP structure is offered in section 1.1 with the intention of introducing the basic 
elements of this structure before presenting all the other possible constituents. After this 
brief presentation, the notions head and dependent ar  introduced in section 1.2. Finally, 
section 1.3 contains the main loci of diversity within the structure of the NP, that is, the 





range of all the possible elements which can be set in the locus of the noun and which 
cause internal structural diversity. It also introduces the main theme of chapter 2, 
namely, the different grammatical analyses of the NP structure.  
 
1.1 Definition 
The ‘prototypicality’ of an NP lies in the fact that the noun-and-determiner combination 
is one of the most ‘faithful’ of all the possible grammatical relations of a language. 
However, NP structures can be quite diverse. A category in general, and a syntactic 
category in particular, is a bundle of instances belonging to the same type although not 
sharing clear cut features among them, but “showing a criss-crossing network of 
similarities” (Taylor 1995: 38; see also, Rosch 1973, 1978; Lakoff 1987; Aarts, 
Denison, Keizer & Popova 2004; Aarts 2007). In this way, under the label NP we may 
find instances of this category with a common noun used alone, without any 
accompanying element, as when we use a noun in a generic sense as, for example, cats 
are always sleeping; proper nouns, as in John took a train at 9.30, and also just 
pronouns, as in we are trying to give our dog a bath.  
Of course pronouns can actually supplant just ‘pieces’ of NPs, as one for 
example (as in the one). Interestingly, these types of NP instances are noun phrases 
without nouns (see section 1.3.1). These instances project an NP structure anyway due 
to the presence in them of a determiner (Hawkins 1994: 106). Thus, an adjective can 
also stand in the place of a noun, as in for example, the happy will live longer (see 
section 1.3.1). This is in fact an unconstrained routine in Spanish (los blancos, las altas, 
las anchas; see section 1.3.4). Such NPs present semantic nuances that must be taken 
into account or dealt with in special ways. Usually, in English, these are possible when 
the adjective describes the human condition or character, and is used to represent a class 





of persons, as in the rich or the blind. This construction always has a plural meaning. It 
does not make reference to a concrete person because it lacks the nominal element that 
evokes a type which can be qualified. In general terms, an NP is a syntactic category 
which represents an instance of an entity in the outside world or in the context of 
communication, so, of course, words denoting entities tend to be needed, and these 
tend to be nouns.   
 
As syntactic categories, NPs play a role within the structure of larger units like 
verb phrases (VP), prepositional phrases (PP) and clauses. Within a VP they can be 
direct objects, as in, for example, wash my dog; or indirect objects, as in give my dog a 
bone; and they can also be predicative complements, as in my dog is a good pet. Within 
a prepositional phrase, NPs function as complements of the preposition, as in, for 
example, in the garden, with the dog. Within a clause structure NPs typically function 
as subjects, as in the dog ate all his food.  
 
1.2 Heads and dependents 
1.2.1 Heads 
Most linguistic theories postulate that the notion head is a pivotal element in the 
syntactic analysis of linguistic structures. The truth is that “the notion head has a part to 
play in almost all current syntactic theories” (Cann 1993: 44). In fact, “a phr sal 
construction can (...) be defined as any construction which has a head, and a phraseas 
any unit which exhibits such a construction” (Matthews 1981: 161). According to 
Matthews (1981), one of the main elements which makes up a phrase in general terms is 
that it contains a head which is almost obligatory. This ‘obligatoriness’ of the head 
applies always with reference to its syntactic influence; but I also contend that it is 





almost obligatory when dealing with its ‘physical’ presence once we make use of 
language, that is, its syntactic influence is always present although it is not explicitly 
visible. Together with obligatoriness, the main function of the notion head is that it 
determines the syntactic distribution of the constituents of a construction. As a 
consequence these constituents are subordinated to the main element.  Zwicky (1985: 2) 
defends the existence of heads within syntax and offers the following definition for 
them: “[t]he intuition the be captured with the notion HEAD is that in certain syntactic 
constructs one constituent in some sense ‘characterizes’ or ‘dominates’ the whole”. 
Thus, the main function of a head is to project the main characteristics of a larger 
syntactic construction. Hudson (1987) also makes reference to this notion and, quoting 
works by Anderson (1971, 1977), Matthews (1981), and Hudson (1984), states that all 
these linguists “agree not only in using the term ‘head’, but also in using it to refer to 
the element in some construction to which all the other parts of that construction are (in 
some sense) subordinate”.  
This position is also defended by McGlashan (1993: 205). It is true that 
sometimes the head of a structure can be omitted, as in the NP the blind, where the noun 
(people) is not present, but most linguists consider it is still the latent head (see section 
1.3.1). Some linguists take the omission of the noun as a fundamental piece of evidence 
for defending the idea that the noun is not the head because it can be omitted. But, as 
McGlashan (p. 205) points out:  
 
Head categories are obligatory since they provide the syntactic and semantic 
types of the result category: without these, the result category would not be 
defined. Consequently when the head category is absent, it must be elliptical 
rather than optional: it is implicit in the discourse and when reconstructed 
from context provides syntactic and semantic types of the phrase. 





With this assertion, McGlashan seeks to defend the view that the head is really never 
optional: it is an obligatory element which, even when omitted, can always, and actually 
must always, be inferred from the context of communication.  
Hudson (1987: 112) offers an analysis of the function head following Zwicky 
(1985) and at the same time modifying his views. He tries to show that: 
 
[T]he analysis which Zwicky assumes, (…) [is] either irrelevant or open to 
improvement. (…) Zwicky rejects [the idea] that there is a general category 
which subsumes many –though not all- of the ‘head-like’ concepts. 
Naturally I shall suggest that this supercategory is what has traditionally 
been called ‘head’. 
 
He defines head as “the name of a grammatical relation category, on a par with 
categories like ‘subject’ and ‘object’, but on a higher level of generality than these” (p. 
131). In a more recent contribution, Hudson (1993: 266) states about the head function 
that it is “different from the other daughters only in that its features are the same as 
those of the mother”, that is, the semantic and syntactic features of the head element are 
projected in the final phrasal category.  
 
In sum, it could be said that the head is the element which contributes the main 
semantic and syntactic features for the elaboration of a higher syntactic construction. In 
order to be the head of a construction, an element has to be able to perform or project a 
syntactic role within the structure which it heads. 
 
Cognitive linguists like Langacker and Taylor have also offered definitions for 
the notion head. Thus, Langacker (1991: 549) makes a distinction between two different 





types of heads. He posits the existence of a ‘local head’ and a ‘global head’, and he 
defines them as follows: 
 
Locally, at any given level of constituency, the head is that component 
structure whose profile corresponds to that of the composite structure. 
Globally, within a nominal1 or a finite clause, the head is the lowest-level 
noun or verb which profiles the thing or process instance designated by the 
nominal or the clause overall. 
 
And, according to Taylor (2002: 590), the notion head can be explained in the following 
way:  
 
The head of an expression is that constituent whose profile is inherited by 
the expression. On the table is headed by on, since the relational character of 
the phrase is inherited from the preposition. 
 
From a generative point of view, the notion head is also taken into account. 
Dealing with heads, Radford (2004: 455), for instance, offers the following definition:  
 
The head (constituent) of a phrase is the key word which determines the 
properties of the phrase. So, in a phrase such as fond of fast food, the head of 
the phrase is the adjective fond, and consequently the phrase is an adjectival 
phrase (…).  
 
 Although Cognitive Grammar and Generative Grammar use very different tools 
for studying the syntactic structures of language and are based on quite different 
principles, both linguistic frameworks defend the idea that there is an element that 
                                                           
1  Langacker uses the term nominal when referring to the structure which contains at least a Determiner 
and a noun. In the present work I use the term NP, which is more usual. 





‘directs’ the distribution of the whole structure. For present purposes, I will also assume 
that the head of a structure is that element whose characteristics (syntactic and 
semantic) are projected in the highest structure within which it is included. Thus, the 
head is the constituent element around which all the other constituent elements turn.  
 
1.2.2 Dependents: modifiers vs. complements 
If the head is the main element within a syntactic structure, the rest of the constituents 
are its dependent elements. Therefore, whenever we have a head, a dependent or 
dependents are implied. A dependent is an element which modifies the head and is 
subordinate to it. This means that if the existence of an element A within a structure is 
not possible except via the presence of another element B, A is a dependent element of 
B. Taylor (2002: 588) states that “[a] dependent unit can only be conceptualized with 
reference to other entities”. This means that in order to use the dependent element we 
have to previously use the head.  
 But the notion dependent is not so simple. This is a general term that subsumes 
two more specific ones, modifier and complement. Huddleston & Pullum (2002: 24) 
label these notions as ‘subtypes of dependent’. They also point out (p. 439) that “[t]he 
distinction between these two kinds of dependent is essentially the same as in clause 
structure, but in the NP they are not as clearly differentiated syntactically”. As shall be 
seen, this is often ignored by some. The most general description of the differences 
between a complement and a modifier is that a complement is “licensed by the head 
noun. The licensing criterion is the most basic criterion for complements (...)” 
(Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 440). On the other hand, a modifier depends on the noun 
but it is not obligatory for the understanding of the NP.  





Consider now Matthews’s (1981: 147) comment about word subordination 
within syntactic structure: 
 
In an attributive relation the element which can be dropped is an ‘attribute’ 
(or ‘subordinate’). So, very sleek and (the) thrushes on the lawn have 
attributive constructions with the attributes very and on the lawn. The 
determiner in some thrushes or the thrushes is also classed as an attribute; 
thus one can say The thrushes are singing or Thrushes are singing, but not 
The are singing. 
 
In relation to the ‘subtypes of dependents’ and more specifically to the modifier 
category, McGlashan (1993: 205-206) maintains that modifiers are generally not 
obligatory and as consequence they do not influence the final syntactic category. In the 
case they were obligatory, McGlashan points out that “it is the head category which 
provides the types”. He also points out that when a modifier and a head appear together 
within the same syntactic structure: 
 
[P]hrases are characterized as the category which results from the extension 
of a head category through specification by a modifier category. The head 
category provides the syntactic and semantic type of the result category so 
long as the modifier category does not change properties of the head 
which define its syntactic and semantic type (emphasis added).  
 
Langacker (1991:  6) also contends that if we have an element which is a head 
“the other component is a complement or a modifier depending on whether it elaborates 
a salient substructure of the head, or whether one of its salient substructures is 
elaborated by the head”. When an element elaborates its head, this projects part of the 
meaning of the head which is not attained by the head itself, and thus complements it. 





On the other hand, when an element is elaborated by the head, the head allows the 
presence of the modifier which expands its meaning, but which is not necessary for 
understanding the meaning of the phrase.  
 
From a different linguistic point of view, Generative Grammar also considers 
the notion of dependent as important in grammar. Moreover, this linguistic framework 
also considers the distinction between complement and modifier. Thus, in the words of 
Radford (2004: 441) a complement is “a term used to denote a specific grammatical 
function (...). A complement is an expression which is directly merged with (and hence 
is the sister of) a head word, thereby projecting the head into a larger structure of 
essentially the same kind” (emphasis in the original). Radford (2004: 462) also points 
out that a modifier is an element like tall “in an expression such as tall men, [where it] 
is traditionally said that the adjective tall modifies (i.e. attributes some property to) or is 
a modifier  of the noun men”. 
  
As can be appreciated, all linguistic theories agree on the basic definition and 
existence of heads and dependents. This must be indicative of the fact that these 
syntactic notions are of relevance and must be taken into account when analysing 
linguistic constructions. These frameworks also draw attention to the basic distinction 
made between modifiers and complements. Both will be important in the present work, 
which starts from the premise that within the grammar of the NP these two notions are 
taken to be unproblematic. In chapter 2 I will start by looking into a series of 
disagreements that different schools of thought have on the most basic aspects of the NP 
structure. 
 





1.3 The diversity of the NP: structure and constituents 
That nouns are central to the NP structure is surely obvious. So is the fact that an NP 
can also be formed by many other words. Whether one defends the point of view which 
sees the determiner as the head of the Det + N structure (Brame 1982; Abney 1987; 
Siloni 1997; Alexiadou, Haegeman & Stravou 2007), or the idea that the lexical element 
is the head of the construction (Matthews 1981; Huddleston & Pullum 2002), the noun 
is an essential and obligatory element among the possible constituents of such a 
construction. Generative grammarians analyse the noun as the head of an NP-
complement of the determiner head; and for those who defend the NP against the DP 
(Determiner Phrase), the noun is obviously the cornerstone of the NP construction. 
However, the preferential syntactic treatment of the noun does not allow it to escape 
diversity, that is, the lexical element is also an object of variation and change.  
 
1.3.1 The diversity of the head-noun 
Its full semantic content is the most salient feature of a noun. As a word category it 
allows making reference to the different objects, emotions and entities which make up 
the external world of the speaker and his/her mind. Givón (2001: 58) points out that the 
main role of nouns is to evoke entities, and that “[n]ouns (‘common nouns’) do not refer 
to individual entities (‘tokens’), but only connote classes (‘types’) of entities”. Its 
content is, thus, rather transparent and accessible. Nouns are the linguistic elements 
which enable contact with the context of communication, the contact between speakers 
and hearers, allowing them to make reference to the physical entities and non-physical 
emotions and thoughts. 
Their centrality in the NP structure does not prevent nouns from the fact that 
they can be omitted, substituted and fused. Thus, although they are usually taken to be 





obligatory and the essence of an NP; they can actually disappear. Nonetheless most 
linguists agree that it is always implicitly present. Consider the following examples:  
 
(1a) The rich aren’t better                             
(1b) The poor aren’t to blame                       
(1c) The blacks bore terrible injustices        
(1d) The whites aren’t better humans 
 
(2a) I like this one 
(2b) My dog prefers the ones in the other bag 
(2c) Give me the other ones 
(2d) The one on the left is bigger 
 
As can be appreciated, all these examples lack a head-noun (as head of an NP, or 
as head of an NP-complement of a determiner).  These are divided into two types: those 
which are made up by a determiner and an adjective (Wierzbicka 1986), and those made 
up by a determiner and one(s). This latter type of construction is denominated ‘fused-
head construction’ by Huddleston & Pullum (2002: 410), who consider that “[f]used-
head NPs are those where the head is combined with a dependent function that in 
ordinary NPs is adjacent to the head, usually determiner or internal modifier” (see also 
section 1.3.3). This ‘fusion’ could be indicative of the fact that variety is also present in 
the syntactic organization of the NP, and not only in the possible elements that may 
fulfil the nominal position. It could be considered that if the noun is analysed as the 
head of the NP, once this is not present in the structure, as in the blind or the one, the 





headedness position might be developed, exceptionally, by another typical nominal 
element of the NP (see section 2.6).   
In fact, replaced not only by adjectives and by indefinite pronouns, but also 
verbs can substitute nouns. Thus, Pullum (1991) contends that gerunds develop the 
functions of a noun in phrases such as your breaking the record. He discusses English 
gerunds and points out that their most salient property is that they show not only verbal, 
but also nominal characteristics. He uses the term ‘nominal gerund phrases’ for 
referring to this type of structure but basically maintains that this type of NPs are 
headed by VPs (Verb Phrases). The following is the syntactic analysis made by Pullum 
in order to illustrate his theory: 
 
(3)       NP 
 NP [POSS: +]                                                 VP [VFORM: prp] 
                                                            V [VFORM: prp]                    NP 
                                                                                                Det                   N’ 
                                                                                                                         N 
 
         your                                                 breaking                  the                record 
 
1.3.2 The diversity of the dependents  
Dependents are also a source of diversity and variety, and as we have already seen, they 
even show diversity inside their own category because they may be modifiers or 
complements. The dependents of a noun go from a simple adjective to a complex that-
clause, and the complexity of a Noun Phrase is due in large measure to the combined 
use of all these possible dependents. There exists also a type of dependent which differs 





from the ‘adjective-dependent pattern’; these are ppositive modifiers. This type of 
linguistic element is different from other (also called appositive) structures like John, 
the gardener, which have to do with the NP structure but at a different level. 
‘Appositive dependents’ (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 447) are dependents which 
“when substituted for the matrix NP in a declarative clause systematically yield a clause 
which is an entailment of the original”. The following examples illustrate this 
definition:  
 
(4a) She sang in [the opera ‘Carmen’]                        
(4b) She sang in ‘Carmen’ 
 
(5a) It was founded in [the year 1850]                      
(5b) It was founded in 1850 (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 447).  
 
Examples (4a) and (5a) entail (4b) and (5b). In each of these pairs, the b examples offer 
a reduced version of the whole NPs in their a counterparts. As a consequence of its 
strong links to ‘common’ NPs, this issue will be dealt with more deeply in chapters 3 
and 4, where the notion of apposition is studied and analysed in depth.  
Just as the general category dependent shows diversity, the subcategories 
complement and modifier may be classified as pre-head or post-head elements. 
Depending on their position and on whether they are complements or modifiers, these 
two functions may be performed by different syntactic categories.  The function of pre-
head complement, according to some, is usually performed by nouns, as in a novel 
writer, or in a book seller; but there are a small number of adjectives which may carry 
out the complement function as well, as in these examples taken from Huddleston & 





Pullum (2002: 439): a legal adviser and an ecological expert. Post-head complements 
have a more elaborate and complex form and are carried out by prepositional phrases or 
clauses, as in: the author of the book, r the rumour that Jane has married. 
Modifiers are more varied. Pre-head position may be developed by a determiner 
alone, as in another twenty days and the scarcely ten students present. Adjective 
Phrases (the white cats on the roof); Verb Phrases (the burning house); and nominals, (a 
children’s magazine); can also function as pre-head modifiers. In post-head position we 
can also find determinatives, adjectives and APs (Adjective Phrases), but the most 
common form of this type of dependent is Prepositional Phrases (th  house with three 
chimneys, the girl in a pink dress).   
As we continue our tour through the syntactic structure of the NP construction, 
we realise that all its possible linguistic components give rise to many forms of 
structural complexity. 
 
1.3.3 The diversity of the determiner 
By the side of the syntactic role played by the noun, the determiner also plays a key role 
in the NP structure. But its absence, as well as that of the noun, is an option among all 
the diverse instances of the structure of a Noun Phrase. However, in English, the use of 
a noun without a determiner is only possible if the noun is in the plural and makes 
reference to an entity in general terms, never referring to a particular group, in which 
case, we need a determiner. The following examples show this possibility: Children 
love games and sweets; Dogs love to run and eat bones. In these two examples, the five 
underlined nouns appear without an accompanying determiner and, even so, they make 
up NPs. For this reason this type of construction is called bare NP. Huddleston & 
Pullum (2002: 355) point out that “[n]ominals headed by plural count nouns or by non-





count nouns can freely be admitted as indefinite by default, forming bare indefinite 
NPs [...]” (emphasis added). 
As noted, the determiner can be omitted under certain circumstances, but there is 
also the possibility of using it alone. Thus, for example, in These are better, the subject 
of this clausal structure is carried out by an NP which is made up by a demonstrative 
alone without a nominal accompanying element. This type of NP instance is considered 
as fused-head constructions by Huddleston & Pullum (2002: 410 ff.). Given the absence 
of the nominal element and the necessity of a head element, it could be considered that 
the headedness position is also fused with that of the determiner, in which case the 
determinative would developed the head role (see section 2.6). However, not all the 
linguistic elements which can occur in determiner position allow this use. The 
exceptions to this phenomenon are the definite and indefinite articles he and a(n), 
which cannot suffer fusion and, as a consequence, cannot be used alone as head of the 
NP. This is interesting because these two elements carry out the determiner function 
per excellence, and even so (or perhaps because of that), they are not syntactically 
strong enough to work alone and make up a Noun Phrase.  The definite article the is the 
most basic indicator of definiteness. Its use on the part of the speaker means that he/she 
assumes that his/her hearer can identify the entity to which the NP makes reference. 
Moreover, it marks the noun as representing an entity which –the encoder presumes- 
will be recognized by the hearer. On the other hand, the indefinite article a(n) is the 
most basic element used with singular count nouns to indicate indefiniteness and 
introduce an entity that is not recognized by the hearer. When discussing the 
transmission of given-new information, Prince (1981: 224) puts special emphasis on 
how speakers connect old and new information making use of different linguistic 
elements, such as in the use of definite and indefinite articles.  





As far as the presence of the determiner is concerned, the function de erminer 
can also be performed by an extensive list of linguistic elements, like demonstratives 
(this, that), personal pronouns (we, you), universal quantifiers (all, both), distributive 
determinatives (each, every), existential determinatives (some, any), cardinal numbers 
(one, two, three…), disjunctive determinatives (either, neither), and possessive 
pronouns and phrases, as in my dog and Alice’s cat, (for an extensive enumeration see 
Huddleston & Pullum 2002, chapter 5). 
From a very descriptive point of view, these elements determine the whole 
phrase. The determiner is considered as a key function in the structure of the NP. When 
a determiner is added to a noun or nominal, an NP construction is formed (Huddleston 
& Pullum 2002: 354-355). Determiners add their own meaning to nouns and they 
specify the Noun Phrase as definite or indefinite. This is a decisive semantic 
contribution because a noun alone does not make reference to a specific, ‘unique’ 
instance of an entity. The function of a noun consists in evoking the general types which 
need to be complemented in order to be referring expressions (Givón 2001).  
 
1.3.4 Cross-linguistic variation 
Diversity does not only affect the English NP construction. When taking a look at 
different languages, one can realize that different NP structures are used and that 
different grammatical rules are applied. As a consequence of general linguistic features 
such as rich morphology and agreement, languages like Spanish, Galician, Italian, and 









(6) O                                   meu                                  coche (Galician) 
         Det. masc. sing.        Poss. masc. 1st p. sing.          masc. sing. car 
          My      car 
 
 
(7) La                            mia                                   macchina (Italian) 
     Det. fem. sing.        Poss. fem. 1st p. sing.          fem. sing. car 
     My             car 
 
As can be seen from these examples, there is a typological variation between the 
English model and the Galician and Italian instances. As noted, the prototypical English 
NP is made up by a Det + N, but that structure is not possible in Galician and Italian 
because it is not grammatical as can be appreciated from examples (6) and (7); *Meu 
coche (My car) and *Mia macchina (My car). In these two languages it is obligatory to 
use the construction Det (def. art.) + Poss + N2. 
If the English and the German NP patterns are compared, typological variation 
can also be appreciated. When checking through all the possible forms of the English 
NP, it is impossible to find a construction such as *give me the olds (as a consequence 
of the linguistic constraints already discussed), but in German this structure is perfectly 
possible, as seen in gib mir die alten (give me the olds). But this linguistic variation is 
made more obvious –and also common- if we turn our analysis to a cross-linguistic 
examination, as observed in the German example, and in particular in Spanish and 
Galician examples. Consider these instances:  
 
(8) A mi                                             me gustan                los rojos  (Spanish) 
         Reflexive form 1st p.  sing.      1st p. sing. like                 masc. pl. red 
           I like the red ones       
                                                           
2 As in almost all grammatical constructions in all languages, exceptions to the rules are possible. In the 
specific case of Galician the determiner before the possessive may be omitted in vocatives, when the noun 
designates unique beings, in stereotypical phrases and with kinship names. In Italian the determiner is 
only omitted when used with father, mother, son and daughter. 





(9) A min                                    gustanme                   os vermellos  (Galician) 
         Reflexive form 1st p. sing.     1st p. sing like-me              masc. pl. red 
          I like the red ones 
 
These examples show an unconstrained routine in Spanish and Galician, a linguistic fact 
that is not possible in English. When a determiner (in particular definite and indefinite 
articles) is used in this position, it develops a nominalising function in Spanish as well 
as in English. However, these two languages do not make use of this linguistic structure 
under the same circumstances. On the one hand, the English grammar only allows this 
possibility if it makes reference to a plural, general use. On the other hand, in Spanish 
and Galician it can be used to make reference to general and particular instances in the 
same way. Moreover, singular and plural forms are possible as a consequence of the 
number agreement system obligatory in Spanish and Galician, as number is marked, 
redundantly, in all constituents.  
Therefore, NPs are not simple constructions that follow a general invariable 
prototypical pattern of elaboration, but complex, intricate and varied structures which 
offer a great field of study. All these NP structures and all their possible syntactic 
functions suggest that the grammar of the NP may indeed not be the fixed, static 
homogeneous entity that most linguists, somewhat unreflectingly, take it to be.  
 
This general overview of the different words which can determine a noun in 
order to create an NP has shown that the function of the determiner is an important 
characteristic in the structure of the Noun Phrase. The determiner is a functional 
category. Its semantic content is almost null, at least in the case of central determiners, 
which indicate information about quantification, grammatical number and various 
aspects involving reference. It could be said that it belongs to the ‘syntactic’ part of 





language. Consistently, it is a syntactic element which creates syntactic support for the 
insertion of lexical categories within the syntactic structure of language. Moreover, 
among all the possible accompanying elements of a noun within an NP structure, 
without a doubt, the determiner is the most important and essential one. It is almost 
obligatory in all instances of the NP construction; its presence allows the creation of a 
full-fledged syntactic category, and it is the ‘eternal’ partner of a noun. Even more, 
when the nominal element is not present, the function of the determiner seems to be 
expanded in the sense that it develops the head role (see section 2.6). With all these 
characteristics, the determiner is not an easy linguistic element to delimit and analyse. 
This fact causes a diversity of views with reference to the head element and the 
complement/ modifier element of an NP structure. Until now we have been dealing with 
the general features of the structure of the Noun Phrase, features which are not bound to 
a concrete linguistic framework. Chapter 2 offers an overview of particular and 












































Headedness within NPs. Matters of endocentricity 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Although the majority of linguists accepts and argues in favour of the distinction 
between head and dependents, as previously seen, there is no such consensus about 
which constituent is the head and which the dependents within NPs. The main point of 
this chapter is to discuss different syntactic analyses of the NP structure in relation to its 
headedness. In section 2.2 we find a traditional/conventional syntactic analysis 
according to which an NP structure has a noun as its head. Section 2.3 offers a thorough 
analysis of the generative point of view about the structure of the Noun Phrase, which in 
its present form (Chomsky 1996) defends a DP account with the determiner as its head. 
Section 2.4 presents the Cognitive Grammar point of view, which postulates that the 
determiner is also the main element within the NP structure. However, this framework 
offers very different arguments for defending this position. Moreover, in section 2.5 we 
can also find two analyses which deviate from the main stream. One defends a structure 
with two heads; the other one contends that the NP is a headless structure. Finally, in 
section 2.6 I offer my own analysis of the central constituency of NPs, that is, that 
involving the relation between determiners and nouns, which from a cognitive point of 
view defends the position of the noun as the head of the structure. These different points 
of view and frameworks also in themselves underscore the various internal dynamics 
that generate the NP structure.  
 
Huddleston & Pullum (2002: 63) argue in favour of an NP phrase as opposed to 
a determiner phrase (DP) and point out about the determiner that “there is a wide range 





of ordinary NPs that contain no determiner (...). The determiner then is a kind of 
dependent (...)”. Matthews (1981: 63) is also in favour of the NP –not of the DP- and 
points out that “[a]n article (…) presupposes the head element”, that is, every time we 
find an article functioning as a determiner we expect to find also a noun, because it is 
not possible to find a determiner (definite or indefinite articles) within a syntactic 
structure without the presence of a noun, as this would not be grammatical, at least in 
English. In this respect, Matthews (p. 69) adds the following point: 
 
(…) we are concerned with a case in which the dependent element has two 
special properties. The first is that it enters into a bounded system of 
oppositions (…). The second is that it can have no dependents of its own, or 
at most dependents which are themselves of a closed class. Thus, there is no 
element that in turn presupposes (…) an article (…). When both conditions 
are met (…) the dependent will be described as a determiner, or said to 
have a determining function.  
 
On this view, the function of the determiner depends completely on the use of a noun. 
Those who defend an NP structure concentrate on the fact that the noun is the head 
because “[it] defines the selectional properties of the phrase” (Huddleston & Pullum 
2002: 357). 
 
 Those linguists who are in favour of a DP structure give it a parallel analysis to 
that of a clause, as understood in most generative works (for a study of the Noun Phrase 
from the generative point of view consult Alexiadou, Haegeman & Stavrou 2007). 
Within the generative framework, functional elements have long ago taken central stage 
in the syntactic analysis of languages in that the head of syntactic constructions is 
always a functional category. In the case of the clause, the heading element is the 





inflection (I) or something analogous to that (Chomsky 1981, 1986). In the case of the 
set Det + N, the functional element is the determiner, so that is the head of the 
construction. Siloni (1997: 7) argues in favour of the so-called DP hypothesis, pointing 
out that the determiner is the head because “D is the element which converts the 
nominal expression into a referential phrase, which consequently is able to serve as an 
argument”. Among the linguists who defend this position are Abney (1987), Szabolcsi 
(1987), Bernstein (2001, 2008) and Longobardi (2001). In general, current Generative 
Grammar has adopted this view. 
 
 It is worth mentioning here that this analysis was previously pointed out by 
Brame (1982) before Abney’s full development of it. After suggesting that the 
functional element, that is, the determiner, should be the head of the construction, he 
proposed to “call DET of NP, P of PP, infinitival to of VP, and COMP of S the head-
selector of the relevant constructions” (p. 321). He introduced the term ‘head-selector’, 
a function which will be developed by the functional element and which ‘corresponds 
roughly to the traditional notion of head’ (p. 321).  Then, in a footnote, he clearly 
states: “In fact, I think it is a mistake to think of N as the head of an NP” (p. 321). As 
we can see, lexical elements are relegated to mere subjects of functional elements 
despite the fact that these are elements which create a link between the human mind and 
the reality; a reality that influences the evolution and development of our cognitive 
abilities.  
 
 Not only does Generative Grammar defend the view that functional elements 
are the heads of the syntactic construction they appear in, but Hudson (1984: 90-92), 
from a Dependency Grammar point of view, argues also in favour of this thesis. In the 





Dependency Grammar framework, the syntactic organization of a structure is not 
defined by a specific word order. Its internal make-up is determined by the relation 
established between a word, which will be the head, and its dependents, so that phrasal 
nodes do not exist. Hudson defends the view that when a determiner and a noun appear 
together within a structure, the former is the head and the latter is the modifier. He 
offers the following reasons to defend this position: First, he considers that some 
elements like all, three, some, this, which, “can occur on their own, with an understood 
noun, in positions otherwise available only to nouns, so they must themselves be 
classifiable as nouns” (p. 90). The second reason also involves words such as all, three, 
and which. Hudson points out that these are the head of the construction in examples 
like three of the dogs, which of the cats, because, as can be seen, the determiners “can 
be followed by an optional of phrase (…) with the lexical noun in a clearly modifying 
position, inside the of phrase” (p. 91). The third deals with the lexical content of the 
linguistic elements. Hudson considers that “the lack of lexical content in determiners is 
irrelevant, because there is no general requirement for heads to have more lexical-type 
meaning than their modifiers” (p. 91). He compares the function of the determiner to 
that of the inflection within the verb phrase, a position defended in Generative 
Grammar. As can be seen, this view eschews meaning when it comes to motivating 
syntactic analyses. If the head element, which is reflected in the final category, does not 
contribute with semantic content, then, the final category is a semantically undefined 
category. In view of this, he concludes that “if one can accept the semantically empty 
does of John does like syntax as head of like, there should be no objection (…) to taking 
even a or the as head of a following noun” (p. 91). Internal coherence is important 
when developing a full-fledged theory of grammar, and if the functional element is the 
head in one type of construction, linguists generally find it appropriate to extend this 





pattern to the rest of the structures. Now, this is a matter of methodological 
convenience (Croft 2001). Be that as it may, for now, the fact that the inflection is the 
head is also arguable. The fourth reason alludes to pronouns. Hudson (p. 91) establishes 
a relation between nouns and pronouns pointing out that “[a] case can be made (…) for 
the analysis of the as an allomorph of he, she, it and they, none of which can occur 
before a lexical noun (…). This analysis makes it natural to take the ither as head, or 
as the first of two nouns in apposition (…)”. Notice that articles cannot stand alone as 
NPs, and that that does not seem to bother Hudson. In relation to appositive structures, 
in principle these are structures which show two NPs that make reference to the same 
entity (see chapters 3 and 4). That has nothing to do with the fact that the and the noun 
within the same NP do not make reference to the same entity. Hudson’s fifth reason 
deals with the order of the elements. In particular, he maintains that the order of the 
elements within the NP structure confers to the determiner its position as head. He 
concludes that “if the lexical noun modifies the determiner, then its own modifiers must 
not be separated from it by the determiner (…). Otherwise there is no explanation for 
the total ungrammaticality of examples such as *big the boy. [And finally,] (…) if 
determiners were modifiers, they would be pre-modifiers, so again they should be able 
to occur in different orders relative to other premodifiers” (p. 91).  
 
 This introduction has offered an outline of the linguistic tendencies when 
analysing syntactic headedness. The next sections capture the essence of different 









2.2 The conventional Noun Phrase structure 
The conventional analysis of the NP structure views the noun as the head of the 
structure, and the articles and demonstratives, and all the possible functional elements 
which can occupy the first position of the NP, as the dependent of the structure. One of
the works which has substantially contributed to the syntactic analysis of the NP 
structure was Bloomfield’s Language (1933), where the American linguist introduced 
the term endocentrism. This is a pivotal notion for the syntactic explanation of the NP, 
especially from the traditional point of view. An example of endocentrism is three 
Persian cats, where the whole NP fulfils the same role as its head alone, that is, the 
noun cats, according to Bloomfield. On the contrary, an example like until last 
Christmas is an exocentric instance. On this occasion the whole phrase does not fulfil 
the grammatical role of any of its constituents.  Bloomfield establishes a tradition with 
this pioneering work. Taking endocentrism as a guiding characteristic for the syntactic 
analysis of linguistic expressions, and the fact that lexical elements are the heads within 
these endocentric constructions, the lexicon of a language must be taken into account. It 
contains the meanings of the entities which evoke the different elements which make up 
the context of a community. A community evolves when communication is attained, 
and this occurs when meaning is transferred. In relation to this idea, Bloomfield (1933: 
162-163) points out that for a correct use of language and a fruitful transfer of meaning, 
the users of that language must pay special attention to the distributional structure of  
syntactic categories:  
 
(…) if we knew the lexicon of a language, and had a reasonably accurate 
knowledge of each sememe, we might still fail to understand the forms of 
this language. Every utterance contains some significant features that are 
not accounted for by the lexicon. (…). Part of [the] meaning depends upon 





the arrangement (…) in which these morphemes appear in the complex 
form. Every language shows part of its meaning by the arrangement of its 
forms.  
 
The arrangement of things is the one responsible for a good elaboration of meaning and 
also for its good transmission. In relation to the arrangement of linguistic forms is the 
conception of word order. In fact, one way of creating linguistic forms (syntactic 
structures) is by means of word order. “Order is the successions in which the 
constituents of a complex form are spoken” (Bloomfield 1933: 162-163). Languages 
like English follow a strict syntactic order as a consequence of their lack of inflectional 
endings, and thus the order of their constituents is a crucial fact for an appropriate use of 
language. This is very important in relation to NPs because the prototypical 
arrangement (the set Det + N) of this type of structure is fixed: speakers cannot alter the 
syntactic structure of the NP and say things like, for example, *House the, or *Dog this.  
  
 As for the role of the determiner, Bloomfield (1933: 202) deals with this aspect 
of NPs and concentrates on the fact that demonstratives and articles are adjectives:  
 
The adjectives are divided into two classes, descriptive and limiting, by the 
circumstance that when adjectives of both these classes occur in a phrase, 
the limiting adjective precedes and modifies the group of descriptive 
adjective plus noun. Thus, in a form like this fresh milk, the immediate 
constituents are the limiting adjective this, and the noun phrase fresh milk 
(…). 
 
Within this limiting class of adjectives he also makes a distinction, and thus he 
postulates that limiting adjectives may be determiners or numeratives: 
 





Our limiting adjectives fall into two sub-classes of determiners and 
numeratives. These two classes have several subdivisions and are crossed, 
moreover, by several other lines of classification. 
 The determiners are defined by the fact that certain types of noun 
expressions (such as house or big house) are always accompanied by a 
determiner (as, this house, a big house). (…). This habit of using certain 
noun expressions always with a determiner is peculiar to some languages 
(…), (p. 203). 
 
As we can see, the final aim of using a determiner within an NP structure is that of 
accompanying the noun. At the same time that the determiner accompanies the head 
noun, it also fulfils a ‘meaning-role’, that is, it contributes with some meaning to the 
head noun, that is, the ‘identifiability’ of the noun. Thus, the function of the determiner 
is to signal if the noun makes reference to identified or unidentified elements. But, why 
are they not the head of the construction? Bloomfield (1933: 264) states that: 
 
The meaningful features of linguistic signalling are of two kinds: lexical 
forms, which consist of phonemes, and grammatical forms, which consist of 
taxemes (features of arrangement).  
 
Bloomfield (p. 166) concludes that “[a] simple feature of grammatical arrangement is a 
grammatical feature or taxeme. (…) [A] taxeme, taken by itself, in the abstract, is 
meaningless”. Determiners are taxemes, that is, grammatical features, and as a 
consequence, they are meaningless, that is, they do not carry meaning by themselves. If 
they are taken alone, if they are used without a noun, their content is not enough for 
communication. Their meaning is ‘identifiability’, and they cannot project this 
meaning if they are not bound to a noun, a fact that does not allow them to be the head 
of the construction.   





Bloomfield’s work caught on quickly in the world of linguistics. Hockett, an 
American structuralist, from whom we inherit a great deal about the perspective which 
nowadays we consider traditional grammar, assumes Bloomfield’s vision about 
endocentrism and elaborates it further. Hockett (1958: 225) considers that nouns, 
adjectives and verbs indicate which type of pattern a construction must follow, and thus 
the construction must contain the same characteristics as its head. In reference to nouns 
he contends that these are:  
 
[A]s head in nests of attributive constructions, often with initial a or an, the, 
this or these, that or those, or unstressed some (/səm/): a boy, an elephant, 
the boy (…). The resulting endocentric phrase, or sometimes the bare word, 
occurs typically as a subject (The boy is here), as an object of a verb (We 
saw the boys), as an object of a preposition (Look at the boys), and as a 
nominal predicate attribute (My children are boys).  
 
So, as can be seen, Hockett (p. 184) considers the NP structure as an endocentric 
construction. He states that we can consider a structure as endocentric when “the form-
class of the constituents is similar to the form-class of at least one of the ICs [Immediate 
Constituent]”. To illustrate this, he offers the following example: “Old dog is a singular 
noun just as dog is”. Hockett (p. 184) points out that “the privileges of occurrence in 
larger forms of old dog are much the same as those of dog”. Therefore, the dog shows 
the same structure as old dog where the noun is the element which designates the class 
of the larger structure, that is, an NP. He adds: “[t]he constituent whose privileges of 
occurrence are matched by those of the constituents is the head or the center; the other 
constituent is the attribute”, (p. 184).  
 





As can be seen, this endocentric idea of NP structure has survived to the present 
day. Despite modern developments starting in the late 80s, this view is still perhaps the 
paradigm in at least non-specialised grammar classes at the graduate level of most 
universities.  
 
2.3 The generative perspective 
2.3.1 Generative Grammar until the 90s 
Generative Grammar starts its path with the work of Chomsky in the late 50s. One of 
its main tenets is that specific grammars arise out of an innate Universal Grammar 
common to all languages. It also tries to give a set of general rules which could be 
applied to all syntactic structures, that is, all the utterances of a language follow some 
patterns and there is no room for exceptions. From its beginnings to the present day, 
Generative Grammar has offered different versions of the initial theory. It began in the 
year 1957 with the Standard Theory. This changed in the year 1965 to the Extended 
Standard Theory. Then the Revised Extended Standard Theory developed in the early 
70s. The Government and Binding/Principles and Parameters Theory appeared in the 
year 1981. Finally, in the 90s the Minimalist Program became the new version of 
Generative Grammar.  
 In work prior to the 80s, a structure such as the door of the house was analysed 
as an NP with a head noun, in this case house, a complement of the house and the 
definite article the  was its specifier. Chomsky (1965: 26) offers the following example 









(10) (i) NP → T + N 
          (ii) T → the  
          (iii) N → man, ball, etc.   
 
This means that the NP involves at least a determiner and a noun, and the final 
projection reflects the noun as the main element in the formation of this syntactic 
category. This simple, rather traditional structure continued to be considered until 
Jackendoff (1977). 
 
2.3.2 Jackendoff (1977) 
Jackendoff’s 1977 work introduces a new theory which would dramatically change the 
generative outlook about syntactic structures. This is the X-bar Theory. With it, 
Jackendoff tries to set an analysis which explains the common syntactic core of the 
different linguistic structures common to all languages, specifically of all phrasal 
projections (see Fukui 2001). The X-bar Theory is an important reference point for the 
development of the DP-hypothesis. In fact, this theory of the X-bar was first suggested 
by Chomsky (1970: 210), and one primary property of it in relation to phrasal 
categories is that all phrasal units are projections of lexical categories. In Chomsky’s 
own words: 
 
[L]et us use the symbol X-bar for a phrase containing X as its head. Then 
the base rules introducing N, A, and V will be replaced by schema (48), 
where in place of … there appears the full range of structures that serve as 
complements and X can be any one of N, A, or V: 
   (48) X’→  X … (p. 210). 
 





Schema (48) shows how phrasal structures, in the present work NP structures, are 
formed. The X stands for the lexical category noun and the dots are the complements 
of the head noun within this nominal structure, as in, for example, house with a 
garden, or dog that bit my cousin. 
 
In his work, Jackendoff (1977: 29-30) points out about the X-bar Theory that: 
  
The X’ Convention can be taken as a theory of syntactic categories in 
universal grammar, making three principal claims. First, universal grammar 
includes a set of syntactic features which defines the possible lexical 
categories of human languages. (…) 
 The second claim of the X’ Convention is that each lexical category X 
defines a set of syntactic categories X’, X’’, …, Xk, the supercategories of 
X, related by phrase structure rules (…). 
 The third claim of the X’ Convention is that rules of grammar are 
stated in terms of syntactic feature complexes and the prime notation. 
 
 Dealing with phrasal categories, the X-bar theory claims that all phrasal 
categories share similar features. Thus, there are not four different phrase structure 
rules in order to analyse the projections of nouns, verbs, adjectives and prepositions. 
Rather, all of them share the same underlying structure. For Jackendoff (1977: 34), the 
syntactic structure of NPs follows this schema:  “Xn→… Xn-1 …”. He points out that 
“all possible phrase structure rules are of [this] form (…) [and], that [this schema] 
represents the canonical form for all phrase structure rules”. Using the following 
syntactic tree, Jackendoff (1977: 17) claims that this “structural schema (…), in which 
X represents any lexical category, is claimed to constitute a linguistically significant 
generalization of the structures associated with major categories”: 
 





(11)                     X’ 
 
                   Spec x                                      X’ 
 
                                                  X                                 Comp  
 
The X-bar type of category, in this specific case the N-bar category, can be 
included within a higher structure. This higher structure will form a new phrasal 
category. Chomsky (1970: 210) had already introduced this change of category in the 
following way: 
 
[T]he phrases immediately dominating N-bar, A-bar and V-bar will be 
designated N-double bar, A-double bar, V-double bar, respectively. To 
introduce further terminological uniformity, let us refer to the phrase 
associated with N-bar, A-bar, V-bar in the base structure as the “specifier” 
of these elements. Then the elements N-bar, A-bar, V-bar might themselves 
be introduced in the base component by the schema (49): 
 (49) X’’ → [Spec, X’] X’ 
 
This latter schema presents a new element which takes central stage: the 
Specifier. This is responsible for the creation of a new syntactic category, where 
functional elements go a step further because they become the only guiding elements in 
the elaboration of syntactic categories, independently of their complexity. The Specifier 
is a functional category, and in the case of NPs “[Spec, N-bar] will be analyzed as the 
determiner” (Chomsky 1970: 210). When the X-bar theory was introduced for the first 
time, one of the first steps taken into account was to sharply separate the lexicon from 
the grammar. Such a step gave functional elements a central position. However, even 





though functional elements are the sine quae non constituents of linguistic structures, 
they are not considered the head of the different syntactic constructions, either in the 
previous versions of the theory, or in the new model developed in the 80s after the 
contributions of, among others, Jackendoff’s X-bar Theory.   
 
 The X-bar theory establishes a structural relation between NPs and clauses. 
Chomsky (1970) concentrates on one specific process in order to illustrate this 
parallelism between two different syntactic structures. That is the process of 
nominalization. When a verb undergoes nominalization, the resulting NP shows a 
symmetric structure to that of the clause. In relation to this Chomsky (1970: 211) 
points out that: 
 
The strict subcategorization features of the lexical item (…) take account of 
the phrases V-bar and N-bar dominating the category to which it is assigned 
(…). Its selectional features refer to the heads of the associated phrase, 
which are the same in both cases. The category N’’, like S, is a recursive 
element of the base. Correspondingly, it would be natural to suppose that in 
the cyclic application of transformations, the phrases of the form N-double 
bar play the same role as the phrases of the form S in specifying the domain 
of transformations.  
 
The fact that functional words are the guiding elements of syntactic structures means 
that these two different syntactic categories have a parallel structure, that is, they show 
a symmetrical distribution. In fact, Jackendoff (1977: 37- 38) postulates that “structural 
parallelism across categories is a crucial consideration”, and he adds: 
 
The general principle entailed by the X’ Convention is that if parallel 
grammatical relations exist in two different categories, the categories must 





be syntactically parallel with respect to that grammatical relation. In this 
way rules involving that grammatical relation can be stated so as to apply to 
both categories, by appropriate use of syntactic distinctive features. 
 
  The element which supposedly allows this parallel structure between an NP 
and a clause is that both of them show the feature +Subj. Jackendoff (1977: 39) 
contends that the analysis made by Chomsky about this feature in relation to clauses 
and NPs is not correct because the structural position of the +Subj feature is not the 
same in these two different categories. He specifically points out about this structural 
difference that “the subject of the S (12a) is dominated by the third node above the 
head verb, but the subject of the NP (12b) is dominated by the second node above the 
head noun. Furthermore, the subject of the NP is embedded in the Specifier node, 
whereas the subject of the S is directly dominated by S”. He illustrates the difference in 
the following way: 
 
(12a)                              S 
                N’’                                                         V’’ 
                N’                              Spec v                                       V’ 
                                                                                        
                 N               T               have           en              V                              N’’   
               
                John          Pres                                              prove                   the theorem    
                                   





(12b)                                     N’’ 
                       Spec N (Det)                                                             N’ 
 
                 Preart                                  Poss                          N                           P’’ 
                 several    of 
                                               N’’                      ‘s            proofs              of the theorem 
                                               N’ 
                                               N  
                                             John 
 
Jackendoff’s variation of Chomsky’s analysis promotes a new rule, which is said to 
strengthen the X’ Convention. It is the Uniform Three-Level Hypothesis. Jackendoff 
(1977: 52) states it in the following way: 
 
[F]or every lexical category X, there are syntactic categories X’, X’’, and 
X’’’, and no more, and the major phrase structure rules elaborating these 
categories are of the form given by the rule schema (3.9) […]: 
(3.9) Xn → (C1) … (Cj)- Xn-1 – (Cj+1) … (Ck), where 1 ≤ n ≤ 
3, and for all Ci, either Ci = Y’’’ for some lexical category Y, 
or Ci is a specified grammatical formative.  
 





Jackendoff (p. 52) finally adds that “rule schema (3.9) provides the bulk of the phrase 
structure rules of the language”, and by that he means of all languages. 
 
As seen until now, functional elements are the ones responsible for the 
elaboration of the different syntactic structures. Within Jackendoff’s model the element 
which corresponds to this type is the specifier. The specifier is the sister of X’ in the X-
bar schema of phrasal structures. Different elements can occupy the specifier position, 
typically the auxiliary verb in a VP, and a determiner or a possessor in an NP. The 
following schema illustrates this (XP stands for X’’):  
 
(13)                                       XP 
                               
 Specifier                        X’ 
                                           
               X           Complement 
 
The model is enriched by a Specifier constituent which is formulated by Jackendoff 
(1977: 104) in the following way: “[a]n NP specifier may contain at most one 
demonstrative, one quantifier, and one numeral”.  
 
 The Government and Binding (GB) framework that starts in the early 80s 
assumes the X-bar Convention. Haegeman (1991: 98-101), for instance, considers that 
the syntactic structure NP must be compared with that of a VP. In fact she contends 
about examples (4a) – (4b) below: 
 





 (4a) The investigation of the corpse after lunch  
 (4b) The police will investigate the corpse after lunch 
 
that “it is attractive to argue that the relationship between the N investigation and the 
PP of the corpse in (4a) is like that between the verb investigate and its object NP the 
corpse in (4b). Both the V investigate and the N investigation have a thematic relation 
with the NP the corpse”. 
 
She suggests the following schema in order to integrate NPs in the format established 
for VPs:  
  
(5)                  NP 
                                                  
                                              N’ 
 
                                              N’ 
                       Spec        N             PP                                    PP 
 
                     the    investigation      of the corpse                      after lunch  
 
Haegeman (p. 99) notices about this schema that “[t]he lowest N’ projection dominates 
N, the head of the phrase and its complement. (…) The specifier of the NP, a 
determiner, combines with the topmost N’ to form the maximal projection, NP”. In the 
GB model this layered analysis is the same for all lexical categories (N, V, A, P). This, 





for instance, is what happens also within an adjective phrase: little in a little girl is the 
head of the AP which functions as the modifier of the noun girl.  
 
2.3.3 Abney’s (1987) new NP model 
The X-bar theory changed when Abney (1987) modified it radically in order to 
postulate a new theory of NP. Abney argues in favour of the view that the Noun Phrase 
is headed by a functional element, that is, the determiner. Following this, the structure 
of an NP is really seen as parallel to that of a sentence, in the sense that the highest 
functional projection dominates the lexical element. Consider examples (6a) and (6b) 
in order to illustrate the symmetry between an NP and a sentence: 
  
(6a) the dog with brown patches 
(6b) the dog bit my neighbour 
 
Schema (7a) shows the syntactic structure of a DP, and schema (7b) represents the 
syntactic analysis of a Sentence (S) or Inflectional Phrase (IP). The symmetry between 
these two structures can be seen through these representations:  
 
(7a)                                                DP 
 
                                    Head                          Comp 
 
                                    Det                               NP     
  
                                     the                     head            comp 
                                                           
                                                              dog         with brown patches 





(7b)                                               IP 
 
  Spec                                                                       I’             
 
   Subj                                                     Inflection                   VP     
 
    DP                                                                          Verb                     Comp 
 
                                                                                                                DP 
 
The dog                                                   past              bite          my neighbour               
 
The determiner in the DP structure, the Specifier in the S or IP, and the 
Inflection in the I’ (I-bar) play the same role. All of them are considered the heads of 
these structures. In order to better illustrate this explanation, consider this example 
taken from Radford (1997: 64- 65): 
 
(8a) Are trying to help you 
 
Radford contends about this example that it is incomplete. He points out that this 
incompleteness is caused by the fact that “auxiliaries require a subject, and the auxiliary 
are doesn’t have a subject (...). More specifically, let’s assume that when we merge an 
auxiliary (= I) with a verb phrase (= VP), we form an incomplete auxiliary expression 
which is traditionally denoted as (...) I’= I-bar (...) and that only when we merge the 
relevant I-bar with its subject do we form an IP”. Given these explanations, Radford 





points out that a complete version of the last example is ‘We are trying to help you’. He 
offers the following syntactic tree:  
 
  (9a)                  IP 
                          D                            I’ 
 
             We              I                         VP 
 
                              are            V                          IP 
 
                                              trying       I                         VP 
 
                                                               to              V                     D  
 
                                                                                help               you  
 
As noted above, this could be compared with an NP. When we put together an 
adjective and a noun we do not have a complete NP, as in black dog. It is only when 
we add a determiner that the phrase becomes complete and grammatical, the bl ck dog. 
Thus, this is the generative basis for including a determiner, an inflection and a subject 
under the same syntactic label.  
Fukui and Speas (1986, in Coene & D’hulst 2003: 3) defend a parallel process 
between IPs and DPs. Moreover, in relation to these categories they “postulate 
movement of the subject, base generated in the specifier position of the lexical 
projection (NP), to the specifier position of its functional projection (DP)”.  





Abney’s new vision rejects the views adopted by prior generative analyses, 
where the N was still the head of the structure and this was accompanied by a specifier. 
His work follows the X-bar Theory and the new tenets which appeared with 
Chomsky’s (1986) work. As a consequence of this modification, the new syntactic 
category Determiner Phrase (DP) appeared in linguistics. DPs are extended projections 
of the lexical element, in this specific case, of the noun, according to him.  
      
2.3.4 The current generative analysis: the DP hypothesis 
Following Abney’s proposal and the X-bar Theory, later generative work adopted 
these two theories in such a way that the lexical element was relegated to the 
complement position in all syntactic categories. Chomsky (1996: 172) states that “[a]n 
X-bar structure is composed of projections of heads selected from the lexicon. Basic 
relations, then, will involve the head as one term. Furthermore, the basic relations are 
typically “local””. In the following schema Chomsky presents two examples of local 
relations “the Spec(ifier)-head relation of ZP to X, and the head-complement relation 
of X to YP”: 
 
(10)                                      XP  
                                         
                                              ZP                      X’ 
                                                     
                                                             X                   YP     
                                
 In relation to the headedness of determiners within Noun Phrase structures,  
Haegeman (1991: 608) points out that the fact that cross-linguistic evidence shows that 





“determiners are head-like functional elements is also suggested by the fact that in 
some languages they are realized as bound morphemes”, and she offers the following 
example:  
 
(11)     Swedish  
           flicka   -n 
           girl       det 
           ‘the girl’ 
 
Giorgi & Longobardi (1991: 133) argue for specifier headedness by means of 
the Argument Uniqueness principle, which states that “only one argument may occur in 
each Spec position”. They defend this principle on the grounds that: 
 
Spec, i.e. the pre-head position, is subject to a uniqueness filter for 
arguments, as a universal property of X-bar theory, (…). Since the external 
arguments, either possessors or agents, are generated on the left of the head, 
i.e. in the Spec position, (…), it follows that only one such argument can be 
generated there. 
 
This principle applies to “the syntactic representations derivable from the lexicon” 
(Giorgi & Longobardi 1991: 133), that is, it applies to syntactic structures which follow 
the X-bar theory.   
Giorgi & Longobardi (1991: 199) (see also Longobardi 2001) make it clear in 
their work that the Uniqueness Principle which applies to determiners is characterized 
by its semantic motivation, and thus: 
 
[A]n NP can be determined from the semantic point of view only once: it is 
plausible, in fact, that elements with the function of Determiners are licensed 
precisely by each introducing a distinct NP. 





This quotation alludes to the existence of two Uniqueness Principles; one deals with the 
structural position of the elements, and the other with their semantic structure. Giorgi 
and Longobardi state about the structural position of the determiner in relation to this 
Uniqueness Principle that the constraint relative to Argument Uniqueness is perhaps 
related to the existence of a single structural slot for nominal expressions in the Spec of 
NP. Therefore, there can only be one element in the Spec position, i.e. the determiner 
position.  
Authors like Hewson (1991) follow this analysis. He takes as a basis 
Guillaume’s (1973) distinction between completive and suppletive pronouns because he 
considers the determiner as a pronoun. The determiner is a completive pronoun, an 
independent element which functions as the head of the structure. Thus, he points out 
that (p. 335): 
 
[T]he strictly configurational composition of the phrasal noun (Det + N) 
represents (…) the cognitive binary structure of a noun (referent + lexeme). 
The determiner represents the internal mental referent of the noun, the 
element that is characterized by the internal incidence that creates the noun 
as a distinctive part of speech. The lexeme, in turn, represents the label that 
is used to characterize the referent, the concept that becomes a noun by 
incorporating its own referent.  
 
 Coene & D’hulst (2003: 6) point out some characteristics of the determiner and 
one of them makes reference to this parallelism between an NP and a clause (see also 
Bernstein 2001). They notice that “both the complementizer and the article are 
subordinators in the sense that they enable the clause or the noun phrase to act as 
arguments”. In fact, they continue the parallelism between a DP and a clause when they 
defend the idea that ‘the parallelism between IP and DP still holds, since the subject of 





the verb phrase will move out of Spec, VP to Spec, IP and the subject of the noun 
phrase will move out of Spec, NP to Spec, DP’.  
 
We have seen that the determiner is the head of the syntactic structure because it 
is the element which allows the lexical word to be considered within a syntactic 
structure as an argument of the verb (Bernstein 2001; Longobardi 2001). It is therefore 
treated as a sort of Comp constituent, an element whose primary function is to link. As a 
consequence, it is considered the main element in a syntactic structure, the head. This is 
so because syntax is in charge of the functioning of language. This is, of course, 
compatible with the linguistic philosophy according to which syntax is an independent 
part of human cognition. Functional elements are the only ones responsible for the 
elaboration of syntactic structures.  They are in fact the quintessence of syntax.   
 
2.4 The NP and the cognitive analysis 
Cognitive Grammar started in the late 70s and early 80s with the work of, especially, 
Lakoff & Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1987) and Langacker (1987, 1991), (for a general 
overview about cognitive linguistics consult Geeraerts 2006; Evan, Bergen and Zinken 
2007; and also Evans, Vyvyan & Stéphanie Pourcel 2009). The first steps of this 
framework arose as a reaction against the syntactocentrism that prevailed after the so-
called generative wars of the early 70s, when a meaning-sensitive and a syntax-
sensitive view of grammar were confronted inside the generative framework. As 
Langacker (1991: preface) clearly states, he helped create it because “[he] felt that 
neither camp was attacking the basic conceptual problems that needed to be resolved 
before that issue [the autonomy of syntax] could be examined in a meaningful way”. 
Thus, Cognitive Grammar posits that meaning is the raison d’être for the existence of 





language use and that syntax is not independent: it forms part of the general cognitive 
abilities of the human endowment. Following these two tenets, cognitive grammarians 
like Langacker present an analysis of the NP structure which relies on the fact that 
functional words and lexical words both contain meaning. The determiner is given 
great relevance in the cognitive analysis, although it does not acquire the role given to 
it by generative grammarians. It acquires this importance because, as we will see in 
section 2.4.2, it is the constituent responsible for gr unding, that is, the process which, 
in general terms, creates an NP.  
 
2.4.1 Meaning as the main target  
One of the principles of the theory of Cognitive Grammar is that the grammar of a 
language is reduced to symbolic relations between two components, the semantic and 
the phonological. These two components, and syntax itself, cannot be separated or 
work alone, because there is no sense in usi g them independently: they need each 
other in order to express ideas. In relation to this, Langacker (1991: 3) points out that: 
 
A central tenet of the theory is that grammar reduces to symbolic 
relationships between semantic and phonological structures. In contrast to 
the generative dogma that grammar (or at least syntax) represents an 
“autonomous component” distinct from both semantics and lexicon, it 
maintains that lexicon, morphology and syntax form a continuum of 
meaningful structures whose segregation into discrete components is 
necessarily artifactual. 
 
Therefore, the semantic component of language has much to do within the elaboration 
of the syntactic categories of a language. Grammatical structures are the creation of the 
equal contribution of semantics and syntax, although, as we will see in section 2.6, 





semantics has a vital function in the form of syntax. Langacker (1991: 3) points out 
that “every grammatical construct is thus attributed both conceptual and phonological 
import and is seen as inhering in the symbolic relationship between the two”. 
 As for the structure of ‘Nominal Phrases’ -and the different lexical elements of 
all the possible phrase structures- in relation to the different characteristics of their 
main constituents, Cognitive Grammar considers, in the words of Langacker (1991: 3), 
that: 
 
The symbolic units generally thought of as “lexical items” tend to be 
morphologically simple and quite specific in both their semantics and their 
phonological content. (…) The units generally thought of as “grammatical” 
are more schematic semantically and often phonologically. 
 
This implies that, as we have already discussed, functional words, in this specific case 
the determiner, also have meaning. In fact, no form is devoid of meaning in Cognitive 
Grammar. What must be clear, though, is that the content of functional words is more 
schematic than that of lexical items, and this fact must surely be central in the analysis 
of any syntactic structure. Within the confines of Cognitive Grammar, the schematic 
features of a determiner do not contribute the same linguistic strength as the specificity 
of a noun. They differ in the type of content they reflect. These two elements combine 
their semantics and phonological characteristics in order to elaborate a syntactic 
structure. This is grammar, the combination of “simpler symbolic structures to form 
progressively more complex ones” (Langacker 1991: 5). Thus, an NP is a complex 
structure which is the result of the combination of two simpler structures. It is a 
grammatical construction. In fact: 
 





Any such combination is referred to as a construction. It consists of two or 
more component structures that are integrated to form a composite 
structure. At each pole, integration of the component structures is effected 
by correspondences established between their substructures, (…), a 
construction is characterized as an assembly of symbolic structures linked by 
correspondences and categorizing relationships, (Langacker 1991: 5, 
emphasis on the original).  
 
In order to describe and analyse a syntactic structure, Cognitive Grammar deals with 
categories: “the component structures are best described, not as constituting the 
composite structure, but rather as categorizing certain facets of it and as motivating to 
some degree the form-meaning pairing it embodies” (Langacker 1991: 6). Thus, for 
Cognitive Grammar, an NP is not formed by constituents as such, but by categories.  
 Of course, in Cognitive Grammar there are grammatical rules for the 
elaboration of the grammatical categories. These rules are “constructional schemas”, 
and these can be defined as: 
 
[T]emplate[s] representing in schematic terms the common relationships 
among component and composite structures observable across the set of 
specific expressions that support its extraction (Langacker 1991: 6). 
 
 Cognitive Grammar defines the head of a structure as “that component structure 
whose profile corresponds to the composite structure profile” (Langacker 1991: 6). 
Thus, the head is the one which contributes with its profile (see section 2.4.2) to the 
whole structure. The profile of an expression is the entity which an expression 
designates; the element within the base of a whole structure which is obligatory, has 
prominence and is the main linguistic component within the whole structure. 





Therefore, the characteristics of the head element are reflected in the final grammatical 
structure, which is a concrete example of a general category. 
 
 Cognitive Grammar has a notional approach to the categories of speech. A 
noun “is (…) claimed to profile a region in some domain” (Langacker 1991: 18), that 
is, an expression that profiles a thing. It selects an entity among all the possible 
candidates in a specific area of conceptualization, that is, mental experience. And 
within Cognitive Grammar, a region is “a set of interconnected entities” (Langacker 
1991: 15). Thus, a region is the set of the possible references which a noun can evoke. 
“A region is ‘bounded’ (along a certain dimension) when there is a limit to the set of 
participating entities (i.e. it does not extend indefinitely)” (Langacker 1990: 67). This 
implies that when a region is bounded, its referential properties are narrowed down.  
 Consistent with the semanticist orientation of the model, Langacker (1991: 51) 
points out that within “the structure of nominals (…) [the] semantic function (rather 
than constituency) is the critical factor for understanding their organization”. And there 
lies the main difference between a bare noun and an NP, that the meaning they project 
is different. The structure of the NP, as well as other syntactic categories, is influenced 
mainly by the content of its elements. In order to offer a contrastive explanation 
between the different features of a noun and an NP, Langacker (p. 51) points out that: 
 
The most basic difference between a simple noun and a nominal is that the 
former names a type, whereas the latter designates an instance of that type. 
When a type is conceived as having multiple instances, some specification 
of quantity is pertinent to identifying the designated entity. An additional 
semantic function is grounding, which pertains to the relation between the 
designatum and the speech-act participants. 
 





In a system like this, the determiner is the element which, with its schematic meaning, 
gives referential specification to the whole NP. This specification is linked to the 
participants of the act of communication, that is, to the context of communication. 
Thus, context, participants, and the meaning of the structure are combined in order to 
elaborate the structure of an NP. And, as we will see, the participants, the context and 
the meaning of a construction rest on nouns for their relevance in the elaboration of 
syntactic structures (see section 2.6).  
 
2.4.2 Grounding 
Grounding is treated as the main function within the elaboration of an NP. It is a 
central notion within Cognitive Grammar, and Langacker (2004: 85) views it as: 
 
[R]eferring to highly grammaticized elements, essential to the formation of a 
nominal (…), that relate the profiled thing (…) to the speech event and its 
participants. 
 
The following is a figure that represents a schema created by Langacker (2004:  86) in 
order to illustrate the notion of grounding: 
 
Figure 1. The grounding system  
 
                              
 
                                         
                                   
 













This schema shows how the speaker (S) and the hearer (H), sharing the same ground 
(G), establish coordinated mental reference to an instance of some type. The 
instance is represented by the dot within the circle which is profiled and marked as the 
object of attention. The directing of attention is represented by the dashed arrows. 
Grounding occurs when both the speaker and the hearer make reference to the same 
entity. This fact is reflected in the use of language the moment the speaker utilises a 
determiner in the specific case of NPs. 
  
 Grounding is considered as the final step for the elaboration of a full syntactic 
category such as an NP. Notice that the functional elements are responsible for the 
final step when a noun becomes an NP. This means that the determiner is in some 
sense the central element within an NP. Figure 2 illustrates the schema of a full 
nominal taken from Langacker (2004: 87): 
 









The speaker (S) and the hearer (H) achieve coordinated mental reference within the 

















differentiated from all the possible candidates of the same type, which are represented 
by the circles with a dot and the letter a. In the words of Langacker (2004: 86), this 
schema “profiles a particular instance of the type specified by the noun, singled out and 
contextually identified in the manner indicated by the grounding element”.  
 
 Grounding is treated as one of the four components which elaborate the 
conceptualization of an NP. Taylor (2002: 344-345) terms these four components: 
specification, instantiation, quantification, and grounding. As the sequence suggests, 
grounding is the final step in the formation of an NP. He offers a definition for this 
notion in the following lines: 
 
This is the process whereby the speaker ‘locates’ the designated instance 
from the perspective of the speech event. Differences between definite and 
indefinite, specific and non-specific, are aspects of grounding. 
 
 Taylor (2002: 346-349) also considers that grounding is the main process in the 
formation of an NP. But, although the determiner is the crucial element in the creation 
of an NP, it cannot project an NP by itself. This means that it needs the noun for its 
lexical content; the noun has a semantic function within the structure it elaborates. 
Langacker (1991: 33) posits that “the semantic function of a simple noun is limited to 
specifying a type”. And the main function of the determiner is to elaborate an instance. 
But in relation to these two notions, Taylor (2002: 348) concludes that a co-dependent 
relation is obligatory between the NP construction (a highly abstract syntactic 
structure) and the lexical element: 
 





[A] grounded instance, [that is, an NP], (…) says nothing about the type to 
which the instance belongs. (…) [and] the type-instance, [i.e. a noun], 
relation [shows] no indication of the grounding relation. Because of their 
conceptual overlap (…) we achieve a more complex representation of a 
grounded nominal. 
 
Therefore, the determiner and the noun work together to create NPs, as the determiner 
needs the noun and the noun needs the determiner. In fact, it could be said that their 
relation depends on interdependency (this point of view is defended by Ball 2004, see 
section 2.5.1). However, from the cognitive point of view, the determiner characterises 
the NP more than the noun. This is actually the position explicitly defended by Taylor 
(2002: 348-350). He contends that as consequence of the conceptual overlap between 
the determiner and the noun, a grounded nominal is created, but this overlap is not 
equitable. The determiner is given more prominence: 
 
It follows from this account [of the conceptual overlap] that the determiner 
is the head of the grounded nominal. The bare noun designates a type. It is 
the contribution of the determiner to profile an instance of the type, 
identified from the ground (Taylor 2002: 348-349).   
 
And he adds: 
 
Since a grounded nominal designates an instance, not the type, the profile of 
the composite expression is inherited from the determiner, not from the 
noun. The determiner itself profiles a schematic instance, which receives 
semantic content from the type specification designated by the noun with 
which the determiner combines (Taylor 2002: 349). 
 





In sum, Taylor (2002: 350) considers that the determiner is the head of the construction 
because “[a] constituent is a head to the extent that it contributes its profile to the profile 
of the complex expression”. 
 
 2.4.3 Headedness within Cognitive Grammar: nouns and determiners 
As has been seen, headedness is a controversial notion in linguistics in general, and 
within grammar in particular. There are many different points of view about what a 
head is, and which element is the head of a construction, (see sections 1.2, 1.2.1, 1.2.2; 
Zwicky 1985, 1993; Hudson 1987; Van Langendonck 1994). Cognitive Grammar 
offers a definition and a point of view about the characteristics which a word has to 
exhibit in order to be considered the head of its syntactic structure. There are two main 
criteria for identifying the head of a construction. One is that the candidate word 
determines the grammatical category of the whole syntactic structure; the other implies 
that the chosen word provides the syntactic structure with semantic content. These two 
parameters are taken into account in order to define the notion head, and Cognitive 
Grammar decides on the first. In fact, regarding the way headedness applies to 
nominals, Langacker (2004: 87; see also Langacker 1991: 4.1.1) posits that: 
 
[I]n a given construction, the head is the profile determinant, i.e. the 
component which imposes its profile (and hence its grammatical category) 
on the expression as a whole. This does not deny the centrality and structural 
significance of the lexical head noun (emphasis on the original).  
 
 We have seen that grounding is the main process in the elaboration of an NP, 
and as consequence the determiner is the main element. But let us analyse the 
determiner and the noun from the cognitive point of view in detail with the purpose of 





attaining a precise understanding of these two elements. We have said that the noun 
profiles a type, and for this reason it cannot be the head, because it does not evoke a 
specific reference. But it is also considered within the cognitive framework that the 
determiner alone does not contain enough features for elaborating a syntactic structure 
by itself. Langacker (2004: 100) admits this ‘deficiency’ of the determiner, especially of 
the definite article, and points out that: 
 
[T]he definite article relies on unique instantiation of a type to coordinate 
mental reference. Yet its own type specification, being maximally 
schematic, has no practical utility in this regard. For this reason the English 
definite article does not stand alone as a full nominal. 
 
 In that way, “[o]ne determining factor is the type specification provided by a lexical 
head noun (…). [T]he noun (…) selects a pool of candidates that are eligible for 
consideration” (Langacker 2004: 96-97). So, the noun cannot be the head because it 
does not make reference to a specific entity. However, it is responsible for bringing into 
the discourse context references to the entities which make up the context, the 
community, within which the language evolves and functions. This is because language 
use is linked to a community. In my opinion, the deficiency of the functional element 
extends to the entire set of determiners, and not only to the definite article, because all 
these elements show a certain degree of dependency on the noun. 
 
 In sum, Cognitive Grammar seems to opt for a structure of nominal phrases 
where the ‘profile determinant’ is the grounding constituent. However, the fact that this 
constituent does not seem to suffice to motivate the composite structure, to project it 





alone, suggests that its profiling power is not of the same degree of motivation as other 
instances of profiling within the same framework. 
 
2.5 Other recent analysis of the NP structure 
Apart from the traditional, generative, and cognitive analyses of the noun phrase, there 
are other syntactic analyses of this structure which move away from these theories 
considerably, or which take as a basis some of their tenets but modify them in order to 
integrate them within their own theory. Together with the possibility of contemplating 
the determiner as the head or the noun as head, there are also the logical possibilities of 
contemplating both as heads, or none. To these less-known ways of understanding the 
structure of the NP we turn now.  
 
 2.5.1 An exocentric structure  
Jerry Ball (2004) defends an exocentric view of the NP structure. He points out that the 
syntactic structure Det + N has two heads instead of just one and calls this theory bi-
polar. Ball (p. 1) refers to his theory in the following way: 
 
A bi-polar theory of the structure and function of nominals (…) is presented 
in which a specifier, functioning as a referential pole, and a head, 
functioning as a relational pole, combine to form a referring expression. 
 
Both constituents of the noun phrase are thus equally important in the structure of the 
construction to the point that neither of them is taken as a dependent of the other. To a 
certain extent, Ball follows Langacker (1987a)’s theory. Apart from terms like head, 
modifier and complement, commonly used in any syntactic analysis of an NP, Ball also 





includes the notion of grounding, of cognitive reminiscence. But apart from these 
notions, Ball (p. 17) invokes another one with generative overtones: 
 
In the bi-polar theory there is a fourth functional category called the 
specifier. The grounding predication typically corresponds to a specifier 
with the specifier functioning as the “referential head” of the composite 
structure. 
 
Therefore, the Spec category of Ball’s theory equals the grounding function of 
Langacker, but with the difference that the Spec shares responsibilities with the noun, 
it is not the only one that is responsible for the creation of the NP. He (p. 1) contends 
that “both the specifier and the head make significant and meaningful contributions to 
the larger expressions in which they occur”.  
Ball defends the view that the semantics of an element within a construction is 
very important, in fact, he rejects the theories which rely uniquely on the syntactic part 
of language, that is, those which give more relevance to functional elements than to the 
semantics of words. He contends that “purely syntactic representations fail to make 
important grammatical generalizations. It is only in recognizing the grammatical 
functions of lexical items and expression forms that the generalizations follow” (p. 3). 
To illustrate this assertion, he uses examples like: 
 
(12a) The bull is running.  
(12b) The running bull.  
(12c) The running of the bull.  
 





With these examples he seeks to demonstrate that “[i]nsisting that the head of a nominal 
is necessarily a noun and that a nominal is necessarily a noun phrase only leads to 
confusion resulting from the confounding of grammatical function with part of speech 
and phrasal form” (p. 3). In relation to examples (12a), (12b), and (12c), it must be 
concluded that the word running does not have a different meaning in each of these 
examples. Instead, ““running” [must be treated] as a verb (participle) that functions as 
the head of a clause in (12a); as a (pre-head) modifier in (12b); and as the head of a 
nominal in (12c)” (Ball 2004: 3).  
  
Ball contends that within syntax the role of the determiner is as important as that 
of the noun because it is the one which enables us to distinguish a noun from a verb, 
when these categories are written (or sound) in the same way, something frequent in 
English. In these cases, the head of the different syntactic constructions, VPs and NPs, 
as in the dance vs. to dance, has the same word form. Thus, Ball (p. 6) concludes that: 
 
[T]here is little basis for the head determining the grammatical function of 
the expression. Rather, it is the specifier [the determiner the] that determines 
the grammatical function. 
 
But, he also rushes to clarify that: 
 
Languages provide a base lexical construal which reflects the prototypical, 
unmarked use of the words in the language. But grammar provides 
mechanisms for framing alternative construals, often reflected via syntactic 
and morphological marking (p. 5). 
 





In relation to this ‘base lexical construal’ and to the fact that verbs can be the head of 
an NP and that nouns can act like verbs on some occasions, Ball (p. 5) adds that: 
 
There is no claim that the criteria for membership in a part of speech or 
word class are exceptionless. Action words that are frequently used as the 
heads of nominals may come to have the status of a noun. In this case the 
action described by the word is construed objectively and the noun sense of 
the word is separately represented from the verb sense in the mental lexicon.  
 
It was mentioned above that some verbs and nouns are written or pronounced in the 
same way and that the grammatical element which accompanies them makes it clear 
which category we are using on each particular occasion. In relation to the determiner, 
it can actually be used with verbs in order to create a noun. Ball (p. 6) refers to the use 
of the determiner on these occasions in the following way: 
 
“The” has the effect of objectifying the following head, often forcing action 
words to be interpreted as one of the typical participants in the action, rather 
than the action itself. 
 
The determiner is treated by Ball as the referential pole which has the power of 
transforming an action into an object, and thus making an explicit reference using as a 
base even a verbal lexical item instead of a noun. This is reminiscent of cognitive 
thinking about construal: the human ability to portray the same situation in different 
ways, as in for example An animal ate the cheese or A mouse ate the Parmesan cheese. 
The content of these two sentences is the same, the fact that somebody ate something. 
But the second sentence is more specific, and offers more detailed information about 
the action. These are two examples of interpreting and transmitting the world 





experience. A good example of construal is the differences between the verbs rob and 
steal (Lakoff 1987). These two verbs make reference to the same act, that of taking 
away something illegally. But the difference lies on the fact that rob does not evoke 
any human being from which something is subtracted. On the contrary, steal alludes to 
a person from whom somebody takes something away. The same act, expressed by 
means of different linguistic elements, is viewed differently depending on where the 
linguistic elements place the ‘camera’. 
 
 We have seen the characteristics of the Sp c within the noun phrase structure. 
But, what about the other element, the one which Ball calls ‘head’? The head is the 
lexical part of the noun phrase; it is the element which contributes with semantics to 
the whole structure. He argues this in the following way (p. 16): 
 
[A] linguistic element which combines with a modifier such that the head 
provides the profile of the composite expression. A modifier, then, 
constrains the type specification of the head, but does not provide the profile 
for the composite expression. The profile of the head projects to the 
composite expression, not the profile of the modifier. 
 
Thus, the noun is the element which specifies which type of entity we are making 
reference to. Therefore, the final result of Ball’s analysis explains that a grammatical 
category is linked to a lexical category and both of them have the same relevance 
within the final structure:  
 
The specifier or “referential head” combines with the “relational head” (…) 
to form a composite expression, with the “relational head” providing the 





type specification for the composite expression and the “referential head” 
projecting the referential type of the composite expression (p. 17). 
 
The introduction of the term Spec within the analysis of the NP structure has a clear 
object in the bi-polar theory. As we have seen in previous sections, the noun is often 
seen today as the complement of the determiner, which is the head. The insertion of the 
Spec allows Ball (p. 17) to reject this position: 
 
The introduction of the specifier function avoids the need to view the 
“relational head” as a complement as suggested by Langacker. It allows the 
head (as opposed to a complement) to project the relational type –thereby, 
retaining a semantic basis for the notion of a head and at the same time 
maintaining a distinction between heads and complements (i.e., 
complements do not project relational type to composite expressions). It 
avoids the inconvenience of suggesting that “the” is the head of the 
expression “the book” –contrary to any semantic notion of what a head is. 
 
In general terms, these are the main points of the bi-polar theory where both elements, 
the determiner and the noun, are given the same relevance within their syntactic 
structure. The semantics of the whole expression is an important tenet within this 
theory. Thus, the meaning of the whole expression depends on the equal contribution 
of the noun and the determiner. On the one hand, the determiner projects the content of 
the noun given that the nominal element is not a grammatical category, and as such it 
cannot create a syntactic category by itself. On the other hand, the noun provides the 









2.5.2 A headless structure  
Dryer (2004) presents a completely different analysis of the NP structure. Until now we 
have been concerned with endocentric analyses, with the determiner as head, or with the 
noun as head. Exocentric structures have also been discussed, where both elements are 
important. It would seem that the only logical possibility left is one which holds that the 
NP has no head at all. This is what Dryer (2004) has proposed.  
 
Dryer takes this position when he examines NP structures which do not contain 
nouns. He remarks that there are languages which have NPs but which do not have 
nouns within their constituents, as in Nkore-Kiga, a Bantu language spoken in Uganda.  
He uses this example taken from Taylor (1985: 54) as illustrative of this language (p. 
43):  
 
(13) Omuto           a-ka-gamba                      na-anye 
                         young         3rd sing-REMOTE.PAST-speak      with-me 
‘the young one spoke to me’ 
 
 Apart from the Nkore-Kiga language, Dryer also mentions languages like Lucazi, 
another Bantu language, North-East Ambae, an Astronesian language spoken in 
Vanuatu; and Spanish. When one examines nominal constructs in such languages, he 
contends, one finds it easy to: 
 
[A]rgue that in many cases, nouns should just be considered one of many 
constituents of noun phrases, without a privileged status as head, and with a 
status no different from various other constituents which are traditionally 
considered modifiers of the noun. If there are languages in which noun 
phrases are headless, even when a noun is present, this raises questions as to 





whether a similar analysis might be applied to languages in which nouns are 
obligatory (Dryer 2004: 47). 
 
In fact, apart from considering the set Det + N as a headless structure, he posits that the 
term ‘noun phrase’ is used even when the noun is not the head or there is no noun in the 
structure. As a consequence, he contends that the use of this notion is a case of 
“grammaticizing a high frequency pattern rather than in terms of the notion of ‘head’”, 
(Dryer p. 47).  
Dryer (p. 48-49) examines six arguments in order to defend his theory. These are 
also meant to suggest that the noun is similar to the traditional modifier. The arguments 
have to do with: 1. ellipsis; 2. the fact that the modifier is the noun; 3. the fact that the 
modifiers are the heads; 4. the fact that the determiner is the head; 5. the fact that that 
they are headless; or 6. the fact that all NPs are headless structures. 
 
With the aim of defending the first hypothesis, Dryer (p. 50-54) resorts to two 
arguments: the first is that when nouns are missing in NPs “the speaker could have 
supplied an appropriate noun, and the noun is recoverable to the hearer”. This reminds 
us of the informational status of lexical items. When a noun is old, it can be omitted 
because it is implicit in the context, but it is present in the mind of the interlocutors. 
This implies ellipsis of the head noun. Dryer (p. 51) does not rely on the recoverability 
of the noun because he considers “that the ability to provide a noun is not sufficient to 
justify an ellipsis analysis”. As a consequence, he considers two other options. The first 
is that it is always possible to supply the noun. In this case an analysis concerning 
ellipsis is appropriate. The second is the fact that it is just usual to supply the noun, but 
Dryer takes into account situations where the speaker cannot provide a noun and thus, 
an analysis in terms of ellipsis is not possible. He (p. 51-52) concludes that “[t]o show 





that a construction involves ellipsis, one must be able to show that there are logically 
contexts where the speaker could not provide an appropriate word and where the 
construction in question cannot be used”. To illustrate this conclusion, consider the 
following example: a context where one looks into a dark room and sees two objects 
which cannot be identified clearly. In this situation one can say: “I see two things. (…) 
The larger thing…” (Dryer p. 52). Now, take a look at the next examples taken from 
two different languages, Hebrew (14) a. and Indonesian (14) b., where the omission of 
the noun is possible and this is replaced by ‘thing’ for example (this is also possible in 
English):  
 
(14) a. ha-gadol 
     DEF-large sing. masc 
      ‘the large one’ 
 (14) b. yang besar   
                        REL   large 
                            ‘the large one’ (Dryer p. 52) 
 
In his opinion (Dryer 2004: 52), “[b]ecause the speaker could not provide an appropriate 
noun in the context described, these are apparently good cases where an ellipsis analysis 
is not tenable”. Finally, he (p. 53) concludes that: 
 
One might argue that nouns with meanings like ‘thing’ or ‘person’ are 
appropriate in the sort of the context illustrated above [the dark room], 
where the speaker cannot provide a more specific noun. But, then the ellipsis 
claim would seem to be vacuous. 
 
There was a second possibility for explaining a missing noun within an NP. 
That was ellipsis. It indicates that “in languages with gender/noun classes, it is often 
possible to use noun phrases without nouns, where the gender or noun class of the 





modifying word reflects the gender or noun class of the noun that would be used if a 
noun were used, as in Spanish el blanco”. But contrary to this idea, Dryer (p. 54-55) 
argues that: 
 
[T]he argument for ellipsis based on gender agreement does not seem 
especially convincing. Again, this provides no argument against an ellipsis 
analysis in these cases, but I suspect that in many of the cases involving 
gender agreement, the construction cannot be used unless a missing noun 
could be provided. In other words, I suspect that in many of these cases, 
there is independent motivation for an ellipsis analysis. This is the case for 
example, with the Spanish construction illustrated by el blanco. 
 
The second approach to the analysis of NPs deals with modifiers which can be 
considered as a noun, used in order to support headless structures. Dryer (p. 62) offers 
the following example in order to illustrate this situation: the poor. He concludes that 
“[o]ne argument that poor (…) is really just a noun is that one cannot use the poor to 
denote a single poor individual, (…). Rather, the poor is inherently generic and 
grammatically plural”.  
Dryer presents another example taken from a different language, Lucazi. In this 
example the modifier can be considered as a noun because it appears with inflectional 
morphology. The example is the following one: 
 
 (15)  ma-ífò      a-á-mu-nénè 
                    NC6-LEAF     NC6-POSS-NC3-BIG 
                        ‘the leaves of the big one (referring to a tree, class 3)’ 
 
 But apart from this example, he does not find clear cases where this hypothesis works. 
Thus, he finally concludes that: 
 





The claim that in noun phrases apparently lacking nouns, one of the overt 
words is really a noun becomes more far-fetched when one examines other 
sorts of examples of noun phrases lacking nouns (p. 63). 
    
This conclusion is reached because of examples such as the following one taken from 
Tidore, a West Papuan Language spoken in Halmahera, eastern Indonesia: a j ng 
malofo (the two beautiful ones). In this example it is difficult to decide which of the 
words jang (beautiful) or malofo (two) stands for the noun. This is similar to Spanish 
las dos (the two). 
 
 The third approach makes reference to various constituents within the NP 
structure, which can be considered the head instead of the noun. Dryer (p. 65) provides 
some examples that illustrate this hypothesis as in the following example taken from 
Koyra Chiini:  
 
           (16) i-jeeno   di 
        ABS-old     DEF 
        ‘the old one’ (from Heath 1999: 87) 
 
Here the adjective stands in the place of the noun. It can occupy this position because it 
is accompanied by the prefix -. Dryer (p. 65) points out about this feature that “[o]ne 
might treat this prefix as a derivational prefix deriving nouns from adjectives, but the 
process seems to be both productive and transparent, so it is not clear that anything is 
gained by analysing these words as nouns: rather (…) this is simply one of the things 
that adjectives can do in this language. The function of the prefix would be to signal that 
an adjective is serving as the head of a noun phrase”. Finally Dryer (p. 65) comes to the 
conclusion that this hypothesis does not stand up because: 





Despite the cases where this hypothesis has some plausibility, the problem 
remains of what it means to say that an adjective is serving as the head of a 
noun phrase. 
 
The fourth approach presents the theory of current Generative Grammar, which 
views determiners as the head of the whole NP structure. First, Dryer (p. 65) considers 
the potential adequacy of such an analysis for languages such as Spanish:  
 
There is little question that this approach would solve the problem presented 
by many of the examples, and that many of the examples could be construed 
as providing an argument that determiners are the heads of noun phrases. 
For example, if one claims that determiners are the heads of noun phrases in 
Spanish, then the possibility of having noun phrases consisting of a 
determiner plus adjective simply means that the determiner can combine 
with adjective phrases.   
 
However, he ends up concluding that this analysis does not fit in languages which lack 
articles and demonstratives. Thus, from the very first moment Dryer does not see the 
determiner as the head of the construction. He considers that this possibility must be 
treated separately for each language. Consider the following examples taken from 
Tidore: 
 
(17) ona          jang         malofo 
                    3rd pl           beautiful            two 
                       ‘the two beautiful ones’ (used by Dryer taken from Van Staden 2000:                                                                                                                            
                                                                                                                           194)                                                                     
 (18) ona         jau         gia 
                    3rd pl              hold        hand  
                       ‘they hold hands’ (taken from Van Staden 2000: 212) 
 





It can be seen in these two examples that the same word functions as a definite article or 
as a pronoun. Dryer (p. 66) concludes about these examples that “since the view that 
determiners are the heads of noun phrases also claims that what are traditionally called 
pronouns are really determiners, this view works well for languages like Tidore”.  
Although there are languages which may support the idea that the determiner 
could be the head of a noun phrase, this analysis does not work in many other 
languages. Thus, Dryer (pp. 67- 68) points out that:  
 
The view of determiner as head does not appear to provide a good solution 
to the problem presented by relative clauses appearing as noun phrases 
without a noun (...). 
[W]hile the view that determiners (or articles) are heads of what are 
traditionally called noun phrases would solve the problem presented by 
some instances of noun phrases without nouns, it leaves cases unsolved. 
 
The next approach is simply descriptive. It presents the theory that phrases with 
a noun have a head, but those noun phrases which do not have a noun are headless. 
However, Dryer (p. 69) proposes that the solution to the structure of NPs must be dealt 
with resolving the headedness issue, not eschewing it: 
 
[W]hat is the motivation for saying that nouns, when present, are heads but 
that no other words can serve as heads? What property is it that nouns have 
that other words in noun phrases lack that provides a reason for saying that 
they are heads but that no words in noun phrases without nouns are heads? 
One of the traditional features of heads is that they be obligatory; what is the 
motivation for analysing the noun as head if it is not obligatory?  
 
The last approach holds that noun phrases are structures that always lack heads. 
Dryer (p. 69) proposes: 





[C]onsider[ing] that noun phrases are always headless, and that even in 
canonical noun phrases with a noun, the noun is not a head. Under this 
hypothesis, nouns are just one of the many types of words that occur in noun 
phrases. 
 
We may ask: if nouns do not have a certain degree of importance within the noun 
phrase, why do we use them? Which is its function within the noun phrase if we can 
express NP meaning without them? Dryer (p. 69-70) points out that the main function of 
nouns is pragmatic: 
 
Noun phrases refer to particular things in the world. Speakers need to have a 
way to refer to things in a way that will make it easy for the hearer to 
understand what they are referring to. 
 
He considers that the noun is usually given such a central position because of a 
number of features, especially because it allows speakers and hearers to make reference 
to their context. He makes a difference between permanent properties and temporary 
properties. Nouns express permanent properties. That is why they are so essential in the 
NP structure, because “it is far more likely that the hearer will be aware of a permanent 
property than a temporary property” (Dryer p. 70). Among other elements with the same 
property, nouns are advantageous because “they typically have richer meanings and are 
part of a classificatory system by which we classify things in the world” (Dryer p. 70). 
This usefulness of nouns for referring to things is important even in languages 
where NPs can occur without them. Dryer (p. 70) points out that “such noun phrases are 
likely to be used in only two situations: first, when the speaker does not know what kind 
of thing the thing that they are referring to is; and second, when the kind will be so 
obvious to the hearer that it can be left out”. This means that in those languages where 





the noun is an obligatory element within NPs it can be said that “we can explain this 
grammatical constraint without appealing to the notion of head” (Dryer p. 70). That is, 
the noun does not deserve the head label because, from a cross-linguistic perspective, it 
is only used in the extreme case that the speaker does not achieve communication. Its 
presence is required when the rest of the possible constituents of an NP do not provide 
the hearer with reference to the adequate type.   
 
In sum, Dryer contends that the notion head is not necessary. One way of 
describing the grammar of a language is to consider that it contains phrasal categories 
with heads. The option proposed here is that it is also possible to posit that phrasal 
categories do not contain heads. This grammatical description spells out rules which 
reflect similar properties to heads, but which must be considered generalizations instead 
of heads, and must realize that a difference must be made between them. It is also 
important “to distinguish cases involving generalizations over a large number of items 
from generalizations over a small number of items” (Dryer p. 71). Generalizations over 
a large number, such as pluralization, imply that the speaker will produce them even 
when he/she never heard them. Generalizations over a small number of items mean that 
the properties of some categories, such as noun phrases, will apply to other phrasal 
categories. “[K]nowing properties of some phrasal categories will lead to speakers 
assuming that other phrasal categories have the same properties. But unlike the case of 
pluralization of nouns, there is no evidence that speakers do this [generalize over 
phrasal categories], and there are reasons to doubt that they do” (p. 71). Dryer (p. 71-72) 
offers three reasons why generalization of the properties of the phrasal categories does 
not apply:  
 





a. “The number of positive cases [speakers] would have to know in order to 
know the pattern is sufficiently small that it is doubtful that they would draw the 
generalization”.  
b. “Speakers learn the properties of individual phrasal categories at the same 
time”, that is, when they know the properties of noun phrases and clauses, they already 
know the properties of adjective phrases.  
c. “It is not clear that the properties shared across different phrasal categories are 
sufficiently similar that they will outnumber the differences enough to cause speakers to 
detect the patterns of similarity”.  
 
Differences among the different syntactic categories entail that speakers must learn 
these idiosyncrasies. Thus it is quite difficult that speakers distinguish heads across 
categories. This is a major reason for Dryer to defend the idea that the notion head 
should not be used in a syntactic analysis.     
 Going on with Dryer’s reasons for not admitting the existence of heads within 
syntax, and particularly within NPs, consider the case of pronouns and their 
antecedents. It is common to use pronouns and their antecedent nouns as an indicative 
feature of the headedness of nouns within a noun phrase. However, from Dryer’s point 
of view, the use of pronominal morphemes within the noun phrase illustrates that they 
are always attached to the noun. But this attachment does not involve any reference to 
the notion head. “It does make reference to the idea that (…) nouns are the most 
frequent element in short noun phrases, but it does not make any reference to the notion 
of head” (Dryer, p. 74). 
 
As a conclusion, Dryer (p. 75) points out that: 





[T]he conflicting evidence in many languages as to which is the head of 
noun phrases could be construed as an argument against either being head. If 
the notion ‘head’ has a place in linguistic theory, then would not we expect 
the distribution of head properties to be clearer? It is not clear what 
argument there is against the view that speakers do not just learn the 
structure of different sorts of phrase without attempting to identify one 
element in the phrase as head. 
 
So – on this view – the noun is not the head of the construction because it does not show 
clear features of headedness cross-linguistically. No doubt, Dryer’s ideas are radical 
indeed. They are suggestive of the difficulty in working out minimally shared views 
about the structure of the most basic objects in grammatical description. If only because 
of this, Dryer’s way of challenging received wisdom is useful. It does show that NPs are 
not the pristine objects that linguists have traditionally taken for granted and that as 
soon as valid and across-the board scientific discovery procedures are used to reason 
about them, even the most central core of the structure of the NP emerges as an ideal 
construct. As such, this construction is surprisingly vulnerable to perspectivisation. As 
such too, that reflects the various forces that build the NP.  
 
2.6 The present framework: a cognitive approach 
2.6.1 The cognitive basis 
The general outlines of the cognitive framework have been dealt in section 2.4, where 
the main aspects of the structure of nominal phrases have been set out. The present work 
adopts the cognitive framework, although it considers that the analysis that has become 
widespread in the model does not provide the most adequate view of the syntactic 
structure of prototypical NPs. The most important difference with respect to the 
standard cognitive syntactic analysis is that here I intend to argue that the noun is the 





head of the construction when dealing with the NP prototype. However, there exist 
some instances of the NP construction that are syntactically better understood if 
headedness is shared between the noun and the determiner, as it happens in the blind or 
the black. The analysis developed in this section follows also some of the principles of 
Construction Grammar.  
 
2.6.1.1 A brief introduction to Construction Grammar  
Construction Grammar is a linguistic framework inspired by the works of Fillmore et al. 
(1988), Culicover (1999), Kay & Fillmore (1999), Goldberg (1995, 2006), Goldberg & 
Jackendoff (2004), and Jackendoff (2008), among others. This linguistic theory also 
uses elements of Frame Theory (Fillmore 1976, 1982), which relies on the fundamental 
importance of semantics, and its role on influencing or shaping syntactic phenomena. It 
has to do with the fact that one cannot fully understand the meaning of a word without 
knowing the encyclopaedic knowledge that relates to this specific word. In that way, a 
word activates a frame which makes reference to other words and experiences which 
allow speakers and hearers to shape their language and, consequently, their 
conversations. A semantic frame is a structure of related concepts, and these are 
elaborated by means of experience. The different concepts which make up the frames 
interact with one another in such a way that without knowledge of all of them, one does 
not know the knowledge of one of them. This chained knowledge entails that, when 
losing one link of it, the elaboration of the conceptual frame fails. Such a theory has to 
do with the semantic notion of profiling discussed in sections 2.4.2 and 2.6.1.2 
(Langacker 1991).   





Construction Grammar is associated with the principle that gr mmatical 
constructions, rather than syntactic rules and principles, are the primary units of 
grammar. Goldberg (1995: 6) points out that: 
 
The basic tenet of Construction Grammar [...] is that traditional 
constructions –i.e., form-meaning correspondences- are the basic units of 
language.  
 
Constructions are form-meaning correspondences that exist independently of lexical 
elements, that is, they carry meaning by themselves. Construction Grammar sharply 
refuses the generative principle that language must be studied only paying attention to 
its formal structures without taking into account its semantics and the discourse frames. 
The focus of this theory is to emphasize the semantics and distribution of particular 
words and grammatical elements, as well as cross-linguistically unusual patterns. 
Initially, Construction Grammar arose in connection with structures that rival theories 
tended to define as ‘marginal’. Soon, however, Construction Grammar  argued that 
“[t]he hypothesis behind this methodology is that an account of the rich 
semantic/pragmatic and complex formal constraints on these patterns [unusual patterns] 
readily extends to more general, simple, or regular patterns” (Goldberg 2006: 5).  
Construction Grammar is linked to Cognitive Grammar in the sense that they 
share many theoretical principles. Langacker (1991: 8) reflects on this relation and 
contends that “in many respects, Cognitive Grammar is basically congruent with 
Construction Grammar: in its usage-based nature; in its treatment of constructions as 
complex categories; and its notion that the part of a lexical item’s characterization 
resides in the structural frames (constructional schemas) in which it occurs”. As well as 
the cognitive model, the constructionist approach denies the sharp distinction between 





syntax and the lexicon and proposes that they form a continuum. It defends the view 
that a word and a complex structure only differ in their internal complexity, “but both 
lexical and syntactic constructions are essentially the same type of declaratively 
represented data structure: both pair form with meaning” (Goldberg 1995: 7).  
Construction Grammar focuses on the fact that language develops out of 
language use; thus this is a usage-based theory, another similarity with Cognitive 
Grammar. Langacker (1991: 6-7) notes that the usage-based character of Cognitive 
Grammar provides “emphasis on specific expressions and the extraction therefrom of 
low-level schemas as well as those representing higher levels of abstraction”, which is a 
natural solution to explain language. The commitment of Construction Grammar is 
similar because it treats all types of expressions as equally central for analysing 
grammatical structures and patterns. There is no ‘core’ grammar, no ‘privileged’ 
position of language knowledge.  
Although the constructionist approach rejects the main ideas of Generative 
Grammar, it must be pointed out that this framework shares a characteristic with the 
formalist account of language: namely, the fact that both of them postulate that language 
is creative. Both frameworks defend creativity but view it differently: 
 
Constructional approaches share with mainstream generative grammar the 
goal of accounting for the creative potential of language (Chomsky 1957, 
1965). That is, it is clear that language is not a set of sentences that can be 
fixed in advance. Allowing constructions to combine freely as long as there 
are no conflicts, allows for the creative potential of language. At the same 
time, constructional approaches generally recognize that grammars don’t 
generate sentences, speakers do” (Goldberg 2006: 22).  
 





Construction Grammar is a linguistic framework which takes into account, and 
under equal conditions, all the linguistic levels of language, that is, syntax, semantics, 
pragmatics, discourse frames, etc. All of them contribute to the same extent to the 
analysis and explanation of language. As regards the role of the speaker, this is the one 
in charge of generating sentences. Thus his/her personal and mental experience with the 
world influence his/her use of language, instead of following ‘strict’ fixed rules of 
grammar. From a Construction Grammar perspective, in principle, an NP is just another 
form-meaning symbolic package.  
 
 2.6.1.2 Grounding the noun 
The main properties of grounding in relation to the elaboration of an NP have already 
been introduced. Now we need to deal with this notion in a more specific way. This 
time grounding is to be seen in relation to the participants in the act of communication, 
speakers and hearers. Langacker (2002: 29) contends about the notion of grounding 
that “the term ground is used for the speech event, its participants, and its immediate 
circumstances. A nominal […] incorporates some element which specifies a 
relationship between the ground and the thing [...] it designates”. In this sense, he 
contends that (Langacker 2004: 85):  
 
Nominal grounding “singles out” or “identifies” the intended nominal 
referent by enabling the speaker and hearer to direct their attention to the 
same conceived entity in the context of the current discourse situation. 
 
As can be seen, the context of communication is very important in the elaboration of 
NPs. The surroundings of speakers and hearers influence their use of language and 
consequently, they lead to a fruitful communicative act which requires that the speaker 





and hearer make reference to the same processes and entities. This is achieved when 
the speaker and the hearer share a coordinated mental reference, that is, they 
concentrate their attention on the same instance of a particular type (Langacker 2004: 
91). The notion ‘coordinated mental reference’ evokes a book by Fauconnier (1985) 
which contains a theory about this mental coordination between the participants in the 
discourse event. Revealingly, the book is entitled Mental Spaces, and it makes 
reference to the internal organization and composition of the conceptual spaces that 
speakers and hearers form and which contain, in each precise moment, the entities 
which are required for fruitful communication. In the words of Fauconnier (p. 16) 
mental spaces are: 
 
[C]onstructs distinct from linguistic structures but built up in any discourse 
according to guidelines provided by the linguistic expressions. In the model, 
mental spaces will be represented as structures, incrementable sets- that is, 
sets with elements (a, b, c, …) and relations holding between them (R1ab, 
R2a, R3cbf, …), such that new elements can be added to them and new 
relations established between their elements.  
 
It is in this milieu of coordinated mental reference inside a particular space that 
determiners come in: they guarantee the sharing of the same context by speakers and 
hearers. They make it possible for both interlocutors to be involved in the same 
conversational topic. When both participants zero in on the same mental reference, it is 
said that they share the same ‘immediate scope of concern’. Now, “this scope 
comprises what is onstage and deemed relevant for a particular purpose at a given 
moment in the flow of discourse” (Langacker 2004: 91). What is particularly important 
about this is that in order to set the relevant onstage items, language-users need to fix 
in their minds a certain number of lexical elements which evoke the different types 





within the context of discourse. If there are no linguistic elements which reflect the 
class of types, it is impossible to create meaning out of nothing.  
Onstage elements are related to what Langacker (2004: 91-92) terms cu rent 
discourse space (CDS): 
 
[T]he current discourse space (CDS) [is] defined as whatever is construed 
as being shared by the speaker and hearer as the basis for communication at 
that moment. Naturally, as a discourse unfolds the CDS and immediate 
scope are constantly updated. This is an essential factor in the semantic 
value of grounding elements. 
 
When the onstage portion of the CDS is set, a frame is established in order to mark the 
limits of the discourse. Langacker (2004: 92) considers that “[a] discourse fram is the 
onstage portion of the CDS, the immediate scope of attention for interpreting the current 
expression and augmenting the conceptual structure being constructed in a discourse”. 
 
Thus, the appearance of a new CDS is provoked by the appearance of a new 
discourse. Consequently, this new discourse implies that a different immediate scope is 
required for the creation of a coherent act of communication. This in its turn causes the 
linguistic elements which make reference to the types to change also. That is, the lexical 
elements, the nouns, are different and they must be set again in the mental references of 
both speaker and hearer. This change of discourse frame establishes the first as the 
‘previous discourse frame’ and the new one, as the ‘current discourse frame’. In order to 
explain these two notions Langacker (2004: 92-93) points out that: 
 
The previous frame is the one to which an expression applies, providing the 
basis for interpreting it. The current frame is the one presently being 





assembled, the augmented conceptual structure resulting from its 
interpretation (emphasis on the original). 
 
And he adds: 
 
In schematized form, successive frames of this sort figure in the meanings of 
nominal grounding elements, which indicate the discourse status of the 
nominal referents. 
 
This highlights the importance of the context for the creation of meaning. Langacker 
insists that “frames of this sort figure in the meanings of nominal grounding elements”, 
but this is not made possible by determiners because the meaning of the determiner 
does not change. It is true that we have definite and indefinite articles, and other 
demonstratives, that contribute with different meanings to the noun, but their use 
depends on the noun. They presuppose the noun. This notion of presupposition is 
important. It makes reference to the fact that an element is related to another one, or that 
it requires or needs other elements as a previous condition for its use. This means that 
there is an article because there is a noun and since articles presuppose nouns, but not 
vice versa, this implies that the head is the noun because without it there is no article.  
 Consider Mathews (1981:63): 
 
[…] we will establish no direct co-variance between the auxiliary and a 
subject, or an object, and so on. The function of hascan accordingly be said 
to presuppose that of appeared: there is no role for the auxiliary except in 
relation to the element that it is auxiliary to. 
 An article similarly presupposes the head element. On the one hand, 
there are clear restrictions on its relation to a noun. […]. On the other hand, 
there is a relation between the object noun and its verb. […]. Other 





restrictions apply to nouns in subject position. […] But there are none which 
establish a relation between, for example, a verb and the article in its object. 
 
In order to better explain this point, it is important to take into account 
pragmatics, how language interacts with context. The surroundings of a linguistic 
expression influence its characteristics; pragmatic functions reveal the linguistic 
environment of linguistic elements (Prince 1981; Lambrecht 1994). In my view, the 
context is essential for felicitous language use. Keizer (2007a: 190) shares this point of 
view and contends that “pragmatic functions (...) are assigned only to those topical and 
focal elements which are singled out for special treatment; i.e. those elements whose 
information status is reflected in their grammatical form”. The grammatical form of the 
NP reflects the informational status of its referents. Its syntactic organization and 
constituents reflect its informational features. In this sense, the determiner is a sort of 
complement which elaborates the noun. Thus, the grammatical form of the NP varies 
depending on the informational status of the noun. If the noun is new in the discourse 
frame, it obliges the speaker to use the indefinite article. If the noun is old, a definite 
article is used. So, the direction of encoding is from noun to determiner. This means 
that the use and the meaning of the determiner depend on the noun, as this is inserted in 
a perfectly specific discourse.  
 
As regards the informational status of an element, it is also important to keep in 
mind the notions of primary topic and focus domain. The primary topic is the part of a 
syntactic construction that is being talked about. The focus domain is “that part of a 
sentence that is interpretable as being asserted” (Goldberg 2006: 130).  Those elements 
which do not belong to the primary topic or to the potential focus domain are said to 
belong to the set of backgrounded elements. These three notions are considered to be 





the relevant categories of relational informational status (Goldberg 2006: 129-157). 
They can be applied to the analysis of NPs and their informational organization. I 
contend that the noun is the head of the NP structure, in part also because it has to be 
the primary topic within this construction. The final NP projects a meaning which 
corresponds to that of the primary topic. Topicality has to do with the informational 
status of the topic element and is central to noun phrase headedness. If old, an element 
can be the topic of a sentence. At phrase level, when a noun is old in the discourse 
frame we use a different determiner than when this is new. This is what we have to 
take into account for establishing the topic of an NP, the discourse level. If we consider 
the discourse level as the basis for establishing the primary focus of an NP where the 
noun is the one responsible for the creation of the discourse frame, then it follows that 
the noun’s headedness resides in its immediate connection with the frame. By contrast, 
determiners depend on the informational status of the noun within the discourse frame. 
Thus, they must be considered as backgrounded elements, relating to the discourse 
frame only indirectly. 
 
2.6.1.3 Meaning within the Noun Phrase 
 Cognitive Grammar understands the grammar of a language in terms of 
conceptualization. Conceptualization is in direct contact with meaning. In fact, it is the 
process by means of which we elaborate the meaning of a linguistic element or a 
grammatical category (as seen in section 2.4.2). The meaning of NPs is the main point 
in the present work, and how the syntactic organization of NPs depends on this meaning 
projected by the whole phrasal structure. The meaning of the highest category 
influences its syntactic analysis. From a constructionist point of view, the schematic 
meaning of an NP is that of a determined entity. This construction offers a 





generalization; it gives a general meaning which can be specified using the appropriate 
elements. This construction is one of the basic units of language. But, if we take into 
account how humans store linguistic elements in their minds (Aitchison 1987, 1989), 
constructions need basic elements whose internal features project different 
constructions. That is, basic elements which categorize the world and set the linguistic 
components which tie the human mind with the context where human beings interact. 
They are the seed of constructions, and these constructions are the basic communicative 
patterns of language (Jackendoff 1993). Thus, the schematicity of constructions in 
general and NPs in particular is specified by means of lexical elements which are the 
‘basic elements which categorize the world’.  
As pointed out above, in section 2.4.3, the determiner is usually taken to be the 
profile determinant of the NP. In relation to the meaning of grammatical constructions, 
Langacker (1990: 12-13) points out that:  
 
Grammatical constructions have the effect of imposing a particular profile 
on their composite semantic value. When a head combines with a modifier, 
for example, it is the profile of the head that prevails at the composite 
structure level.  
 
Thus, if the determiner is the head, the meaning of the whole structure is, chiefly, that 
of the determiner. But, from the point of view of the present work, this analysis should 
be modified. Viewing the determiner as the head is hard to reconcile with the fact that 
before establishing mental contact between the speaker and the hearer, the lexical items 
in the minds of speakers and hearers need to be set first. Nouns are the elements which 
make up the discourse frame. They develop the main referential function because they 
are responsible for the framing of a conversation. Consequently, if nouns are not used, 





the informational status (old/ new elements) is not activated because speakers and 
hearers do not recognize the entities of the discourse frame.  As a consequence, 
constructions cannot be projected.  If mental contact (in the terms of Fauconnier) is not 
established between the speaker and the hearer, communication does not follow. When 
the participants in the communication act establish the lexical items in their heads, they 
know how to use them, and they know how to link them together. When people use a 
word, they have to know three important features about it in order to use it correctly. 
These are its pronunciation, what it sounds like; its role within a sentence; and, of 
course, its meaning. This means that, if the interlocutors in an act of communication 
have to establish mental contact, first of all they need to know the meaning, the 
syntactic role and the pronunciation of the lexical items which elaborate the discourse 
frame. In fact, it is quite important to mention that if the interlocutor does not use the 
same discourse frame, they do not achieve understanding, and communication fails. 
Aitchison (1987: 39), citing Herbert (1935) points out that: 
 
‘Words matter, […] for words are the tools of thought, and you will often 
find that you are thinking  badly  because you are using the wrong tools, 
trying to bore a hole with a screw-driver, or draw a cork with a coal 
hammer’.  
 
Herbert obviously means ‘lexical’ words. If the wrong lexical items are selected 
communication is not attained. When the lexical items which make up the discourse 
frame do not fit semantically with one another, communication is messy. For example, 
if we choose the verb phrase commit suicide and the noun phrase the dog, the resulting 
clause does not work semantically, the dog committed suicide.  
 





 Let us detour briefly and consider the notion of subcategorization ow. It is the 
case that verb subcategorization of NPs is compared with verbal subcategorization of 
clauses. Payne (1993: 129) makes reference to Baltin (1989: 3-5) in order to explain 
verb subcategorization of clauses and he contends that: 
 
[V]erbs subcategorize for clauses according to different complementizer 
types, and this is all the information that is necessary for the lexical entry. 
For example, a verb like wonder subcategorizes for a [+WH] 
complementizer like whether or if. Once whether has been chosen, both 
finite and non-finite clauses are possible, but if permits only a finite clause. 
 
Baltin suggests that the complementizer is the head of the clause because it is 
responsible for the verb form of the subordinate clause. In contrast to Baltin, Payne, 
(1993: 129) mentioning Zwicky’s theory of complementizers, points out that: 
 
[T]he English complementizer that permits indicative and subjunctive 
complements, and the choice of indicative versus subjunctive is dependent 
on the matrix verb rather than the complementizer. 
 
This highlights the fact that verbs on some occasions depend on their complementizers 
for subcategorizing their complements, but sometimes the complementizer does not 
play any role in the election of complements. NPs seem to be different. Payne (1993: 
129- 130) contends that: 
 
[V]erbs in English do not seem to subcategorize for different determiners or 
quantifiers. If a verb permits a noun-phrase complement, it permits a noun-
phrase complement regardless of its determiner or quantifier. We do not 
have a set of verbs X which only permit objects beginning with, for example 





the quantifier every, and another Y which only permits objects beginning 
with each.  
 
This indicates that verb subcategorization depends on the content of the lexical word 
which is subcategorized, not on its grounding features. This is in relation to discourse 
frames because the lexical elements which draw them are responsible for the right 
subcategorization of verbs. The meaning of the whole expression depends on the 
lexical items which make up the discourse frame, and these are the ones which – in 
their turn – select their own dependent elements.  
 
 The fact that lexical items, nouns, are the ones responsible for the distributional 
characteristics of NPs depends upon their semantic features. Those who defend an NP 
structure concentrate on the fact that the noun is the head because “[it] defines the 
selectional properties of the phrase” (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 357). This means 
that the semantic properties of the noun are the guiding features of the whole phrase. In 
reference to this fact, Zwicky (1985: 4), a formal grammarian, signals that the 
distinction between a head and a modifier can be elaborated taking as a basis the 
semantic content of the words: 
 
[…] we could take the head/ modifier distinction to be at root semantic: in a 
combination X + Y, X is the ‘semantic head’ if, speaking very crudely, X + 
Y describes a kind of thing described by X. On this basis, N is the semantic 
head in Det + N (those penguins describes a kind of penguin).   
 
Zwicky points out that one element of the structure “characterizes” the whole 
construction within which it is included. Thus, if the head contributes with all its 
characteristics to the highest construction, it also contributes with its semantic content. 





The meaning of the whole expression depends on the meaning of the element which is 
the head. And the head has to be an element with enough semantic strength to allow the 
highest structure to work within an even higher construction. This is the reason why 
verb-argument ties ignore the determiners of the arguments. 
 
 Apart from this, the noun is also the head of the structure because, as Jiménez-
Juliá (2000: 109- 110) points out “a head is a unit which has suffered an expansion. An 
expansion, in turn, is an addition of constituents to an initial unit, an addition which 
complements and enriches its content, modifying its referential and communicative 
possibilities, but without changing the nature of the unit3”. To begin with, the 
determiner cannot be the head because this element does not make reference to a 
linguistically ‘tangible’ element, that is, its meaning – its content – cannot be 
expanded. It evokes such an abstract linguistic component that its meaning expansion 
is not feasible. On the other hand, the ‘contentful’ nature of the noun allows its 
headedness because it represents a specific referent which may undergo modification 
and complementation. Moreover, in relation to the nature of the head unit, if this 
feature does not or cannot change, this unchangeability blocks the possibility of the 
determiner of being the head because its nature changes dramatically from a highly 
schematic structure to a totally concrete construction. Jiménez-Juliá (p. 110) also states 
that “an element is obligatory within a syntactic unit, if its absence invalidates the 
possibility of expressing the categorial semantics associated to it4”. This is what 
happens within an NP: if the noun is absent the resulting structure does not work 
                                                           
3 The translation is mine. “Un núcleo es una unidad que ha sufrido una expansión. Una expansión, a su 
vez, es una adición de constituyentes a una unidad inicial, adición que complementa y enriquece su 
contenido, alterando sus posibilidades referenciales y comunicativas, pero sin cambiar la naturaleza de la 
unidad.” 
4 The original says: “un elemento es obligatorio dentro de una unidad sintáctica, si su ausencia invalida la 
posibilidad de expresar el valor semántico clasemático asociado a la misma.” 





because of the schematic meaning of the determiner, and in fact if there is no noun, 
there is no determiner. No one seems, to have considered the basic fact that one can – 
in fact, Broca’s aphasics do just that – conceivably manage to communicate using only 
lexical pieces like tiger, eat, lion, yesterday. It would of course be impossible to do the 
same with function words: the, this, has, -ing. 
 
It is important to realise that all these considerations stem from the raw lexical 
meaning of nouns but they relate to whether and how that meaning has syntactic 
representations. And what they suggest is that both when it comes to integrating a 
referent (meaning) with its discourse frame and an argument (meaning) with its 
syntactic frame, it is the sheer lexicality of the noun (which includes its grammatical 
category) that becomes relevant. There thus seem to be nothing wrong with the idea that 
the functional elements are slaves to those integrative processes. They do not drive 
them, but are simply instruments to make them possible. Regarding their instrumentality 
as the key feature of NPs is like regarding gasoline as the key feature of a car.  
 
2.6.2 Changes in the cognitive model 
2.6.2.1 The noun as the basis of the referent 
As we have already noted, Langacker (2004) observes that different discourse frames 
influence the meaning of the grounding elements. I propose giving adequate 
consideration to the fact that discourse frames influence the meaning of determiners and 
discourse frames are the product of the nouns set in the mental spaces.  Now, consider 
the following figure: 
 





Figure 3. Semantic and syntactic interrelation between the noun and the 
determiner  
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Here there are a functional word, asserted by its functional pole, and a lexical word, 
which is characterised by its semantic pole. What must be taken into account is the fact 
that the functional element has a semantic role, and the lexical one has a syntactic role, 
contrary to the view that functional words are the axis of linguistic expressions and 
thus the organisers of the syntactic structure. The boxes with the thick lines represent 
the main features of NPs concerning their meaning and thus, syntactic structure. The 
semantic role of the determiner influences the semantic pole of the noun. This can 
represent the grounding function.  Grounding, as a semantic function, affects the noun 
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in its semantic pole, marking the informational characteristics of the noun, which 
depends on the discourse frame that it creates. As can be seen, the semantic features of 
the determiner are not directly projected in the highest structure, that is, its contribution 
is meaningful when we deal with the noun, but not with the NP. Both features of the 
noun are projected in the NP, its semantic pole, influenced by the determiner, and its 
syntactic role, as head of the structure.   
 
Figure 3 shows the separate syntactic and semantic contributions of determiners 
and nouns. The noun is a lexical item with a semantic pole and a syntactic role. “[T]he 
head of a syntactic phrase tends to map into the outer most function of the 
corresponding conceptual constituent” (Jackendoff 2002: 14), in that sense, the noun is 
the main element within the phrasal category because both of its features are projected 
in the NP structure. It develops a syntactic role, as head of the construction, and as a 
subcategorizand of a verb. Its semantic pole is its main contribution. In this part the 
determiner plays its semantic role. The noun selects its complement among the possible 
candidates, definite/ indefinite articles, quantifiers, determinatives, etc. It could be said 
that the meaning of the determiner is part of the extrinsic meaning of the noun. It only 
affects the noun at the word level, that is, when the noun is analysed at the lexical level. 
Once the content of the noun is complemented by the determiner it develops its 
syntactic role. Both together, the semantic pole, complemented by the semantic role of 
the determiner, and the syntactic role of the noun, elaborate an NP.  
  
2.6.2.1.1 The functional element: the syntactic aid 
Schemas are devices of grammatical description. Langacker points out that they are 
templates representing sets of expressions, with their abstracted commonality being 





observable at certain levels of specificity.5  They represent an abstract commonality to 
the type of lexical element which requires a template. As noted, Taylor (2002) defends 
the idea that the determiner is the head of a grounded nominal because the determiner is 
considered to profile a schematic instance, which receives semantic content from the 
noun. Thus, in his opinion, the determiner is the head because it allows the specific 
identification of an element within the wide range of possible candidate types. The 
question is: how can a schematic meaning project a specific category like an NP?  As 
an element of grammatical description, the determiner reveals the syntactic features of 
the noun. Moreover, the schematic meaning of the determiner is revealed by the 
specificity of the noun. This supports the main idea of this chapter, that semantics 
directs syntax. In fact, as Jackendoff (2002: 54) points out “[o]ne approach that has 
won some degree of acceptance (...) is that the lexicon contains not just the actual 
lexical items of the language but also more abstract schemata from which actual items 
can “inherit” properties”. This means that the lexicon of a language includes those 
words which traditionally were considered only functional and belonging uniquely to 
syntax. The present outlook of language points out that, as a consequence of functional 
words having a certain degree of semantic content, they can be considered as part of the 
lexicon. They are additional meaningful complements for the proper lexical items. 
Narrowing down the referential possibilities of the NP by means of a determiner is a 
process which makes use of an abstract schema included in the linguistic features of the 
lexical item.  
 
 Langacker contends that constructions are either expressions (of any size) or 
schemas abstracted from expressions in order to capture commonality (at any level of 
                                                           
5 These notes have been taken from a course given by Langacker in Madrid, March 2008. 





specificity).6 This commonality is only visible when the elements which allow its 
visibility are used within the construction. Within the NP structure, the element which 
contributes with specificity to the whole NP is the noun. Construction Grammar points 
out a similar problem. The NP construction contains a general meaning that must be 
specified. It needs some sort of specification and be understood correctly. The 
construction offers a general schema to the speaker. She/he uses this generalization in 
order to present all the possible candidates that may appear in this pattern. It could be 
said that the NP construction is a schematic representation of the internal meaning of 
nouns. Thus, nouns are the elements which bring meaning to the specific NP. Goldberg 
(1995: 66) contends that “the semantics associated with a construction is ultimately 
generalized, or that it is abstracted to a single more general sense”. This means that an 
NP is an abstract general ‘notion’ which is specified by means of a noun, which at the 
same time brings an array of complements which are selected depending on the 
informational status of the noun. Thus, the specificity of the NP is due to the use of a 
noun, not that of a determiner. And the commonality among nouns is that they use 
determiners as templates and vice versa. So, the syntactic role of the noun is the 
governing position within an NP, that is, the head. With respect to the determiner, it is 
contended that, as an abstract schemata, it is the representation of the schema 
abstracted from lexical items. Thus, a determiner is the representation of the schema 
used by nouns. The noun is the head of the expression because it is the base from 
where the schematic meaning of the determiner is obtained.  
 The constructional pattern Det + N implies a general construction, as seen 
above; it is like the road which has to be followed by the vehicles. But although this 
way is obligatory, it does not work without the lexical elements. What is more, it does 
                                                           
6 These notes have also been taken from a course given by Langacker in Madrid, March 2008. 





not work even with only functional elements. Thus, the construction generally and 
specifically used by nouns can be applied to different lexical categories (adjectives and  
-ing forms) because it offers a general nominal sense to the lexical element. That is, the 
Det + N construction is adapted to the adjective or the -ing form providing them with 
the syntactic capacities of NPs. The construction, not the determiner, contributes with 
the general meaning of its nominal head to the novel lexical use of different items which 
can be included in the construction. So, the construction is independent of the nouns and 
determiners. Going on with the specificity of constructions, Goldberg (2006: 115) 
quotes the work of Kaschak & Glenberg (2000) on the fact that “subjects rely on 
constructional meaning when they encounter nouns used as verbs in novel ways”. As a 
conclusion, they contend that “the constructional pattern specifies a general scene and 
that the “affordances” of particular objects are used to specify the scene in detail.” Thus, 
as can be seen, the use of a noun as a verb changes its category into that of the verb 
because the construction moulds the nouns until it fits grammatically. So, this could be 
applied to NPs which contain a lexical element which is not a noun but develops its 
role. The constructional meaning of the whole structure adapts the novel element until it 
fits. This novel element acquires a minimum of noun-features, provided by the NP 
structure, which allow it to work like a proper noun. An example of this type is for 
example the rich. There is an adjective developing the head function of the noun. This is 
possible because the NP construction contains a schematic/general meaning which 
moulds the adjective and couples it within the noun construction, as seen above (see 













The present chapter is devoted to continue with the headedness issue within 
grammatical constructions. Specifically, it is going to deal with the headedness problem 
within a construction that could be considered the quintessential headedness problem, 
that is, the close apposition.  
Close apposition (henceforth also CA) is a well-known object of study in 
linguistic studies, but it resists the passing of time because it resists revealing its 
internal design. Appositive studies go back in time until the ancient Romans, but it was 
during the twentieth century when apposition began to be analyzed in depth. From 
Poutsma (1904) until Acuña-Fariña (2009), during a whole century, this notion has 
undergone and is undergoing no end of analyses. It has been considered as a double-
headed structure (Hockett 1955; more recently Lekakou & Szendröi 2007), and when its 
headedness is attributed to only one of its nominal elements, there is no consensus about 
which of the two nouns is the head. Some consider the first noun (U1) the main element 
(Lee 1952; Hawkins 1978; Keizer 2007a, b); others claim that it is the second noun 
(U2) that deserves that status (Haugen 1953; Burton- Roberts 1975). Still others contend 
that the head of an apposition varies depending on its constituency (Acuña-Fariña 
1996). This issue will be treated in more depth in section 3.3. 
 In light of an obvious structural relation, it is convenient and relevant to discuss 
the main differences between close and loose appositions (henceforth also LA). This is 
the aim of section 3.2, but before contemplating their grammatical differences in detail, 
we must know what an apposition is in general terms. Traditionally, apposition was a 





concept that applied to nominal elements, and thus, mainly, an apposition has typically 
been seen as a construction which contains two juxtaposed nominal elements. But as we 
will see, according to some authors, apposition can be also possible between verb 
phrases (VPs), adjective phrases (AP), adverb phrases (AdvP), and even clauses. It is 
also important to explain here that apposition can be seen as a grammatical relation 
(Burton-Roberts 1975; Bitea 1977; Koktová 1985; Meyer 1992), or as a grammatical 
category (Fries 1952; Francis 1958; Bogacki 1973). In general, the former view is better 
received by the majority of grammarians. But, still, there are disagreements among 
those who are in favour of apposition as a grammatical relation. Some authors consider 
it as a relationship of its own, comparable to coordination and dependency (Sopher 
1971; Burton-Roberts 1975; Bitea 1977; Koktová 1985). Others treat it as a subtype of 
dependency (Poutsma 1904), and still others contend that it must be treated as a subtype 
of coordination (Allerton 1979). There are, finally, those who think that it simply does 
not exit (Pignón 1961; Longrée 1987). 
 
3.2 Close and loose apposition 
It has never been an easy task to define and illustrate the notion of apposition, that is 
why most linguists seem to have used it sporadically and they have taken advantage of 
this notion when the analysis of a given construction shows internal syntactic problems 
which lead one in ‘appositive ways’. In such a situation, expressions such as ‘maybe 
appositive’ or ‘an appositive resemblance’ are rescuer tags which imply a request for 
permission to leave the topic, and, astonishingly, this permission is hardly ever refused. 
Unfortunately, this strategy has only contributed to creating a very large notion 
of apposition, the main (but by no means the only) subparts of it being the close and the 
loose types. Perhaps, because it is inherent in the loose variety that this is more loosely 





defined, it has received more attention than close apposition. Both of them are made up 
by a determiner and two nominal elements, but at the same time they show some subtle 
differences. Consider (1) and (2): 
 
(1) The writer Alice Walker won the Pulitzer Prize7. 
(2) The writer, Alice Walker, won the Pulitzer Prize. 
 
As can be seen, the main formal difference between close and loose appositions, at first 
sight, is that the latter contains intonational boundaries. But this is such a crucial fact 
in the analysis of these structures that, as we will see in the following sections, apart 
from being a small distinguishing mark, it conceals a world of grammatical differences.  
 
There exists a group of appositive instances that make up a paradigm: a number 
of examples that share common features which are considered as the ones which better 
characterize the notion of apposition at large. It so happens that the examples that 
instantiate apposition per excellence are loose appositions (see Heringa 2011). 
Examples (3) and (4) are two prototypical models of the paradigm:  
 
(3) Santiago, the capital of Galicia, is worldwide known for its cathedral. 
(4) Don Quixote, Cervantes’ most known novel, is one of the greatest works of 
fiction ever published. 
 
Apart from intonational detachment, these paradigmatic appositions are 
characterized by coreferentiality and functional equivalence. Linguists have 
                                                           
7 Henceforth, those examples which contain an apposition within a larger text will only show the 
appositive construction in italics. 





traditionally considered these three characteristics as the most important features for 
considering a construction to be an apposition. The first of them, the presence of 
intonational boundaries, as pointed out before, is the most perceptible characteristic of 
loose apposition. In fact, authors like Norwood (1954), Burton-Roberts (1975), Dupont 
(1985), Fuentes-Rodríguez (1989), Lago (1991), and Acuña-Farina (1996) contend that 
the presence of intonational boundaries is a determining factor for considering a 
structure an apposition. However, the appositive status may be achieved, according to 
Fries (1952), Francis (1958), and Bogacky (1973), when two constituents, in this case 
two juxtaposed NPs, make reference to the same element, that is, when they are 
coreferential. And finally, as regards functional equivalence, authors like Sopher (1971) 
and Burton-Roberts (1975) point out that the feature that most characterizes apposition 
is the fact that its constituents must be able to perform the same functions inside the 
structure where they are embedded.   
 
 As can be surmised, linguists have never reached a consensus about the structure 
of apposition, so, their different points of view and their different criteria for 
characterizing this construction lead to a situation where a great number of examples of 
a seemingly very different nature are included under the label apposition. Consider the 
following ones:  
 
(5) And it was Greaves’, that master goal scorer, that masterful taker of the 
half-chance, who put Tottenham in that happy position (Meyer 1991). 
(6) Consider the features of Utopian communism: generous public provision for 
the infirm; democratic an secret elections of all officers including priests; 
meals taken publicly in common refectories; a common habit or uniform 





prescribed for all citizens; even houses changed once a decade ... (Meyer 
1991). 
(7) You should rewrite the paper. That is to say, you should organize it better and 
improve its style (Meyer 1987).  
(8) Mr Kinkel, aged 55, a former head of West German intelligence and a high 
profile justice minister, is well-engaged by MPs [...] (Hannay & Keizer 2005). 
(9) In London, in Chelsea, Terry met most peculiar people (Koktová 1985).  
(10) The young lady took us into the house, said Arthur Baddock, and up the stairs. 
That’s where the party was. On the landing up there. (Bitea 1977). 
(11) In 1958, 33 years after the founding of St. Augustin, nine years before the 
settlement of Jamestown, ... I visited the place for the second time (Koktová 
1985). 
 
Broadly speaking, all the previous strings might well fall under the following definition 
of apposition: 
 
(...) apposition is an instance of what Roman Jakobson calls “intralingual 
translation or rewording” or “interlingual translation or translation proper”: 
in other words, apposition usually belongs to the “METALINGUAL (i.e., 
glossing) function” of language, since it is “focused on the CODE” and 
generally conveys “information about the lexical code of English” as known 
and interpreted by each encoder. In so far as it rests on synonymy, 
apposition produces what Carnap and Kennedy call “meaning postulates” 
(Bitea 1977: 456). 
 
Note that examples (5) to (11) are considered as loose appositions, but they show 
features which differ considerably from the paradigm. Some of them are appositive PPs, 





others APs, and still others are clauses. Thus, the NP hegemony disappears from the 
appositive map and this begins to be populated with diverse syntactic categories (on the 
contrary close appositions tend to allow only nominal elements). In fact, Burton-Roberts 
(1975: 410) clearly states that the notion of apposition “need[s] not be confined to 
appositions of NPs, but can be used to describe appositions of full sentences, verbs, verb 
phrases, adjectives and adverbials (...)”. Once all these different syntactic categories 
establish appositive relations among them, a common thread needs to be found for 
identifying them, that is, a prototypical feature or set of features that characterizes this 
linguistic phenomenon. The most salient property is that all of them share intonational 
detachment. Moreover, between the two members of the apposition, an appositive 
marker may be inserted, and as Burton-Roberts (1975: 417) contends “(...) those 
sequences that contain an APP-marker anyway must be appositions. Such markers, after 
all, make appositions”.  
 
As for its headedness, it is not clear that we can deal with head and modifier 
when analysing loose apposition. It is true that the second element, the one between 
commas, is often treated as a clarification of the first nominal unit. But loose apposition 
is “(...) characterized by interchangeability (...)” (Bitea 1977: 456; see section 3.2.1); 
Burton-Roberts (1975: 392- 393) insists that “reversibility” is in fact one of the main 
features of loose apposition, and that “[i]t can be used as a test of apposition”, (see 
section 3.3.3). Therefore, if its elements may exchange positions and U2 becomes U1, it 
does not make sense to deal with headedness because the grammaticality of the clause is 
not affected by this exchange. Moreover, maybe as a consequence of this clarifying 
nature of the appositive element, there are those who maintain the view that loose 
apposition is not considered as a “genuine syntactic relation” (Burton-Roberts 1993: 





184). On this view, it is not even included within the syntactic architecture of a 
sentence. Therefore, “(...) apposition (...) should be viewed (...) as a message which 
deflects from the main stream of communication and which should be kept distinct from 
the proper assertion (main information) of a sentence” (Koktová 1985: 41; see section 
3.2.2). It is analysed as a semantic strategy used by the speaker in order to clarify 
his/her message. In fact, Bitea (1977: 461) contends that “(...) apposition is used to 
make the message clear to the decoder by avoiding ambiguity (...)”. Thus, loose 
apposition is considered as a semantic device with a first member (U1) as the main 
element and the second member as a clarification of the first one, but syntactically 
unconnected with it.   
 
3.2.1 The loose-close apposition relation 
Loose appositions seem to be related to one another by chaining principles that compose 
a super category or space. In this appositive space, all nodes are distinct categories and 
the space exists because of the dense chain of similarities, which make up an emergent, 
Wittgensteinian family (Acuña-Fariña 2006a). In this sense, loose apposition is a 
different kind of radial category if we compare it with Lakoff’s (1987) there 
construction, or the [SBJ DITRV OBJ1 OBJ2] schema in Goldberg’s (1995) 
ditransitives (see Taylor 1995: 116 ff.; Croft & Cruse 2004: 272 ff.), in the sense that no 
relevant attribute is shared by all the members of the family. Its characteristic intonation 
detachment is not enough since other constructions also have it. However, the loose 
family of structures is only half of the problem with the long-standing problematic 
notion of apposition. The other half is that together with the classic loose structure in 
(2), (The writer, Alice Walker, won the Pulitzer Prize) there has always been in the 
literature a classic close version of it, that is, one with no intonational detachment as in 





(1), (The writer Alice Walker won the Pulitzer Prize). In that respect, Hockett (1955, 
1958) treats close and loose appositions in the same way. Contrary to him, Burton-
Roberts (1975, 1993) does not accept structures like the writer Alice Walker as an 
apposition (for discussion see section 3.3).  
 The following examples illustrate some of the different structures that make up 
the close appositive family:  
 
(12) The writer Alice Walker won the Pulitzer Prize. 
(13) Alice Walker the writer won the Pulitzer Prize.   
(14) The word “racism” evokes sadness.  
(15) My sister the dancer participated in the contest.  
(16) My sister Cath participated in the contest.  
(17) We women participated in the race.   
 
Example (12) could be considered as the prototypical instance, as the one which better 
instantiates the close appositive group of constructions. In fact, and maybe as a 
consequence of being the prototype, it is the one which has been the object of most 
works dealing with close apposition. But, its presence in linguistic studies depends also 
on the fact that this construction seems to also emulate the well known ‘common’ NP. 
The use of a determiner, a noun as the head, and a possible premodifier are some 
features that link these two types of constructions, and for better or for worse, this 
similitude has determined the analyses made about close apposition. Thus, the fact that 
two constructions with the same constituents and seemingly the same functions receive 
different designations is surely in need of explanation.  





 As noted above, close appositions are made up by two nominal elements (with 
some exceptions). Apart from the lack of intonational boundaries which characterizes 
loose apposition, the almost invariable nominal character of close apposition is, in 
principle, one of its most representative features (exceptions like here in Santiago, now 
in September are, however, possible). Again, this is a crucial difference between loose 
and close appositions because, as seen, instances like (7) (You should rewrite the paper. 
That is to say, you should organize it better and improve its style) are possible within 
the loose appositive group. Thus, as a consequence of these nominal features, close 
appositions were and are compared with standard NPs in every sense, to such an extent 
that they are sometimes simply analysed as a special type of NP (see Burton-Roberts 
1975), as also happens with other types of nominal constructions like your brat of a 
brother, as we will see in chapter 5.   
 
 One of the most salient features of the NP category (see chapter 2) is that its 
major role is to establish reference: NPs pick out extralinguistic objects in a universe of 
discourse. In the case of close appositions, this referential feature is maintained by some 
authors (Haugen 1953; Hocket 1955; Sopher 1971; Quirk et al. 1985) who contend that 
the two nominal elements make reference to the same entity and thus they are co-
referential. This is also presumably a feature of loose apposition. But not all 
grammarians share this point of view. Burton-Roberts (1975: 395-396, 1993) points out 
that close appositions may not contain co-referential units because co-referential NPs 
cannot make up a superordinate NP. In fact, Keizer (2007a: 38) proposes that “neither 
of the two elements is referential”; it is rather the whole apposition that is referential, 
having as a consequence a relation of predication between the two nominal elements.
 As previously seen, whether a category is seen as homogeneous or 





heterogeneous depends on the eyes of the beholder (see chapter 2). Variety exists even 
within the most basic grammatical category, as it exists within ordinary NPs and close 
appositions. So, it is easy to see a gradience relation between all the possible instances 
that make up a category (see Aarts 2007), and close apposition does not escape 
grammatical indeterminacy. But not all grammarians accept this idea. Some opt for a 
homogeneous account of the facts. Thus, Korzen (2006: 113) adopts this position and 
contends that “(...) the category of “appositions” has become pleasantly homogeneous”. 
He includes a quite diverse group of appositions (which he contends are made up by a 
host and an apposition) where he includes ordinary NPs, appositions as determinerless 
NPs, as NPs with an indefinite article, as a proper noun, appositions as pronouns, as 
infinitive clauses, as a nominal relative clause, etc., to come to the conclusion that all 
the appositive examples are homogeneous with respect to their grammatical structure.  
On the contrary, Keizer (2007a: 58) is of the opinion that appositions should be seen as 
a heterogeneous group because if “each member has the same internal structure, the 
evidence for headedness may seem confusing and inconclusive”. Thus, “there are 
different types of close apposition” (p. 58) which follow a pattern, but not all the 
examples of close apposition have to stick to the general norm.  
 
The following sub-sections discuss the most salient properties of LA, and they 
argue in favour of this construction as the only possible type of apposition.  
 
3.2.2 Semantics and loose appositions 
Bitea (1977) offers a semantic analysis of loose apposition that views meaning as one of 
the major structuring forces of this construction. His analysis of apposition begins with 
an assertion which can be considered the most representative one of the entire article: 





Semantic considerations should be the cornerstone of any description of 
apposition for, as it will be seen, it is the meaning of the units linked by the 
relationship of apposition (appositives) that determines their syntactic status. 
(Bitea p. 454). 
 
Loose apposition is related to meaning via the notion of synonymy. In fact, “sameness 
of reference/ extension means synonymy” (Bitea p. 455), that is, the similarity between 
the two nominal elements, the fact that one functions as the extension of the other, and 
that both of them make reference to the same entity at different levels, leads to a 
synonymous status of the members of the structure. This synonymy can be dealt with 
from two different perspectives, from the theory of competence or from the theory of 
performance. Likewise, three different points of view appear on scene when dealing 
with performance: the encoder’s point of view, the decoder’s point of view, and the 
native speaker’s point of view. But, although loose apposition involves these three 
notions, Bitea is of the opinion that only the encoder’s performance ought to be taken 
into account, to such an extent that his/her motivation and his/her intentions are the 
most important factors when dealing and discussing the use of loose apposition.  
 On the same grounds, apposition is seen as “an instance of what Roman 
Jakobson [1971-1981, vol. 2: 261] calls “an interpretation of verbal signs by means of 
other signs”, since it illustrates either “intralingual translations or rewording” or 
interlingual translation or translation proper” (Bitea p. 456). Therefore, appositive 
structures are included within the metalinguistic part of language; a linguistic means 
used in order to expand a previously used expression. The synonymy between these two 
expressions is latent, as examples (18) and (19) demonstrate. As a consequence, 
interchangeability is considered one of the main features of apposition: 





(18) a. Either study the subject or hire (...) someone who understands it (viz.,  
recognizes what he does not know) (IEEE, 344). 
      b. Either study the subject or hire (...) someone who rec gnizes what he does 
not know (viz., understands it). 
(19) a. Our concern (...) is with language action –language in the full context of 
the non linguistic event which are its setting (SIH, 44). 
 b. Our concern (...) is with language in full context of the non linguistic 
event which are its setting –language action. 
 
Together with the interchangeability of loose appositive structures (Santiago, the capital 
of Galicia, is a rainy town; The capital of Galicia, Santiago, is a rainy town), and at the 
same time related to it, the omission of one of the elements in this type of apposition is 
considered as a valid option for elucidating loose appositive structures. Consider 
examples (20) and (21): 
 
(20) a. Either study the subject or hire (...) someone who understands it (viz.,      
recognizes what he does not know). (IEEE, 344) 
                  b. Either study the subject or hire (...) someone who understands it. 
c. Either study the subject or hire (...) someone who recognizes what he does 
not know. 
(21) a. Our concern (...) is with language action – language in the full context of 
the non linguistic events which are its setting. (SIH, 44) 
       b. Our concern (...) is with language action.  
 c. Our concern (...) is with language in the full context of the non-linguistic 
events which are its setting.  





However, “even if the sentence remains both grammatical and acceptable, a gap will 
appear in the informational structure of the sentence and the decoder will perceive the 
meaning of the sentence to be incomplete (...)” (Bitea p. 457). Therefore, both 
appositive parts are necessary, and the omission of one of them is possible from the part 
of the encoder, but the fact that he/she understands the message does not imply that the 
decoder will understand it. Thus, omission of one of the appositive elements leads to 
grammatical acceptability but semantic incompleteness. In fact, the omission of one of 
the elements and its semantic consequences are more obvious in close appositive 
structures. However, appositive structures without intonational boundaries are not 
accounted under the label apposition. Bitea’s account is not too well focused on close 
apposition. Consider the following quotation:  
 
The two or more syntactic units which enter a relationship of apposition are 
either separated by one or several other syntactic units or placed side by 
side; in the latter case they are prevented from forming a whole by a pause, 
which is rendered in writing by means of punctuation marks (...) (Bitea p. 
460). 
 
This means that the two elements involved in an appositive relationship do not need to 
appear together, one following the other, and other parts of the clause may appear 
between them. On the contrary, when U2 immediately follows U1, then, an intonational 
mark, that is, a comma, a semi-colon, dots, etc., must be obligatorily inserted between 
the two nominal elements. Therefore, expressions like the writer Alice Walker are 
grammatically and linguistically not possible from the point of view presented in this 
section. 
  





 The acceptance of interchangeability and omission as two main features of 
appositive structures means that apposition shows distributional equivalence, that is, 
both elements involved in the appositive relation may fulfil the same syntactic function.  
This implies that “identical distribution and identical syntactic function entail identical 
syntactic status” (Bitea (p. 458) contra Burton-Roberts 1975). 
 
 With respect to the syntactic relation established between the two members of an 
apposition, three options are taken into account: 
 
- apposition as an instance of coordination,  
- apposition as a form of subordination,  
- apposition differing from both coordination and subordination.  
 
Subordination is rejected from the beginning, since the relation that exists between the 
main element and the subordinate element is never between semantically and 
syntactically equivalent units, as seems to be the case in apposition. Therefore, we are 
left with two options, coordination or something different from it. As a first 
consideration “it would be blatantly wrong to say that apposition belongs either to 
subordination or to coordination” (Bitea p. 459). In that case, if one considers that “it is 
disjunctive coordination blending choice and redundancy that illuminatingly throws 
light on the syntactic status of apposition” (p. 459), then, as a result, the appositive 
member U2 “should be treated as a distinct part of the sentence” (459). Both units 
therefore do not fulfil the same syntactic functions: U1 is the ‘main element’ and 
functions as subject, object, etc., and U2 is always and unquestionably the appositive 
member. Therefore, if the elements of a loose appositive relation are different parts of a 





sentence they do not fulfil the same syntactic roles. It must be noted that Bitea’s 
position about syntactic equivalence is not perfectly clear. 
  
 The nature of U2 determines the syntactic relation established between the two 
appositive elements. It could be that the second nominal is another part of the sentence 
in which case the appositive relationship is “a first-degree apposition”. But, it could also 
be an appositive, in which case it is a “second-degree apposition”. At the same time, 
these first-degree and second-degree appositions could be classified as close appositions 
or detached appositions. It must be pointed out here that, on the one hand, a close 
appositive relationship is characterized by the fact that U2 appears right after U1, but 
always separated by a comma or the like, as in Writing was a slow and arduous process 
for Conrad, but he left a golden legacy – superb tales of the sea, nd its most exotic 
ports of call. On the other hand, a detached appositive structure is established between 
U1 and U2 when other types of linguistic material appear between the two appositives 
as in He is obsessed with death, or rather, to borrow Poe’s phrase, the terror of the 
soul which leads to death, where the two members of the apposition are separated by a 
to-infinitive clause. 
 
 As seen, the main aim of Bitea’s account of apposition is the metalingual 
function of this type of structure. Metalingual apposition was already discussed in 
relation to synonymy. Now we need to relate it to the encoder and the decoder of the 
message.  Consider this:   
 
(...) apposition (...) originates in the encoder’s desire to make his/her 
utterance understood, to make certain points. In other words, apposition is 





used to make the message clear to the decoder by avoiding ambiguity 
(Bitea p. 461, emphasis added). 
 
Therefore, avoiding ambiguity is one of the targets of the metalingual function of 
apposition, together with the desire to express an afterthought, which also in some way 
or another may avoid ambiguity. But appositive structures are also used to perform a 
quite varied group of different functions. Thus, this type of structure may be equally 
used in order to introduce an abbreviation, as in Ma y of the suggestions are akin to the 
KISS system – Keep It Simple, Stupid, as well as to introduce a definition of U1, as in 
Poets, i.e. persons with poetic talent, stop writing good poetry when they stop reacting 
to the world they live in; or even to abandon the original construction and start in mid-
sentence, as in These people who have just come in – did you notice them on the train 
the other night?. All these targets share one and the same feature, “the desire to be 
understood”, which implies “the linguistic principle which “inhibits the shortening 
effect of the principle of ‘least effort’ by introducing redundancy at various levels”” 
(Bitea p. 462, quoting Lyons (1972: 90)). Apposition is considered a semantic and 
structural redundant means of being understood on the part of the encoder. However, 
this redundancy is not considered a linguistic excess. The omission of one of the 
elements would result in a semantically incomplete string, a fact which argues in favour 
of redundancy as the only possible way for an expression not being incomplete.   
 
 Bitea shares with Burton-Roberts (1975) the idea that, as a consequence of not 
being derived from relative-clauses (as close appositions do, in Burton-Roberts’s 
opinion) appositions can be made up by different parts of speech (italics are used to 
highlight the appositive relation): adjectives (Your sister is charming – awfully pretty 
and modest), adverbs (As a matter of fact, there are several very distinguished people 





here, in Jerusalem, jus at the present), infinitival phrases (In order to fix a grammar 
(that is, to revise the normal rules so that this grammar will generate the deviant 
utterances) there are two methods which may be used),  participial phrases (The body of 
a woman who was murdered – strangled actually – in a train), and pronouns 
(Something incalculable wrought for them – for him and Kate). In that way, the fact that 
the categorial status of the members within an appositive relation need not be identical 
is evidence of “the syntactic nature of the appositive” (p. 475), that is, the classification 
of appositive structures is also based in the type of members that make up the 
apposition. 
 
 In summary, Bitea contends that apposition is a relation between a main member 
and something else – the appositive. Between them, a semantic relationship exists where 
N2 extends the meaning of N1, in an attempt by the encoder to clarify his/her message. 
But, at the same time, this relationship is also a syntactic one, because the two members 
share distributional equivalence. This assertion is not very convincing because since the 
appositive is considered a distinct part of the sentence, it seems to be logical that it 
cannot develop the same role as the main member, that is, it does not fulfil the same 
syntactic role as N1. The final conclusion is that “apposition is an instance of semantic 
and syntactic equivalence in praesentia” (Bitea p. 476).  
 
3.2.3 Pragmatics in appositions 
Koktová (1985) proposes a “functional generative description” of the internal structure 
of appositive constructions. This framework consists of “a sequence of several levels 
which are connected by the asymmetrical relation of form and function” (Koktová 1985: 
51). At the same time, a difference between the level of meaning and the level of 





surface syntax is postulated; a fact which strengthens the generative character of this 
framework. Moreover, this analysis is also focused on the pragmatic functions of such a 
construction. This is a point of vital importance for this account in view of the fact that 
“apposition (...) should be considered as a pragmatic phenomenon of natural 
language” (Koktová 1985: 39-40, emphasis added). 
 
 Consider the following definition of apposition:  
 
[A]pposition (...) should be viewed (...) as a message which deflects from 
the mainstream of communication and which should be kept distinct from 
the proper assertion (main information) of a sentence (p. 41). 
 
This can be considered as the ‘surface structure’ definition of apposition because, from 
the point of view of the present account, this structure must be analysed taking into 
account its deep structure. Therefore, the deep word order of such structures indicates 
that apposition and coordination are similar. This similarity is the result of “a special 
device which should be combined, in the underlying representation of a sentence, with 
the dependency principle of the dependency tree to yield a special kind of underlying 
representation, namely complex dependency structure”. As a consequence, apposition 
and coordination behave equivalently, that is, their grammatical status is the same as 
that of a single word in the underlying structure. However, the surface and the deep 
structure do not coincide. The same deep word order results in two opposite surface 
structures. That is, whereas the information provided by the second element of an 
apposition is secondary, the second element of a coordination is part of the main 
information of the sentence with both of them contributing to the truth conditions of the 





whole clause. Therefore, the actual use of language, that is, the surface structure, will 
lead Koktová to admit the differences between coordination and apposition. 
 
 Apposition is seen as a message distinct from the assertion of the main 
sentence. This definition evokes a logical property about the truth conditions of a 
sentence, that is, “apposition does not contribute to the truth conditions (intension) of 
the proper assertion of a sentence” (p. 41), (as in, for example, I do not know Bill , 
Mary’s friend). The appositive element strays off from the truth conditions of the main 
sentence, and thus, sentential negation does not affect it. Thus, in order “to describe the 
truth conditional semantics of sentences containing appositions, it is necessary to 
analyze the proper assertion and the secondary information of a sentence separately” 
(pp. 42-43).  
Therefore, coordination and apposition are not so similar after all in view of the 
logical property of a common referent that characterizes appositions. The similitude 
between these two grammatical relations is revoked based on the fact that “in this 
property apposition differs from coordination, the referents of whose members [are] 
supposed to be disjoint” (p. 46). Consider the following examples:  
 
(22) In Los Angeles and in its suburbs, many people own horses.  
(23) In Los Angeles, in its suburbs, many people own horses.  
 
Example (22) illustrates coordination, and it is contended that in both places in Los 
Angeles in general and also in its suburbs, people own horses. On the contrary, example 
(23) is an apposition, and in this specific case only a place is mentioned, the suburbs of 
Los Angeles, and both NPs make reference to the same place. To this, it must be added 





that there only exists one type of apposition, contrary to coordination which has four 
different semantic types8. This is a consequence of “the relations between the referents 
of the appositive members [which] are indistinct” (p. 58), a feature that can only be 
avoided “cognitively (…), i.e. by means of a factual knowledge and in context and 
hence unable to provide a basis for a strict linguistic subcategorization of apposition” 
(p. 58). In the light of these linguistic features, differences between coordination and 
apposition accumulate: together with the fact that the information contributed by the 
apposition is secondary and the fact that these two different types of constructions do 
not share the feature of a common referent, we must add the fact that appositive 
structures only belong to one type of apposition, which is an argument against the view 
that apposition is a relation similar to coordination.  
 
 As regards the prototype, a construction can only be considered a prototypical 
appositions if it is made up by two apposed NPs (Koktová p. 52) separated always by a 
punctuation mark, where the second one of them is not an overtly attributive element, 
that is, a construction traditionally considered as the paradigmatic case, as in (24): 
 
(24) John, the gardener, is a very perfectionist man. 
 
With respect to the other types of appositive constructions, those structures that contain: 
i. two apposed NPs where the second nominal element is an indefinite NP, in which 
case it is an attribute (Maggie, a waitress of the restaurant, is a special girl); ii. apposed 
Prepositional Phrases (The World Cup 2010 is celebrated in Africa, in South Africa); 
Adjective Phrases, Adverbial Phrases, and Verbal Phrases can make up appositions 
                                                           
8 The four different types of coordination that Koktová distinguishes are: (1) conjunctive coordination, (2) 
adversative coordination, (3) inclusive coordination, and (4) exclusive coordination.   





(Mary wants to cook, to prepare the meal);  apposition of clauses (When Alfred realized 
that his car was not there, that somebody had stolen it, he almost fainted); and 
apposition of two different syntactic categories, that is, of an Adverb Phrase and a 
Prepositional Phrase for instance (He finished his exam late, out of time) are also part of 
the group of appositions. In the same line as Burton-Roberts (1975) and Bitea (1977), 
Koktová postulates that appositive structures are not exclusive of noun phrases.  
As could be seen throughout this sub-section, close appositions are not included 
within the appositive group. In fact, it is considered that Quirk et al. (1972) are wrong 
when they include instances like The word ‘ if’’ within the appositive group. Thus, the 
following structures are excluded from the appositive family: 
 
- The set Det + N + N: 
(25) The actor Jude Law presented his new film. 
- Non-restrictive (appositive) relative clauses: 
(26) Their proposal, which they presented yesterday, was well received. 
- Chunks of complementation juxtaposed on the surface:  
(27) Norman Jones, who was at that time a student, wrote several bestsellers.  
 
 In example (25) Jude Law is a restrictive adnominal adjunct, (compared to Mississippi 
in The River Mississippi). In the case of example (26), this structure is considered as a 
non-restrictive adnominal adjunct. And finally, example (27) is not included within the 
group of appositions owing to the fact that it is derived from an underlying non-
restrictive clause.  
 





With respect to appositive markers, considered traditionally9 as identifying 
elements when classifying the different types of appositions, these elements do not carry 
grammatical meaning, that is, they do not “represent distinct appositive types” (p. 61). 
Moreover, these elements “should be treated, due to the indistinctness of their lexical 
semantics, as sentence adverbials”. In this way, appositive markers lose their 
grammatical implications in the elaboration of appositive structures. 
 
 Summing up, Koktová’s proposal offers a pragmatic analysis about apposition 
with generative overtones. Underlying structures lead the author to create a similarity 
between apposition and coordination. However, this theory seems difficult to uphold in 
view of the differences on the primary/secondary nature of information, truth 
conditions, and common referentiality between coordination and appositive structures. 
Only a hypothetical deep structure, where coordination and apposition are identical, 
supports this idea. But this is only possible from a generative framework. If actual 
language use is taken into account, then the linguistic form of the different speech acts 
is the material we must use in order to support a theory, and in this specific case, 
appositive structures do not argue in favour of a generative account where coordination 
and apposition are essentially the same.  
 
3.2.4 Apposition as a semantic, pragmatic and syntactic relation 
Meyer begins his appositive studies in the year 1987 with an article entitled “Apposition 
in English”. His main point of departure with respect to the notion of loose apposition is 
that, for a precise analysis of structures like a famous linguist, namely Noam Chomsky, 
a semantic, pragmatic and syntactic account is needed. We are going to see that Meyer’s 
                                                           
9 See Sopher (1971), Quirk et al. (1972), Burton-Roberts (1975), and Meyer (1992) for arguments in 
favour of appositive markers as identifiers of appositive structures.  





(1987) analysis only makes reference to loose apposition, in principle. However, in the 
process of the study of apposition, he changes his mind and he also takes into account 
close appositions as part of the appositive group (Meyer 1989, 1992; see also section 
3.3.5). 
 Following Matthews’s (1981) work, Meyer (1987) is of the opinion that 
grammarians confront serious linguistic difficulties if they only take into account 
syntactic criteria when analysing apposition. But, in the same way, an exclusively 
pragmatic account does not solve the puzzle of apposition either in his view. Therefore, 
“apposition [should] be defined in terms of constraints that specify its semantic, 
pragmatic, and syntactic characteristics” (p. 102). Rejecting some, if not most, of the 
traditional criteria for apposition, Meyer proposes his own semantic, pragmatic, and 
syntactic constraints. The most defining semantic feature of apposition is that of co-
referentiality, traditionally considered as the prime criterion for analysing this type of 
structure. However, abandoning somehow the grammatical tradition, co-referentiality is 
rejected as an essential criterion on the grounds that “some appositions are either 
questionably co-referential or not co-referential at all” (Meyer 1987: 103). Thus, co-
referentiality is not the only semantic relation that may exist between the members of an 
apposition.  
 
In particular, the idea that “(...) attributes behave more like appositions than 
reduced relative clauses” (p. 106) with respect to the relation established between the 
two members of an appostion is in tune with the co-referentiality option given that they 
can be reversed and left out and the resulting structure is perfectly acceptable. Thus, 
“[a]ttributes are therefore best analyzed as appositions; to include them within the class 
of appositions, units in appositions must be allowed to be either co-referential or 





attributively related” (p. 108). Together with the attributive semantic relation, relations 
of hyponymy and synonymy may also hold between the two units of an apposition (see 
also Meyer 1991: 173; 1992: 57-72). Therefore, Meyer’s idea of including attribution, 
hyponymy, and synonymy relations between the appositive elements as indicators of 
this type of structure allows a much wider group of instances to be admitted under the 
label apposition. Moreover, “the main advantage of allowing U1 and U2 to be 
hyponyms or synonyms is that non-nominal constructions can be accounted for as 
appositions” (p. 109). 
 
 Meyer realises that if one is to be realistic and objective, this semantic account 
presents “one unfortunate consequence of the semantic constraint on apposition (...), 
[that is] it admits as appositions too many constructions (...)” (Meyer 1987: 111). While 
Quirk et al. (1972: 620) solve this inconvenience pointing out that co-referential units 
do not make up an apposition if they do not fulfil the same syntactic function, Meyer 
opts for a pragmatic constraint : “in order for two units to be considered appositional, 
U2 must supply new information about U1” (Meyer 1987: 112); see also Koktová 1985; 
or section 3.2.3).  
  
 But this pragmatic account also meets some objections. Example (28) illustrates 
these objections:  
 
(28) It surprises me that they don’t write (Quirk et al. 1972: 633). 
 
In example (28) the that-clause expands the information given by the pronoun It. But it 
cannot be considered an apposition in any way. Meyer’s solution is to make use of a 





syntactic constraint: the “two units are not in apposition if they cannot at least 
potentially be juxtaposed” (1987: 116). Thus, example (28) is not an apposition because 
(29) is not possible:  
 
(29) *It, that they don’t write, surprises me.  
 
This leads him to conclude that “a wide range of constructions can be admitted as 
appositions if apposition is viewed as a semantic, pragmatic, and syntactic relation” 
(1987: 118). This conclusion results in a flood of examples which are considered as 
appositions only because they do not show clear features of coordination or 
subordination.  
 
 In sum, more and more instances were added to the notion of apposition given 
Meyer’s semantic, pragmatic and syntactic classification. Even more, his (1987) 
conclusions lead him to contend, in his (1989) article, that instances like my sister Cath 
should be included under the appositive label as well, as we will see in section 3.3.5.  
 
3.2.5 Redefining loose apposition 
Acuña-Fariña’s (1999) article “On apposition” is aimed at reducing and specifying the 
loose appositive group (see also Acuña-Fariña 2006a10). As seen in the previous section, 
Meyer (1987) analysis allows including under the LA label not only nominal appositive 
instances but also structures containing clauses in an appositive relation (see Burton-
Roberts 1975).  
                                                           
10 Acuña-Fariña’s (2006) is not deeply pursued here given the fact that the analysis carried out in this 
article puts emphasis only on the relations established inside the constructional map developed for the 
different types of loose apposition only and this issue falls out of the scope of the present work. 





 The different analyses developed in order to puzzle out the structure of loose 
apposition had very different conclusions as a result. Thus, the main defining features of 
loose apposition are as varied as: functional equivalence (Hockett 1955; Sopher 1971; 
Burton-Roberts 1975), coreferentiality (Fries 1952; Francis 1958; Roberts 1962; 
Bogacki 1973; Taboada 1978), intonational boundaries (Norwood 1954; Hadlich 1973; 
Dupont 1985; Fuentes-Rodríguez 1989; Lago 1991), predicativity (Pignón 1961; 
Mathesius 1975) and the use of appositive markers (Sopher 1971; Burton-Roberts 
1975). In Acuña-Fariña’s (1999) opinion, these characteristics only prompted the 
inclusion of too many structures under the LA label, which caused the notion of 
apposition to “become virtually meaningless” (Acuña-Fariña 1999: 62).   
 Therefore, Acuña-Fariña’s main purpose is to delimit the types of structures that 
can be considered appositions by means of the re-establishment of the features that a 
structure must show in order to be considered a loose apposition. In the same way, his 
(2006a) article is aimed to specify and clarify the “conceptual space” (Acuña-Fariña 
2006: 1) of apposition, characterized by “[…] the notions of family resemblance, 
prototype, and construction” (p. 1).  It must be pointed out here that both Acuña-
Fariña’s analyses only deal with loose appositions; the close appositive type is not 
included in either study.  
 In the structure traditionally considered paradigmatic apposition, as in, An e 
Chapman, the newly hired gynaecologist, both NPs show features of definiteness and 
coreferentiality. It is traditionally considered that these features allow each of the NPs to 
perform the same function and also to carry the same meaning. This implies a 
grammatical relation of semantic and syntactic equivalence, which mainly characterizes 
loose apposition. However, when we try to apply these features to other constructions 
“[…] a host of problems arise” (p. 66). Thus, to begin with, Acuña-Fariña (1999) puts to 





test the syntactic and semantic equivalence advocated for apposition. Take the following 
nominal examples:  
 
(30) Anne Chapman, a gynaecologist, will soon do that job in the firm.  
(31) Anne Chapman, gynaecologist, will soon do that job in the firm.  
 
These examples contain two clearly juxtaposed NPs, as in the appositive paradigm. It is 
supposed that, as well as in Anne Chapman, the newly hired gynaecologist, both NPs 
also show semantic and syntactic equivalence. But this is not the case, “[…] without an 
article and with an indefinite article, the absolute functional and notional equivalence 
that we find in the paradigm is not present” (p. 66). This not sharing of the most 
representative feature of apposition implies that the paradigm is the unique example that 
shows semantic and syntactic equivalence, which implies that it is the only instance that 
can be supposedly called apposition. Given this mismatch of features, Acuña-Fariña 
contends that “[…] the best analysis for these [other] nominal types is one in terms of 
non-restrictive modification, rather than one in terms of apposition. Let us refer to the 
analysis I am proposing as the External Projection Theory […]” (p. 67). The external 













(32)                                           NP 
 
                              DET                                                       NOM 
 
                                                                   NOM                                   MOD 
                                                            
                                                HEAD                      MOD 
 
                               The            woman           in the red dress,           Anne Chapman 
 
This analysis seems to be supported by Quirk et al. (1985), who contend that it is the 
first NP only which shows agreement with the verb when introduced in a sentence. This 
would imply that only the first nominal is considered the subject of the sentence. For 
instance, in Land, brains, wealth, technology – in other words everything we need –
are/*is plentiful in our country, are agrees with the coordinated phrase, not with the 
apposed material. This analysis receives also support from the fact that “[…] not all 
definite NPs in U2 position may be said to equal the referential potential of the definite 
NP in U1 position” (p. 68). For instance, in He introduced me to the young man, the 
heir to a fortune, the heir to a fortune is not even a referential phrase but a descriptive 
one.  
 Now, if we consider non-nominal appositions as shown in (33) and (34), 
 
(33) He ran –absolutely raced- up the hill.  
(34) They sent him to Coventry, refused to speak to him.  
 





it can be posited that the element in apposition –verbs in example (33) and sentences in 
example (34) - reveal syntactic equivalence as well as the paradigm (He ran up the hill; 
He raced up the hill). But the paradigm also shows semantic equivalence, a feature that 
does not seem to be among those of example (34) at least (They sent him to Coventry; 
They refused to speak to him). Therefore, Acuña-Fariña concludes that “[…] it would 
appear that the equative meaning that characterizes nominal instances of apposition is 
not preserved across the categorical spectrum […], it turns out that only the 
juxtaposition of adverbials (They met there, in London) exhibits the kind of relation that 
hold between nouns in the paradigm” (p. 70). 
 As already mentioned, intonational boundaries are considered to be an essential 
feature of loose apposition. As such Acuña-Fariña uses this characteristic as an 
argument in favour of the similarity established between nominal and adverbial 
appositions (They met there, in London). He contents that “[…] the second pause is 
strongly obligatory in [(35) and (36)], but optional in [(37) and (38)]” (p. 71). Consider 
the following examples:  
 
(35) *Anne Chapman, the newly hired gynaecologist will soon do that job in 
the firm.  
(36) *They met there, in London on the eve of the final.  
(37) He ran, absolutely raced up the hill.  
(38) They sent him to Coventry, refused to speak to him when they found out 
about the harassment.  
 
In examples (35) and (36), “[…] the U1s [are] unacceptably dislocated from the 
remainder of their respective sentences.” (p. 71). And “[w]ithout this second break, only 





U2 relates to the predicator. The result is unacceptability” (p. 71). This unacceptability 
is justified because U1 is left in a dislocated position with respect to the rest of the 
sentence. This ungrammatical dislocation of U1 is also explained in terms of their 
respective local and sentence domains. When the two pauses are used, U2 is the one that 
is isolated form the rest of the sentence having, as a result, a grammatical construction. 
This implies that “[…] the intervening string (U2) is processed in the local domain of 
the first antecedent NP, (the subject of the sentence, Anne Chapman), instead of in the 
broader domain of the sentence […]” (p. 73).  On the contrary, in verbal and sentential 
appositions, which are not in need of a second intonational marker, “[t]he second 
predicator simply takes on the sentential role that had originally been intended for the 
first. It does not look backwards to that predicator, as in expansion of it. Instead, it looks 
forward in search of its complements and adjuncts. Its domain is sentential, not local” 
(p. 74).  
 It turns out that the use of intonational markers implies and explains more 
features of loose apposition. If the commas before and after U2 in a nominal apposition 
prevent it from developing a function with respect to the whole sentence, U1 and U2 
“do not have the same function […] [then] there cannot be apposition” (p. 75) given that 
functional equivalence is one of the main features of the appositive paradigm (Acuña-
Fariña 2006: 13). On the contrary, in the verbal and sentential types both units, U1 and 
U2, would seem to be functionally equivalent. Acuña-Fariña (1999: 76) posits that in 
verbal and sentential apposition “[…] U1 and U2 do share the same function in the 
sentence.” He follows Burton-Roberts’s (1975: 410) account of apposition and his 
Separate Constituent Analysis, according to which the two units in an apposition do not 
make up a constituent as each relates separately to the rest of the sentence. However, 
instead of applying this analysis to what are considered canonical appositions, Acuña-





Fariña applies it only to examples (37) and (38) above. This Separate Constituent 
Analysis is considered to “defin[e] a structure in which two constituents perform the 
same function without making up a superordinate constituent” (p. 77). In the light of 
this, Acuña-Fariña posits that “[…] if anything in grammar is to be called apposition, 
the label should be given to this construction-type only”, that is, to those instances 
illustrated by examples (37) and (38) (see also Acuña-Fariña 2006: 19-21).  
 The Separate Constituent Analysis is in tune with the results of the omission and 
interchangeability tests. The fact is that in a sentential apposition both units can be 
omitted and interchanged and the whole construction does not suffer from 
ungrammaticality. In that way, Acuña-Fariña points out that “[…] apposition is 
characterized by true functional equivalence, since its members do perform the same 
function when they appear together.” (p. 77, emphasis in the original). This view rejects 
the traditional idea of functional equivalence as applied to appositions. As a 
consequence, it is concluded that the paradigm must be analysed as “not being [an] 
apposition […]” (p. 77).  
  
All in all, in the light of the fact that apposition became a blurred notion, Acuña-
Fariña (1999) considers that it needs to be redefined. The Anne Chapman, the 
gynaecologist, type is better described in terms of non-restrictive modification, given 
the lack of true functional equivalence, which is also supported by agreement facts. 
With respect to cases of non-nominal apposition, as in They sent him to Coventry, 
refused to speak to him, semantic equivalence is not found with the exception of the 
adverbial type as in, there, in London. In that respect, it was concluded that the 
obligatory intonational boundaries in nominal and adverbial appositions make them the 
same. In both U2 is isolated from the rest of the sentence and does not play a role in it. 





At the same time, this supports the non-restrictive modification analysis for those 
instances that belong to the paradigm. On the contrary, given that verbal and sentential 
appositions do not show obligatory intonational markers, allowing both units to develop 
the same function with respect to the whole sentence, they are considered true 
appositions. Therefore, “[…] the members of an apposition are not dominated by a 
superordinate node ‘apposition’, but instead relate to all the other sentence constituents 
individually” (p. 79). 
  
3.2.6 Conclusion 
As a conclusion, it must be highlighted that the existence of loose appositive structures 
is rather entrenched in grammatical studies. There may be different points of view about 
their internal compositionality, their grammatical features or functional potential, but all 
grammarians accept loose appositions within the syntax of a language. On the contrary, 
close apposition is a much more open question, and not all linguists agree with the 
syntactic position that this type of construction has carved out in the grammatical map 
of constructions. The present work agrees with the fact that close and loose appositions 
show resemblances, but it also argues in favour of a deeper analysis which demonstrates 
that similarities are in fact relatively superficial. CA instances resemble other 
constructions like NPs, that is, both close appositions and NPs develop the same 
functional roles within a sentence. As we will see, even though their external 
appearance is very similar, their internal constituency differs. Thus, we are faced with a 
problem: same function, same appearance, almost same constituents, but different 
internal links (as BNPs also prove, see chapter 5). Language has no perfect design. Here 
I will try to show that grammatical constructions are not clear and sharp. At the same 
time, they show such grammatical interconnections among them which lead to a 





situation where defining the barriers of this constructional overlap becomes a complex 
task. Thus, language must be seen as a huge system of communication characterized by 
its variability.  
 
 The previous sections offered a sketchy overview of the loose appositive 
structure. In view of both history and at least obvious superficial resemblances 
(Mathews 1981), this was necessary. From now on we will concentrate on CA, 
beginning with a historical account of the theories about it.  
 
3.3 A whole century about apposition. Historical background 
3.3.1 Introduction 
In the following sections the most authoritative works dealing with CA are discussed 
and analyzed in order to draw a map of the historical trajectory of this structure in 
linguistic studies. We will see how it has evolved in such a way that it has gone from 
being a double-headed structure to having only one head, with discrepancies as to which 
one of the two nominals is the head. A whole century of studies on this structure has left 
us a large number of different analyses.  
 
3.3.2 Close apposition as an endocentric structure 
Poutsma (1904), Jespersen (1924), and Curme (1947) are the most relevant of early 
work on apposition. Poutsma’s A Grammar of Late Modern English includes 
appositions within the ‘attributive adnominal adjuncts’ section. The main conclusion of 
this account is that apposition is a type of subordination where the two nominal 
elements are equivalent, one being the head and the other the modifier. Throughout 
Jespersen’s famous grammar, apposition is mentioned on some occasions, but there is 





no special section devoted to the analysis of this construction. The existence of 
apposition is not denied, but it is never referred to as a grammatical construction; all 
instances that resemble adjuncts, predicatives, extrapositions, etc. and structures of the 
like, are considered as appositions. By the time Curme’s English Grammar appeared, 
there was a division of opinions on whether apposition was a grammatical category or a 
grammatical relation. Curme does not offer a specific theory about this structure; 
apposition is the juxtaposition of two nominal constituents, one modifying the other. 
The novel and remarkable issue of Curme’s analysis is that, contrary to the traditional 
idea, the two nominal elements develop two different roles within the whole sentence 
structure. 
 Thus, during the first half of the twentieth century the notion of apposition was 
present in most respected and consulted grammars, but none of them conferred a 
relevant place to apposition among their most discussed themes.   
 
  The notion of apposition had to wait until the year 1955 when Charles F. 
Hockett wrote an article dealing with its internal structure. Taking as a basis two 
previous analyses of apposition, those of Lee (1952) and Haugen (1953), this work was 
the first which offered a clear syntactic analysis. Let us start with Hockett’s own points 
of departure.   
Lee (1952) considers that apposition is, in general, “a purely mechanical term”. 
However, when dealing with loose and close appositions particularly, they are 
considered to differ; and the main difference lies in the fact that N1 and N2 are equal in 
loose apposition, but different in close apposition. Therefore, on the one hand, “[i]n 
ordinary nonrestricitve appositions of the Burns, the poet type there is a suggestion of 
incidental afterthought. (...). In these collocations of substantives, A equals B, which 





latter is incidentally mentioned” (p. 268). On the other hand, “[i]n locutions like the 
poet Burns, (...) we have a different situation. (...) the second element is restrictive and 
is necessary to limit, restrict, or define the meaning of the first” (p. 268). Therefore, 
loose and close appositions are different in nature, but both of them show a head- 
modifier structure.  
Haugen (1953) rejects Lee’s proposal considering that N2 is the element that 
restricts N1, and that “his basis [Lee’s] for regarding Burns as a modifier of the poet is 
that Burns is specific, while the poet is general (...). This is true if one defines 
grammatical relations in terms of external reality; but if one defines them in terms of 
grammatical reality, the opposite is here seen to be obviously true” (p. 165). Thus, in 
order to support his own point of view and reject that of Lee, Haugen applies the 
‘replacement by zero’ test, which supports the thesis that “[t]he head of the construction 
is not the first, but the second noun” (p. 166). As a consequence, the close appositive 
construction “is closely parallel to one in which adjectives modify following nouns (...)” 
(p. 167). As conclusion: “so-called ‘close apposition’ is a modifier-head construction” 
(p. 170).   
 
 The rejection of Haugen’s modifier-head analysis is the first remarkable point of 
Hockett’s theory, too (Hockett opts for a double-headed structure). But this rejection 
does not imply that differentiating between a double-headed structure and a construction 
with only one head and a modifier is an easy enterprise. As a matter of fact, when 
headedness is unclear, according to Hockett (pp. 100-101), we have an apposition:  
 
We have found a rather simple rule of thumb to help us in making this 
distinction. Let the constitute (necessarily endocentric, of course) be AB. All 
the evidence may point to interpreting A as attribute and Bas head, in which 





case we do so. Or all the evidence may point to interpreting A as head and B
as attribute. In some cases, however, there is cogent evidence for both of 
these attributive alternatives. When we find this to be the case, we speak of 
‘apposition’. 
 
Hockett goes on to further delimit the notion and proposes four requirements that a 
construction must meet if: i. the elements making up the construction must belong to the 
same major class; ii. the structure must be endocentric, so, iii. “there must be no more 
justification for taking the first IC as attribute to the second as head than for the 
reverse”, and finally, iv. both elements must make reference to the same entity.  
 
 In Course in English Linguistics (Hockett 1958), the idea of apposition as an 
endocentric structure is maintained. The novelty of this account rests on the fact that 
apposition is included under a different grammatical label, that of coordination; it is 
considered as a subtype of coordination. However, the original idea of an endocentric 
structure in not abandoned, that is, “in some instances it is clear that a construction is 
endocentric, and reasonable to suppose that it is attributive, but difficult to tell which IC 
is the head. (...). In these circumstances we speak of apposition, not of attribution: both 
ICs are heads, and both are also attributes” (pp. 185-186).  
 
 All in all, Hockett’s proposal was a radical innovation. Challenging the classic 
superficial analyses of previous authors and all their theories in the face of their 
semanticist arguments in favour of either one of the nominals, he postulates that the 
headedness of appositive structures is not to be found in only one of them, but is shared 
by both. Moreover, this theory applies to close and loose appositions equally (contra 
Lee 1952), that is, there are no distinctions between these two types of structures. His 





thesis was heavily criticised years later when Burton-Roberts (1975) rejected 
endocentrism and pointed out that apposition in particular was not an endocentric 
structure (see section 3.3.3). It was not Burton-Roberts the only one who saw problems 
in Hockett’s appositive account: Acuña-Fariña (1996: 79) states that “Hockett’s 
conception of apposition as a double-headed construction [is] incompatible with all the 
types of close structures (...).” In fact, Hockett’s thesis was not revived until the 21st 
century when Lekakou & Szendroi (2007) published an article which takes the firm line 
that appositive structures are a clear example of a doubly-endocentric syntactic 
organization. 
 
3.3.3 The Det + N + N structure as a common NP. The close apposition label erased 
from the map 
As noted, Burton-Roberts’s analysis about close apposition rejects Hockett’s theory 
completely. Maybe these disagreements have to do with the fact that they use two very 
different grammatical frameworks. Hockett’s work belongs to the pre-generative era; it 
offers a structuralist account taking as a basis post-bloomfieldian ideas about clause 
structure. On the contrary, Burton-Roberts embraces a transformationalist analysis, in 
the generative tradition of the 70s.  
Burton-Roberts’s main target is endocentricity, rejected from the very beginning 
as one of the main features of close apposition (“appositions cannot be endocentric” 
(Burton-Roberts 1975: 393)). However, it cannot be denied that endocentricity is a 
pivotal feature of noun phrases. Thus, although appositions are not endocentric “(...) 
noun phrases containing nouns are, by definition, endocentric: and so-called restrictive 
apposition [close apposition] is a noun phrase containing nouns” (p. 393). This first 





strategic step allows the rejection of the notion of close apposition, in favour of the idea 
that this type of structure exemplifies the NP category in every sense.  
 
The extremely well-known instance the poet Burns is the point of departure of 
this analysis. To begin with, it is considered that this example violates all the conditions 
for being treated as an apposition in the light of the fact that “Burns is subordinate to the 
poet” (p. 395). In that way, if Burns is a subordinate element, it cannot fulfil the same 
function as the poet. Therefore, so-called close apposition cannot belong to the 
appositive paradigm because the nominal elements do not fulfil the same function. 
Consider examples (39) and (40) as an illustration of this first consideration: 
 
(39)                   S 
 
                                        NP                                                        VP 
 
                                  was born in 1759 
                     NP                                          S  
       det                N                     NP                    VP       
 
 
       the               poet          det             N      VB          N 
 
 
 the            poet    be             Burns 
 





(40)                                                   S 
 
                           NP                                                                      VP 
 
                                                                                          was born in 1759 
                 NP                    
  
      det               N           VP 
 
       the             poet          N 
 
                                       Burns 
 
 On the face of these two syntactic trees, “it is quite clear that the two NPs do 
not have the same function: one is the subject of was born in 1759 and the other is the 
complement of an embedded sentence” (p. 395). Moreover, the the poet Burns tructure 
fails the criterion of coreferentiality, a cornerstone feature of apposition. Following 
Strawson (1952: 145), and his differentiation between the referring and the ascriptive 
role of NPs, the idea that “ he poet and Burns cannot (...) be coreferential, since one or 
other of them is not a referend (...)” (p. 395) gains ground. As a consequence, “the 
relationship that exists between two nouns (...) must be one of attribute and head”. Thus, 
in order to set the basis of this account, the poet Burns is a modifier-head structure, 
which resembles the internal configuration of standard NPs.  
 
S 





Therefore, if the the writer Alice Walker type of structure is not a close 
appositon, what is it? At this point, a transformational analysis comes to the rescue. 
Example (41) is considered to be the underlying structure of the surface structure the 
poet Burns: 
 
(41) Burns Burns is the poet. 
 
“The underlying string in [(41)], then, would appear to be the most appropriate” (p. 
398), since from it we derive that Burns is the head and poet the modifier. Therefore, 
Burton-Roberts’ modifier-head analysis of close appositions is supported by an 
underlying structure where the proper name is the subject of a subordinate sentence 
(The Burns who is a poet; see example (42)). 
 
 Definiteness is another point of discussion. The main idea is the distinction that 
exists between generic and indexical definite determiners which appear in the deep 
structure of a construction, and other kinds of determiners which derive from the deep 
structure. Concerning the structure of the poet Burns, its definite determiner is neither 
generic nor indexical, which implies that the article “is triggered by an underlying 
specification in the form of relative clauses restrictively modifying the noun” (p. 
399, emphasis added). However, in the transformational process, example (42), the poet
is never considered as forming an immediate constituent, because “at no stage of the 
derivation of The poet Burns, (...) is poet specified” (p. 400). In that way, “since it is 
Burns that is being modified, it is Burns that is being determined”. Therefore, the 
definite determiner is present because of the proper noun, and because it is modified. 
Were it not modified, the determiner node would not be filled (as proper nouns alone 





need no determiners). To that effect, the deep structure and consequent derivation of the 
poet Burns, considered as an NP, are the following:  
 
(42) a. [det] Burns [det] Burns be poet       
          b. [det] Burns WH be poet (by relativisation, oblig.)        
     c. The Burns who is a poet  
         d. The Burns poet (by relative reduction, opt.)         
    e. The poet Burns (by attributive preoposing, oblig.)  
 
It is this derivation that leads to the conclusion that close appositions must be 
considered as a structure similar, if not identical, to that of premodified noun phrases. 
Thus, the close apposition the writer Alice Walker has the same structure as the red car, 
a common NP premodified by an adjective. In the case of close apposition, this structure 
is another instance of the NP construction but made up by a proper noun as head and a 
common noun as a modifier. Burton-Roberts’ explanation includes within the NP model 
a not very orthodox instance. NPs made up by a proper noun (not alone) are perfectly 
common and unproblematic; NPs made up by a determiner and a common noun are the 
NP prototype. NPs made up by a bare noun offer no grammatical difficulties. But NPs 
where the definite article is used because of a proper noun premodified by a common 
noun are, at least, grammatically disconcerting. In that respect, even one of the simplest 
structures of language, as NPs could be considered, show internal and external 
variation.  
 
 As seen, definiteness is one of the main features of so-called close apposition. In 
this specific case, according to Burton-Roberts (see also Acuña-Fariña (2009); section 





3.3.7), the use of the definite article depends on the presence of the premodified proper 
noun, and the fact that this proper noun is considered as the head of the whole 
appositive set implies that indefinite close appositions are unacceptable. Examples (43-
46) are thus incorrect, precisely because they are indefinite (see Keizer (2007a) for a 
different opinion, section 3.3.611):  
 
(43) *A poet Burns 
(44) *A friend John (or, *A friend of yours) 
(45) *An actor Laurence Olivier 
(46) *A curve QCR 
 
In order for them to be grammatically possible, they should contain “commas on either 
side of the name (...) [because] the name would no longer be functioning as head” (p.  
401), as shown in examples (47-50):  
 
(47) A poet, Burns 
(48) A friend, John 
(49) An actor, Laurence Olivier 
(50) A curve, QCR 
 
                                                           
11 However, not all linguists accept this assertion. In fact, Keizer (2007a: 32-34) argues in favour of 
indefinite close appositions. She uses examples taken from the ICE-GB Corpus, and three of them are the 
following ones: a soppy elder brother Roberts, a sister Ethel, and a friend John who’s in linguistics with 
me, see section 3.3.8. 
 





In this case, when the comma is introduced between the common noun and the proper 
noun, these structures are appositions proper, that is, loose or non-restrictive 
appositions. As a foregone conclusion: 
 
It appears, then, that in dealing with NPs of the kind we have been 
discussing (...), we are dealing, not with a putative aspect of the grammar of 
apposition, but with the grammar of names when they are modified, within 
the grammar of premodified nouns in general (p. 401). 
 
As briefly seen in section 3.2.2, reversibility is another traditional, prototypical 
characterising feature of true apposition, that is, loose apposition (Bitea 1977: 456). On 
this occasion it is also used in order to argue against the existence of close appositions. 
In the case of examples like the writer Alice Walker this condition does not apply 
because for Alice Walker the writer to be accepted, it must be contextualized. This type 
of structure is “only acceptable if [it is] provided with a context in which [it] can have 
contrastive function” (p. 402). In that way, for Alice Walker the writer to be used 
correctly, it must be inserted into a context where a structure like, for example, the 
teacher Alice Walker has been previously mentioned. Therefore, “the reversal, if that is 
what it is, is transformationally motivated, not arbitrary” (p. 402). Then, again, 
transformations are the eternal solution to grammatical analysis: the Alice Walker the 
writer structure is the result of another step added to those in (42), that is, a 
transformation which “shifts to post-head position the modifier (and any item that the 
modifier has triggered, that is, the article) when it precedes the name” (p. 402). At the 
same time, the main motivation of the application of this transformation is the desire to 
identify the referent of the proper noun uniquely. Therefore, the main purpose of the use 
of reversibility with so-called close appositions is “to bring into focus the contrastive 





function the modification only potentially has in pre-head position, by moving it from 
that position, where its function is neither merely attributive nor sharply contrastive but 
somewhere in between the two” (pp. 402-403). 
 
As a conclusion, Burton-Roberts’s account offers a clear generative analysis 
where derivations, underlying structures and surface structures are the guidelines of 
grammatical analysis. The writer Alice Walker is an instance of a common NP. Its 
surface structure is the result of a derivation process whose point of departure is an 
underlying NP modified by a relative clause, the Alice Walker who is a writer. 
Therefore, the distinctiveness of CA is drastically rejected. As a pure generative 
account, it is concluded that the internal constituency and constituent links within a Det 
+ N (common) + N (proper) structure are the same as in a prototypical NP. As a 
consequence, this analysis offers some results where there is no room for exceptions. It 
could be said that all those structures which contain a determiner and nouns must be, 
obligatorily, common NPs. However, Burton-Roberts’ own words argue against his own 
point of view, in some sense, because th  writer Alice Walker cannot be considered a 
common NP given that the definite article is used because of the proper noun and not 
for the common noun, as in prototypical NPs; and also the fact that the head is modified 
by a common noun surely matters. No matter how we look at these phenomena: they 
seem to resist a homogeneous account of their varied internal structures.  
 
3.3.4 Close apposition, an undifferentiated construction 
Matthews (1981) states that undifferentiation is the term that best characterizes the 
grammatical status of the general notion of apposition within the grammatical map of 
relations. In the face of this: 





(…) apposition (…) may be characterised as [a] relationship of 
juxtaposition. This is the most primitive constructional relation, being 
undifferentiated with respect to any of the specific types [of coordination, 
complementation and modification]” (p. 223, emphasis in the original).    
 
The main aim of Matthews’s analysis is to show that coordination and dependency –
complementation and modification- influence the identification and subsequent 
characterization of apposition. As a consequence of this undifferentiated character, the 
appositive construction shows boundary problems with coordinative and dependency 
relationships. On the one hand, one may dismiss a dependency relation, but the problem 
does not cease because the construction could be considered either an apposition or a 
coordinative structure. On the other hand, if coordination is rejected, the dilemma 
consists in differentiating between apposition and complementation, or apposition and 
modification.  
 In order to set the criteria for apposition, consider the following different types 
of appositive structures:  
 
(51) your brother, the poet 
(52) King George VI 
(53) the brother who used to live in London 
(54) the fact that he did it 
(55) his father, a car salesman 
 
As commonly and traditionally postulated, there is a paradigmatic case, example (51), 
and four related types of apposition (52-55). As in any analysis of apposition, the loose 
appositive construction is considered to illustrate the notion of apposition to perfection, 
and that the rest of the instances resemble the prototype in some way or another. In 





consideration of the variations between the prototype and the rest of the types, “(…) the 
term ‘apposition’ has been used of a variety of constructions, which are not grouped 
together by any single criterion (…)” (p. 223). 
 
 One of the tests that Matthews uses in order to identify and classify appositive 
structures is that of co-reference. Following this criterion, “[i]n general, two noun 
phrases would not stand in apposition unless their referents were to be understood as 
identical” (p. 225). When analyzing possible cases of apposition, as seen, coordination 
is always an option for Matthews and dealing with co-reference its influence on the 
analysis is almost natural. In the same line, in your brother, the poet the NPs are co-
referential, even though if the nominal elements are linked by a coordinative element, 
they cease to be co-referential, your brother or the poet, and the apposition becomes 
coordination. However, in cases like Sir Winston, or Mr Churchill…, where a 
coordinative element is between the two NPs, the fact that NP2 is co-referential with 
NP1 implies that this case “(…) would be seen as appositional, even though, (…), the 
same conjunction is classed as coordinative” (p. 225). It must be pointed out here that 
the evidence that Matthews uses shows some inconsistencies. Given that your brother 
the poet and your brother, the poet are considered to be two different constructions, 
belonging to different grammatical classes, in the case of your brother or the poet and 
Sir Winston, or Churchill, the comma might imply some nuances which make 
Matthews’s analysis difficult to maintain. 
 Reversibility is, for Matthews, the other useful indicator of apposition. 
Instances like (52) illustrate this criterion. King George VI, Mount Everest and Mr 
Churchill are included under the label of apposition, even though it is clear that these 
instances “(…) clearly differ[…] from the paradigm” (p. 227). And precisely, it is the 





reversibility option that leads to this conclusion given that the elements in Mount 
Everest cannot be reversed: *Everest Mount. Moreover, with respect to the paradigm, 
these instances cannot be separated either. It is possible to say y ur brother came, the 
poet, but instead it is completely ungrammatical to use Mr. spoke next, Churchill.  
The idiosyncratic nature of King George VI is also an important factor, in the 
sense that NP1 shows restrictions of use. One cannot say *Sovereign George, or 
*Mountain Everest. Consequently, the traditional test of omission is a helpful criterion 
of apposition owing to the fact that “(…) in these examples only the first element can be 
dropped” (p. 228). One can say Churchill spoke but not *Mr. spoke, contrary to the 
paradigm (your brother, the poet) where both elements can be omitted: your brother 
spoke or the poet spoke.  
 
Then, as a first consideration, the previous tests and analyses demonstrate that 
“[a]pposition (…) lies on a gradation between attribution and coordination (…)” (p. 
228). As a consequence of this undetermined character, grammatical relations like the 
previous ones “(…) are appositional precisely in that they cannot be convincingly 
assigned to either of the fully differentiated types” (p. 229). This is not too unlike 
Hockett’s (1955) account (section 3.3.2). 
 
Besides coordination, dependency relations are also considered to exert some 
type of influence on the notion of apposition. These are illustrated by examples (53), the 
brother who used to live in London, a modifying relation; and (54) the fact that he did it, 
an instance of complementation. The non-restrictive relative clause in his brother, who 
used to live in London resembles a second NP as in his brother, an old friend of mine 
(example (55)). This possible similarity would imply the existence of a structural 





parallelism between modification and an appositive relation. In fact, some scholars 
postulate the term ‘appositive relative clauses’ with respect to this type of structures. 
Then, if these instances are appositions, they must fulfill Matthews’s criteria for 
apposition – co-reference, reversibility and omission –. In the case of a restrictive 
relative clause, his brother who used to live in London, if it resembles apposition to 
perfection, both members could be omitted, but in fact only the relative clause offers 
this possibility: I met his brother vs. *I met who used to live in London. Reversibility is 
not an option either: *I met who used to live in London, his brother. Therefore, 
restrictive relative clauses side more with an attributive relation than with an appositive 
one. With non-restrictive relative clauses (his brother, who used to live in London) the 
co-reference criterion is not fulfilled either. Then, after due consideration, the first NP is 
a referring expression, but the clause is of a different nature. As a consequence, “[t]his 
suggests a juxtapositional analysis, in which [the NP] and [the clause] do not form a 
syntagm” (p. 230). Then, modification cases like his brother who used to live in London 
cannot be considered cases of apposition. Apposition and modification resemble each 
other to such an extent that some instances may question the grammatical barriers 
among the different types of syntactic relations.  
 
Another type of dependency relation is complementation. Opinions are divided 
with respect to examples like the fact that he did it. Some linguists consider that this is a 
case similar to paradigmatic apposition (Matthews 1981: 231 ff.), and others contend 
that the clause is a complement of the NP (Huddleston 1971: 106 ff., 1984: 263-4; 
Brown & Miller 1982: 134 ff.; Burton-Roberts 1986: 176-8; Radford 1988: 193-4, 218-
9). In fact, there are arguments in favor of both analyses. A complementation relation is 
the result of the valency of the previous verb or noun. In the specific case of nouns, 





“[t]he case for complementation would be strengthened if there were nouns with which 
the clause was strongly obligatory. But in general it is not so: The fact is indisputable 
(…)” (p. 232). However, there are nouns which are nominalizations of verbs, verbs 
which do require a complement clause, in which case the noun would also require a 
complement. However, “(…) no latent element need be posited” (p. 232) in such a 
nominalization because the phrase includes a definite article (I heard the announcement; 
the realization surprised me). The use of the implies that the referent of the noun is 
known and then it does not need further specifications.  
As far as the appositive relation is concerned, thismay only be postulated if 
there is an intonational boundary between the NP and the clause. In the case that there 
was no intonational boundary, the noun does not need the complement clause either. 
However, in actual use, certain types of nouns do allow a complement clause with or 
without intonational detachment, as in the case of news (the news that Bill is leaving), 
and feeling (the feeling that it would not happen). Only in this specific cases, “(…) the 
peculiarity of NEWS, FEELING and the like is not that they can take a complement, but 
merely that they allow close apposition (in Bloomfield’s sense12) as well as the looser 
form” (p. 232, emphasis on the original). Therefore, in this specific case we might deal 
with a type of close apposition, even in the presence of subcategorization.  
As a consequence, the structure the fact that he did it could be a 
complementation relation if it is considered as “(…) a single referring expression, 
whose construction would be incomplete if that he did it were deleted (…)” (p. 232). 
Even though it could also be considered an apposition if the fact is “(…) a referring 
expression (…), with that he did it [as] a subsidiary aid to identification (…)” (p. 232). 
Then, again, the barriers between complementation and apposition are blurred.  
                                                           
12 In Bloomfield’s sense two nominal elements are in close apposition when there is no boundary element 
between them.  





The last of the grammatical relations that presents problems of indeterminacy 
with apposition is parataxis. Consider the following examples taken from Matthews 
(1981: 233):  
 
(56) I met [his father], [a car salesman] 
(57) [he is a car salesman], [isn’t he?] 
(58) [a car salesman], [isn’t he?] 
(59) I met [his father] – [a car salesman], [isn’t he?] 
(60) [I met his father] [a car salesman, isn’t he?] 
(61) [I met his father – a car salesman] [isn’t he?] 
 
Example (56) includes two apposed NPs. In example (57) the tag question is 
syntactically related to the previous sentence; as well as in the incomplete sentence in 
(58). If in example (59) a car salesman and isn’t he? form an incomplete sentence, the 
result is a paratactic structure as in example (60), but it could be that only the tag 
question is the paratactic element, as in example (61), and the noun phrases two 
appositive elements. Therefore, these examples strengthen the undifferentiated character 
of the relation of apposition with respect to other syntactic relations.   
 
We may conclude this section with this quotation:  
 
There is a tradition in linguistics which requires that terms should be 
defined with respect to our data, with necessary and sufficient conditions for 
their use. Apposition is a striking instance of a category that cannot be 
elucidated in that way.  





 Instead we have a paradigm use, and other uses that are linked to it by 
various forms of resemblance. Where the resemblances end is naturally 
indeterminate (p.  236).  
 
It could be considered that Matthews’s study of apposition offers the first 
grammatical network of similarities and differences between different syntactic 
relations. However, the study of apposition could be improved if, apart from the internal 
links, one takes into account the possible external similarities between appositions and a 
different category. And if there is a category which influences CA par excellence, that is 
the NP category. The NP influence on appositions in general, and close appositions in 
particular, provokes a categorial merge between NPs and close appositions. The study 
of this merge would clear up many of the internal, and also external, characteristics of 
the CA construction, as we will see in chapter 4. 
 
3.3.5 Gradient apposition 
Meyer’s main idea about appositive structures is that they are gradable units and that 
syntax alone is not enough to explain the grammatical properties of this type of 
structure (see also Meyer 1991, 1992, and section 3.2.4). In that line:  
 
Appositions can be only accounted for formally if apposition is viewed as a 
semantic, pragmatic, and syntactic relation (1987: 101). 
 
 Meyer (1987) begins to toy with the idea of the gradable character of apposition. 
Dissatisfied with the traditional account, where only intonationally demarcated NPs are 
considered true instances of apposition (62), examples like (63) (an example of loose 
apposition in any case, but which contains two clauses instead of two NPs) are also 
considered appositional:  





(62) A famous linguist, namely Noam Chomsky, will speak tomorrow night.  
(63) You should rewrite the paper. That is to say, you should organize it better 
and improve its style.  
 
Gradience is finally fully elaborated in his 1992 monograph, where his earlier intuitions 
on prototypical and peripheral appositions are extended: 
 
(...) apposition is considered an undifferentiated, or gradable, relation, we 
can distinguish those constructions that are most appositional –central 
appositions- from those that are (in varying degrees) less appositional –
peripheral appositions (Meyer 1992: 41). 
 
 
With respect to the traditional debate about whether close apposition exists or 
not, Meyer (1989) takes a stand in favour of the existence of CA, and posits that 
“restrictive apposition is (...) best viewed as a category whose forms are on a gradient 
between full apposition and partial apposition”13 (p. 147). A first general consideration 
about CAs is that traditional analyses of close apposition failed because of the 
“undifferentiated” (Mathews 1981: 224; see section 3.3.4) treatment that grammarians 
have given to appositive structures in general. The problem lies in the comparison made 
between apposition and modification and complementation; a problem which may be 
solved if these types of structures are treated on their own, as independent and 
differentiated linguistic phenomena: if loose apposition showed grammatical gradience, 
close apposition is a much better example of internal and external grammatical 
variation. Thus, there exist “various forms” of close apposition, seven types in particular 
                                                           
13 These two notions are taken by Meyer from Quirk et al. (1985). 





– even though Meyer does not take into account the the writer Alice Walker 
construction with an indefinite article (a guy Mark who is my friend), which is a 
structure quite different from the one which contains a possessive – of which Type 1 is 
the most common:  
 
Type 1: NP (Det. + common noun) + NP (proper noun) 
My sister Cath 
Type 2: NP + that-clause 
The idea that John was unfaithful 
Type 3: NP + to-infinitive 
Their obsession to win the race  
Type 4: NP + of-NP 
The capital of Germany 
Type 5: NP + like + NP 
A dog like Boss 
Type 6: NP (proper noun) + NP (Det. + common noun) 
Alice Walker the writer 
Type 7: NP + whether  
The question whether you should marry or not 
 
Gradience is certainly obvious when analysing the semantic behaviour of these 
structures. It is clear that the second nominal element does not develop the same 
semantic functions in all of these appositions. Using Quirk et al.’s categories, this 
semantic variability includes examples of “appellation, identification, exemplification, 
and designation” (Meyer 1989: 155-158). And, at the same time, “those within the class 





of appellation are most appositional [his brother Joe] and those within the class of 
exemplification least appositional [a person like Mary]” (Meyer 1989: 158). Despite all 
this great variability, there is a constant, permanent and invariable feature which 
characterizes close appositions to a large extent: this is the nominal character of both 
elements within the close appositive construction (Meyer 1992: 10, 21-24). Thus, just as 
the most obvious feature of loose apposition is that it is always demarcated by 
intonation or punctuation marks, in the case of close appositions, the nominal make up 
defines the construction a great deal. In fact, “because apposition is a relation in which 
at least one of the units is usually a noun phrase (...), it is not surprising that nearly 88 
per cent of the appositions in the corpora had functions associated with noun phrases: 
subject (...), direct object (...), and object of prepositions (...)” (Meyer 1992: 34-35). 
Therefore, for an appositive construction to be included under the label close apposition 
it must contain an NP almost obligatorily (as already mentioned, exceptions are 
possible, such as here in Spain).  
With respect to the syntactic behaviour of N2 in these seven types, Meyer (1989: 
151) contends that:  
 
(...) it is wrong to assume (...) that each of these forms is equally 
appositional. While all forms contain appositions whose second units 
restrict the reference of the first units, some forms are semantically and 
syntactically more appositional than other forms (emphasis added). 
 
The gradience of apposition in general does not affect its internal syntactic structure, 
that is, N1 is considered as the main element of the structure and N2 the expanding and 
restricting element (see also Meyer 1992: 73-83). Moreover, when comparing 
appositions with restrictive and non-restrictive clauses it turns out that: 





(…) appositions (…) parallel the behavior of restrictive and nonrestrictive 
relative clauses quite closely: like the head noun of a relative clause, the first 
unit of an apposition determined whether the apposition was restrictive or 
nonrestrictive (Meyer 1989: 151). 
 
In the face of this, the first noun is the element which determines the syntactic function 
of N2. However, this fact does not imply that N1 is the head in all appositive structures. 
Meyer (1989: 151) clarifies in a footnote that he is “not suggesting that a head-modifier 
relationship exists between units in apposition” . 
 
 On the same grounds, close appositions may be fully (coordinate) or partially 
(subordinate) appositional. The criteria for this distribution depend on the obligatoriness 
of the two nominal elements. Therefore, coordinate appositions such as the writer Alice 
Walker or my sister Cath are “fully appositional or double-headed”, and that 
subordinate appositions, as in a dog like Boss, are “partially appositional  and 
indeterminate in terms of their constituent structure” (1989: 159, emphasis added) (see 
also Meyer 1992: 41-42).  
 
 As a conclusion, Meyer’s account centers on the semantic variability of 
apposition in general and close appositions in particular. However, gradience and 
variability with respect to its syntactic structure are not so present in his analysis. First 
of all, the second nominal element is always in charge of expanding the meaning of N1, 
a fact which implies the centrality of the first nominal element. This fact indicates that 
N1 is the syntactic head within an appositive structure. But, in consideration of this 
reading, Meyer clearly denies that his analysis entails that appositive structures are 
Head + Modifier constructions. In the second place, his distinction between full and 





partial appositions does not clarify the rejection of a Head + Modifier analysis either, 
and in fact the subordinate type (partial apposition) with only one obligatory element is 
an indicator that N1 is the head, because in a structure like a dog like Boss,  like Boss 
can never be the head. The general impression is that Meyer seems not to want to say 
that CA is simply a special case of modification inside the habitual NP mold. But in fact 
his own arguments and examples lead to that conclusion.  
 
3.3.6 Determiners and the CA analysis 
Keizer’s (2007a, b) study of close apposition takes as a linguistic basis the framework 
developed by Van Valin and LaPolla (1997). Authors like Halliday (1985), going 
through Fillmore (1988) and Croft (2001), Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008) have 
adapted this framework to their studies and accepted its main assumption, that is, that 
language is a means of communication and as such, utterances are influenced by the use 
that speakers make of them. Therefore, Keizer’s analysis is based on the fact that 
linguistic expressions are the product of general human cognitive processes such as 
conceptualization, reasoning, and storage and retrieval of knowledge. 
   
 After having analyzed all the different proposals about headedness in CA, 
Keizer rejects the modifier-head analysis defended by Haugen (1953) on the grounds 
that the proposed “replacement-by-zero test to determine headedness within close 
appositions fails to prove his point (...)” (pp. 30-31), that is, that NP1 does not have the 
same referential power as NP2, considered for this reason the head of the apposition. 
However, Keizer’s conclusion is that NP2 (the proper noun) is not enough to identify 
the referent of the whole NP as the whole apposition does. The double-headed analysis 
(Hockett (1955); see section 3.3.2) is not very convincing either, and it loses credibility 





because “there is, (...), something distinctly odd about two NPs being mutually 
attributive; moreover, Hockett does not actually specify any evidence to support this 
claim” (p. 31). Burton-Roberts’s (1975) single NP analysis of close apposition (see 
section 3.3.3) is also questioned for its lack of syntactic evidence in favour of his 
theory. Finally, Keizer leaves no room for doubt that she rejects a modifier-head 
analysis of CAs based on the view that the proper noun is the one in charge of imposing 
restrictions on the other elements of the construction. The fact that the proper noun is 
the head explains why close appositions have to be always definite, as proper nouns 
make reference to very specific referents; this assertion leads her to heavily criticize 
Acuña-Fariña’s (1996) work. The obligatory definite character of CAs is one of the 
main reasons of the rejection of this analysis. She takes a strong line on arguing for the 
existence of appositions such as a friend John who’s in linguistics, or this bloke Mark. 
Keizer sides with those who view these structures as close appositions, adducing that 
the indefinite feature “does not seem sufficient ground for regarding them as a different 
category of constructions” (p. 29). This type of construction would be used when the 
proper noun “cannot be assumed to refer uniquely, in which case the speaker may wish 
to add a modifier to enable the hearer to identify the intended referent. (...) If, on the 
other hand, the additional information cannot be assumed to guide the hearer, (...) the 
indefinite article is used (...)” (p. 33).   
 With respect to reference and semantic omissibility, Keizer is of the opinion that 
neither those who argue in favour of the two parts referring to one and the same entity 
(Haugen 1953; Hockett 1955; Quirk et al. 1972, 1985) nor those who propose that close 
appositions do not contain two referential parts (because of the logical impossibility of 
two coreferential constituents to make up a higher constituent); (cfr. Burton-Roberts 
1975), are on the right track. Burton-Roberts (1975) points out that the use of a 





premodified NP1, considered as a more referential structure, turns the whole appositive 
construction even more impossible. Along the same lines, Acuña-Fariña (1996) 
contends that constructions like *the poet of the decade is not possible precisely because 
if NP1 is heavily modified then it becomes referentially ‘saturated’. Placed alongside an 
equally ‘saturated’ referential phrase, the result is not a synthesis, but a mere repetition. 
Only a loose apposition (that is, the writer, Alice Walker) would salvage these 
ungrammatical strings, as in this kind of structure the scope of the does not reach the 
two nouns, but only the first common noun. However, Keizer does not accept this point 
of view because, based on a corpus, examples like David’s twin sister Sally (Keizer 
2007a: 35) are perfectly possible. Thus, NP1 modification does “not tell us anything 
about the scope of the definite article” (p. 36). In sum: “once it is assumed that close 
appositions do not consist of two coreferential elements, the whole idea of semantic 
omissibility – the most generally applied test – becomes irrelevant” (p. 37).  
 
 With respect to the order of the elements, their reversibility and omissibility, 
Keizer points out that after the omission of one of the two elements the resulting 
structure is syntactically and grammatically accepted, but “this does not mean that they 
must have the same internal structure or discourse function” (pp. 37-38). In the same 
line, regarding reversibility, it must be taken into account that “reversing the order of 
the two elements of a close apposition does not always yield a syntactically acceptable 
construction (...)”. Therefore, from an actual use of language, the reversibility and 
omission tests are inadequate for classifying double nominal structures like close 
appositions.  
 





 Keizer arrives at the general conclusion that close appositions are two nominal 
elements –a count noun and a proper noun- with no linking element between them, 
which form one intonation unit. Between them, a relation of modification is established 
and neither of the two elements is referential: only the whole appositive construction 
can make reference. The determiner is given great relevance, having as a consequence 
that all the different types of close appositions have the same structure but different 
analyses, that is, the writer Alice Walker is a head-modifier structure with a determiner 
having scope over the two nouns, but in the case of my sister Cath, even though it is 
also considered a head-modifier structure, the possessive pronoun is not considered a 
determiner but a modifier or specifier having scope only over the first noun (see section 
4.3.1). In fact, Keizer (p. 46) clearly states that “it is important to differentiate between 
the features of definiteness and possessiveness”. Thus, Keizer leaves us with the 
conclusion that the internal syntactic structure of a double nominal structure, as CAs 
happen to be, is easily solved analysing the relation established between the determiner 
and the nouns. Of course, the determiner has a very important role to play in this 
construction, but once you deal with nominal phrases containing common nouns and 
proper nouns, surely there must be a more ‘nouny’ solution to this grammatical puzzle.  
 
3.3.7 Close appositions from a Construction Grammar approach 
Having as predecessor his already mentioned (1996) work, Acuña-Fariña (2009) offers 
a quite different vision about the internal and external structure of close appositions. 
Taking as a basis the Constructional Grammar framework (Goldberg 1995, 2006), this 
work puts forward that: 
 
[A] close look at this family of constructions reveals a rich ecological niche 
where each construction relates to the other constructions forming a dense 





network of taxonomic and inheritance ties (Goldberg 1995), while each 
preserves sufficient formal specificity and idiosyncrasy to merit its own 
space in the close apposition network (Acuña-Fariña 2009: 456). 
   
A good point of departure to understand this new analysis of CAs is to bear in mind 
expressions like “inchoate noun phrases” and “lack of strong functional pressure” which 
will define the notion of close apposition in general, as well as the fact that “so-called 
close appositions can only be seen as instances of more or less ordinary NP structure” 
(p. 458). A close inspection of the CA construction reveals that it shows general aspects 
of the NP construction, even though, at the same time, it must be pointed out that some 
of its aspects do not reflect typical NPs. 
 From the very beginning, the notion of close apposition is compared with that of 
loose apposition. Such a comparison reveals that e poet Burns “does not code 
predications of the same calibre as those in LA”, “so-called appositive markers (...) are 
also barred from the [CA] construction”, CAs cannot appear in series, and “the separate 
illocutionary force of the two nominals (...) cannot even be tested in close types” (p. 
459). Moreover, the function of the determiner is different if it is included in a CA or a 
LA. While in the poet, Burns structure, the determiner is used anaphorically, and it 
“points backwards in discourse in search of specificity for its reference” (p. 460); in the 
close counterpart, he poet Burns, definiteness is not achieved via anaphora but it “is the 
construction as a whole that builds reference ex novo” (p. 460).  
 
 Following the same line of his (1996) work, Acuña-Fariña reiterates the proper 
noun headedness position given that the proper noun “imposes conditions on the whole 
construction” (p. 462). In the face of this position, whenever there is a modification 
inside the close appositive group it must match the proper noun, U2, given that U1 is 





incapable of elaboration. It is possible to say the great painter Picasso in the light of the 
fact that the great Picasso is perfectly correct. On the contrary, the short painter 
Picasso sounds odd because th  short Picasso sounds odd too. In consideration of 
modified indefinite close appositions, which Keizer (2007a) argues for, it is considered 
and accepted that instances like an embarrassed Sir Patrick Mayhew are perfectly 
possible, even though they simply confirm that proper nouns can be modified by a 
restrictive group of modifiers, a fact “independent of the grammar of CA” (p. 465). 
However, even though the modification of the proper noun is not exclusive of the CA 
construction, the fact that the presence of an indefinite article does not alter its internal 
structure, which “suggests that the construction as a whole is rather fixed” (p. 465), is a 
feature exclusive of the grammar of CA. On the same grounds, it is exclusive of the 
grammar of close apposition that when elaboration of the first noun is possible, it allows 
instances like the poet of the decade Burns. This type of instances become even more 
real when compared with cases like the most influential writer on the English 
constitution Walter Bagehot, which “are either extremely sporadic or deviant in the use 
of punctuation or tonicity” (p. 465) contrary to Keizer. 
  
 Acuña-Fariña defines close appositions as “inchoate noun phrases”. Given the 
grammatical evidence in favour of different analysis, this label is considered the most 
adequate for this type of construction. Considering headedness analyses: on the one 
hand, U2, the proper noun, could be the head as a consequence of the selection 
restrictions that it imposes on the whole structure; and also the constrained character of 
the elaboration potential of the common noun, U1, which is in favour of U2 as the head, 
as well as the secondary-primary stress pattern of the construction. On the other hand, 
U1 is pointed out as head of the structure because of pluralisation (which affects the 





common noun) and agreement, which in tune with pluralisation effects, also indicates 
that the common noun is the one which links with the verb in a clause. Likewise, the 
order of the parts shows that if in Burns the poet he proper noun is the theme, in its 
counterpart he poet Burns, it is reasonable to signal the common noun as the theme too; 
in the same way inheritance and taxonomic ties imply that “if we view the entire 
collection of CAs as constituting a dynamic network organized around a number of 
inheritance and taxonomic hierarchies  (a network of associations), then attractors in the 
vicinity of this construction which have a rather clearer [head+ modifier] constituency 
would be expected to exert (via partial, shared co-activation) some influence on the 
constituency of the construction under analysis here” (p. 469). Thus, examples like my 
friend Burns (*My Burns who is a friend) and this bloke Steve (*This Steve who is a 
bloke) show a clear N1 headedness. Finally, there is evidence which speaks in favour of 
the two nouns as head. Pronominalization indicates that only the entire structure can be 
pronominalized, and distribution shows that the poet Burns can be integrated in the the 
excellent Burns paradigm as well as in the the poet over there one (for a more extended 
explanation of this entire evidence see section 4.1). All this varied evidence leads to the 
conclusion that “paradigmatic CAs like the poet Burns have a [the + [X Y]] structure in 
which the constituency of the internal [XY] node is left unresolved” (p. 470). Therefore, 
close appositions show an NP structure whose nominal component shows such syntactic 
indeterminacy that cannot be solved. This indeterminacy is seen as the consequence of a 
“lack of strong functional pressure” motivated by the social referential character of the 
construction, that is, “(…) the construction has as its job the activation of a social 
referent, and in the social world that we inhabit this is usually done either by name or 
profession” (p. 470). Its hybrid constituency also influences this indeterminacy as well 
as the fact that “the construction is easily identifiable as such ‘from the top’” (p. 470).  





  The hybrid character of the CA construction is a good point in favour of a 
constructionist approach to this type of construction. The advantage of this model with 
respect to others is that “in a representational map of the constituent features of a given 
construction, the features which are suggestive of a certain analysis do actually co-exist 
with those suggestive of another, different analysis” (p. 471). In the face of this, 
hybridism is the most adequate explanation when analysing CAs. Close appositions are 
considered to be the result of the fusion of a [the + Modifier + Proper noun] 
construction (the famous Burns) and a [the + Head Noun + Modifier] construction (the 
poet of the revolution). As a result “a third construction arises which is different from 
these two” (p. 471), that is, a close apposition. The resulting construction “has unique 
features of its own, and these emerge with the construction” (p. 471). Due to the 
constraints that affect the emerging construction, it must be said that at the same time 
that it develops new features, it is also “subject to constraints which [do] not affect the 
parent constructions” (p. 471). These are the constraints:  
 
a. The only nouns available are those which make reference to occupations and 
the like (writer, poet, professor, etc.) 
b. The construction is frozen with respect to the referential options of the first 
unit. If the common noun is expanded, it would saturate reference and the 
whole structure could not be pronounced “in a fully integrated manner” (p. 
472). 
c. Restrictions related to conventionalization and idiomaticity also affect the 
construction. That is, the construction “does not accommodate two full NPs 
– at least not with the same grounding mechanism (determiner the)” (*the 
writer the poet vs. my sister the dancer) (p. 472). 





d. The possibility of reversibility of the poet Burns is another emergent 
property of this structure given “the ‘traces of equality’ that have long 
characterized the notion of apposition” (p. 473).  
 
As far as recognisability ‘from the top’ is concerned, and in line with 
Construction Grammar tenets and its view on compositionality, it is considered that 
“language users develop language systems that maximize the expression of meaning, so 
meaning – not componentiality – is really the final purpose of language” (p. 474).  
Additionally, in a construction like the poet Burns, “right after the the top of the 
structure can be reached automatically via neuromotor routinization, and the top is after 
all what we need to make sense of the meaning” (p. 474). Therefore, in Acuña-Fariña’s 
opinion, given the major advances in the field of memory and the role of frequency in 
cognition, it makes much more sense to accept that:  
 
[I]t is actually more wasteful for the mind to generate the same percept all 
over again, especially if what is to be generated has already been generated 
a million times in the past. In such circumstances, all that is needed is 
recognition and retrieval, of structure, for notice that absence of fine-
grained internal structure by no means entails absence of structure: all these 
strings are clear, unambiguous NPs at the top (Acuña-Fariña 2009: 476, 
emphasis in the original). 
  
 As a conclusion, the the + common noun + proper noun construction, considered 
as the “prototypical” close appositive construction, is inserted into a ‘rich ecological 
niche’ where it relates to the rest of the different types of close appositions. Its internal 
structure is due to a fusion process of two NP structures (th  + modifier + proper noun 
and the + head noun + modifier) which has as a result a construction with its own 





specific constrains characterised by a social referential role and a hybrid internal 
structure that is nevertheless easily identifiable from the top.  Given its NP-origin this 
construction is considered to be an inchoate NP as a consequence of the indefinite form 

























































Constructional links between close appositions and ordinary 
noun phrases 
 
4.1 Heterogeneity within the close appositive group, but only one head 
The previous chapter provides an extensive list of similar but different structures which 
have fallen under the definition of apposition at the same time as it offers a panoramic 
view about the historical evolution of the notion of close apposition. Instances like the 
writer Alice Walker (considered as the prototype) have given way to examples like this 
bloke Mark. Some authors have described all possible appositive structures as forming a 
homogeneous group (see Korzen 2006), and others argue in favour of a heterogeneous 
group even though they allege a uniform internal structure (see section 3.3.6; Keizer 
2007a). With respect to these two differing positions, the aim of this chapter is to 
demonstrate that even though most close appositive constructions are characterized by a 
strong degree of conventionalization and a fixed internal structure, some in fact show 
how structural variation is itself one of the main characteristics of language, as seen in 
their own varied internal structure. 
 
 The following sections concentrate on the analysis of the possible close 
appositive constructions from the point of view of the present work. First of all, section 
4.2 deals with the CA prototype, the structure in the writer Alice Walker, which has 
intuitively been taken to represent close apposition at large. It deals with the fact that 
such structures (Det + N + N) do not have a poor internal structure. Following this, the 
main subtypes of CA will be analysed in section 4.3, with sub-sections 4.3.1-6 each 
devoted to the particular analysis of one specific type. It will be shown that the majority 
of them are characterised by a strong degree of conventionalisation and fixity and that 





they are also characterized by a relatively fossilised schematicity with low type 
frequency (Bybee 1985; Ogura 1993; Smith 2001) and large token frequency. This 
makes recognisability ‘from the top’ (Acuña-Fariña 2009) one of the main features in 
the identification of close appositive constructions (Haiman 1994; Boyland 1996; Hay 
2001). However, the issue is in fact not so simple or straightforward; it will also be 
shown that these various seemingly binominal constructions (Keizer 2007a: 22) do not 
all have exactly the same internal constituency, especially if by constituency we 
understand something perfectly well demarcated. With all these possible close 
appositive constructions in mind, section 4.4 will deal with a possible network structure 
of close apposition. This may be considered as an attempt to prove whether a map of 
taxonomic and inheritance ties (Goldberg 1995), such as the one that can be recognised 
for loose appositive constructions (Acuña-Fariña 2006), can also be drawn for CA. If 
this were feasible, a further challenge would be to demonstrate what sort of ontological 
reality such a map might have, an issue related to whether CA is to be seen as a 
monosemous or polysemous category. This section also attempts to show CA structures 
as an interconnected group of constructions with strong internal relationships between 
them. It does so through a construction-grammar-inspired approach with cognitive-
grammar overtones such as the one advocated by, for instance, Fillmore et al. (1988), 
Langacker (1987a, 1991, 1993), Culicover (1999), Kay & Fillmore (1999), Goldberg 
(1995, 2006), Goldberg & Jackendoff (2004), and Jackendoff (2008), among others. 










4.2 The prototypical CA construction: the writer Alice Walker 
It is perhaps shocking to realise that the construction he writer Alice Walker 
construction, such an innocent-looking structure in itself, has never been wholly 
clarified. Part of the problem stems from the fact that it shows such a similar superficial 
organization to its loose counterpart (the writer + comma + Alice Walker) that it is has 
been treated as a second-class construction unworthy of consideration. At the same 
time, this close-but-loose constructions connects CAs to a group of intonationally 
demarcated structures with often unique predicative properties (see Burton-Roberts 
1975; Matthews 1981; Kolliakou 2004; Lekakou & Szendröi 2007; Keizer 2005, 
2007a,b; Acuña-Fariña 1999, 2000, 2006 a, b, 2009). In part, the root cause of the close-
appositive problem lies the difficulty of deciding whether the writer Alice Walker 
patterns more with the writer over there or with the excellent Alice Walker (bold type is 
used to indicate head status). This is what we now need to resolve.  
 
Traditional grammar has wavered between the three views mentioned in chapter 
3, that is, between U1 or U2 is the head, or whether of them are. It must be recalled, 
however, that evidence exists to support the contention that U1 is the head:  
(a) Pluralization: usually speakers prefer to say the painters Van Gogh instead of 
the painter Van Goghs (except when a contrastive interpretation is intended; see 
Burton-Roberts 1975; Keizer 2007a: 56 ff). Moreover, in the presence of two proper 
nouns, it is the common noun that receives the inflectional plural mark: the Whitemarsh 
brothers Tom and Phillip.  
(b) Agreement: consistent with information on pluralization, formal agreement is 
established between the verb and the common noun: the painters Van Gogh were so 
different.  





(c) Constituent order: compare two extremely similar structures such, as Alice 
Walker the writer and the writer Alice Walker. If Alice Walker the writer means the 
Alice Walker who is a writer and the theme Alice Walker functions as head, and if the 
predicative non-referential string the writer is the attribute, it seems reasonable to 
suggest, on the same thematic grounds, that in the writer Alice Walker, writer is the 
profiled constituent of the whole structure that is qualified by the U2 segment Alice 
Walker. 
(d) Taxonomic ties (Goldberg 1995). This is the topic of section 4.4, but for now 
we might consider another comparison, this time between th  writer Alice Walker and 
my sister Cath constructions. Looking only at the meaning of the my sister Cath string, 
it is immediately clear that we are not talking about *my Cath who is a sister (wi h U2 
as head; compare: [the Alice Walker] who is a writer). But the obvious external 
similarities between these two constructions, and given the apparently clear U1 
constituency of the possessive close appositive construction, the writer Alice Walker 
might be also considered a head-modifier construction.  
 
There is also evidence to suggest that U2, the proper noun, is the profiled 
constituent:  
(a) Stress patterns: a secondary + primary stress pattern for the writer Alice 
Walker (Haugen 1953; Keizer 2007a: 24) would be keeping with a U2 head status 
analysis due to the similarity with the kitchen table or the large truck. 
(b) Selection restrictions: at least in its most natural use, the proper noun, in the 
writer Alice Walker, seems to be the one which imposes conditions on the kind of 
constituents that can co-occur with it, specifically that they must be definite and add 
something to the bare name (Acuña-Fariña 1996); normally, *the Alice Walker, *an 





Alice Walker, *Writers Alice Walker, that is, are all wrong. However, Keizer (2007a: 32 
ff.) contends that these restrictions on definiteness are not real given that cases like an 
excellent Clint Eastwood and a Clint Eastwood never seen before a  indeed acceptable. 
In any case, for these structures to be correctly used, they must all show one of the 
following features: a) the proper noun must suffer a recategorization into a common 
noun (as Keizer herself points out); b) or their meaning must change slightly , with 
either an ‘a certain’ interpretation or a contrastive interpretation becoming obligatory ( 
(certain) Clint Eastwood never seen before; it was an excellent Clint Eastwood that won 
the Oscar), or c) the pronunciation of the article must be forced to signal the change 
(/ei/ Clint Eastwood that astonished the stands). All this suggests that we are dealing 
with a related but different construction. 
At the same time, premodification guarantees the proper noun as the constituent 
that imposes conditions on the whole structure. When premodifying adjectives occur in 
the construction, the string sounds better when the adjective points more clearly to the 
proper noun: the excellent writer Alice Walker, the great writer Alice Walker, the 
famous writer Alice Walker are all fine because it is natural to say the excellent Alice 
Walker, the great Alice Walker, and the famous Alice Walker (Acuña-Fariña 1999). 
Conversely, the short writer Alice Walker sounds strange precisely because th  short 
Alice Walker also sounds strange. Keizer (2007a: 33 ff.) also points out that close 
appositive constructions like a soppy elder brother Robert or this bloke Smith are 
attested in corpora. These might be considered instances of indefinite CA with a U1 
head, but in the next section it will be argued that they are different from definite CA 
and that their idiosyncrasy does not fit a constructionist approach to grammar.  
(c) The first, common noun is severely constrained in its potential for 
elaboration: if structures like (?)the acclaimed writer Alice Walker, ?/*the writer 





acclaimed Alice Walker, *the writer of feminist works Alice Walker, *the writer of 
multicultural origins Alice Walker, *the writer that won the Pulitzer Prize Alice Walker 
are deprived of intonational boundaries, their acceptability decreases. These examples 
illustrate the linguistic impact that the saturation of the first segment causes on the 
whole construction (Acuña-Fariña 1996; also Burton-Roberts 1975). Saturation means 
that the first common noun acquires enough specificity to make reference by itself, and 
once reference is established any further addition must appear dissociated from the 
nominal core. In that way, close apposition would not be the most adequate 
construction, giving rise to the use of a loose appositive structure which offers different 
referential properties (however, see Keizer 2007a: 35 for the view that such cases are 
not ungrammatical). On the contrary, the construction does not constrain U2 with the 
limitations imposed on U1. The proper noun may co-occur with the same determiners 
and adjectives with which it ordinarily occurs outside close apposition: the Alic  Walker 
that we all know, the admired Alice Walker. It should also be noted that the slight 
change to the construction seems to affect it enough for it become another construction. 
This suggests a strong degree of entrenchment and conventionalisation (see section 4.4).  
 
Finally, there is evidence to suggest that it may in fact not be possible to 
differentiate between the two nouns, and that both contribute in the same way to the 
construction.  
(a) Distribution: if integration within a productive paradigm is positive proof of 
the validity of one analysis or other, in this specific case both analyses (U1 head or U2 
head) of the same construction would be easily integrated in existing paradigms: the 
writer Alice Walker might be like the excellent Alice Walker, with a clear U2 profiled 





element (the + Mod + Head); but it might also be like the writer over there, with a clear 
U1 centre (the + Head + Mod).  
(b) Pronominalization: this is usually a good indicator of head status, but, 
revealingly, in CAs like the writer Alice Walker one cannot pronominalize any of the 
nouns alone, but only the entire structure: the writer Alice Walker/ *the one Virginia 
Wolf; the writer Alice Walker/ *the teacher one (meaning: the Alice Walker who is a 
teacher). In a clear endocentric structure like the leather jacket, one can only 
pronominalize the head (the leather one), and pronominalization actually ‘reveals’ the 
head. 
 
Despite having long been considered an uncontroversial phenomenon in 
linguistics, then, close apposition remains a striking notion. A century of linguistic 
studies has not been enough to delineate its structure and the previous set of conflicting 
properties might be the reason for this. Hence, rather than expecting that any of these 
principal views on close apposition (U1 as the head, U2 as the head, or both as heads) 
be capable of describing the internal structure of all the possible close appositive 
constructions, it might perhaps be more useful to consider that the head status of the 
construction is simply not resolved. As we have seen, according to Acuña-Fariña (2009; 
also see section 3.3.7) the main idea that we can draw from these strings is that they 
exhibit traces of constituency pointing in conflicting directions, and, at the same time, 
that these traces are inchoate due to lack of strong functional pressure. There seems to 
be three main reasons for this:  
 
1. because the construction has as its job the activation of a soci l referent, 
and in the social world that we inhabit this is usually done either by name or 
profession (i.e. not by height, size, colour of the eyes, etc), with no reason to 





prefer one over the other, and no logical incompatibility between the two; 2. 
because the construction is a hybrid  of distinct and more productive (and 
fully elaborated) templates, which act as attractor poles and pull 
constituency in opposite directions; and 3. and more importantly, because 
the construction is easily identifiable as such ‘from the top’. This makes it 
unnecessary to have to spend valuable cognitive resources (like creating, 
storing and deploying inaudible, abstract, constituent structure) when, 
somewhat metaphorically, we can reach the final destination of that journey 
(last stop: meaning) directly, as it were, with no changing of trains (Haiman 
1994; Boyland 1996; Hay 2001), (Acuña-Fariña 2009: 470, emphasis in the 
original). 
 
With respect to the social referent and the social role implied in the close 
appositive construction as advocated by Acuña-Fariña, I agree that the great majority of 
the instances that can be seen as prototypical, close appositions contain a social referent 
(the ambassador Margaret Scobey, the astronomer Martin Reese, the prince Charles of 
Wales, the actor Tom Hanks), even though, as we will see in sections 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.4 
this is not true of all types (Kermit the frog; the word ‘courtesy’).  
 
Despite these ‘traces of constituency’, I will argue here that the Det + N 
(modifier) + N (head) structure when dealing with prototypical close appositions like 
the writer Alice Walker is the most appropriate analysis (the situation changes in the 
analysis structures like my sister Cath, see section 4.3.1). Apart from the traditional 
evidence advocated above in favour of this syntactic distribution (the secondary-primary 
stress pattern, selection restrictions, the fact that the first common noun is constrained in 
its potential for elaboration), it might be argued that a further – and conclusive – proof 
exists that this is indeed the most accurate structural analysis of the internal 
constituency of this type of construction; it is that prototypical close appositive 





constructions, that is, those composed of a Det (definite article) + N (common) +N 
(proper), are clear examples of a structure whose internal syntactic constituency can be 
solved using the reference point model (Langacker 1993, 2009). 
 
Before applying the reference point model here, its functioning and the main 
purpose of its application will be set out. Langacker (1993: 8) depicts a reference point 
in the following way:  
 
(...) one entity (...) is invoked as a reference point for purposes of 
establishing mental contact with another (...). 
 
 On the same grounds, Van Hoek (1995: 313) considers that: 
 
[r]eference points are, intuitively speaking, local topics – elements which 
the conceptualizer (the speaker or addressee) uses to contextualize other 
elements.  
 
That is, the reference point word is used as a springboard of the target element that 
functions as the head of the construction. Langacker confers great linguistic importance 
on this model, in light of the fact that “our reference point ability [which] is 
fundamental and ubiquitous, and it occurs in the first place because it serves as a useful 











Figure 4. The Reference Point model (Langacker 1993: 6) 
 
                                                                            C = conceptualizer 
                                                                            R = reference point 
                                                                            T = target 
                                                                            D = dominion  
                                                                                            = mental path  
                                     




The following definition offers an explanation of the position of the reference point with 
respect to the whole figure:  
 
Observe that a heavy-line circle is used for the reference-point. The intent is 
to indicate that the reference point has a certain cognitive salience, either 
intrinsic or contextually determined. It is, of course, owing to some kind of 
salience that an entity comes to be chosen as a reference point in the first 
place (Langacker 1993: 6, emphasis added).   
 
Likewise, with respect to this ‘some kind of salience’ feature: 
 
Reference point organization is determined largely by semantic 
prominence. Two kinds of prominence have been established as central 
within CG: PROFILING and FIGURE/GROUND ASYMMETRY 
(Langacker 1987a). Profiling is central to the CG definitions of core 
grammatical constructs such as syntactic categories (nouns, verbs, etc.), as 
well as the notions head, complements, and modifier; figure/ground 












asymmetry is the basis for the CG definitions of grammatical relations (Van 
Hoek 1995: 314-315, emphasis added).  
 
Yet, how are ‘some kind of salience’ and ‘semantic prominence’, but how are this 
salience and this prominence achieved? In order to answer this, let us concentrate on our 
current example, the writer Alice Walker. In this case, I suggest that in this specific case 
the common noun writer is the reference point of the structure, but, where does its 
salience come from? Following the cognitive orientation of this kind analysis, the 
salient status has to do with a taxonomic analysis of the structure and the basic level of 
concepts. Taylor (2002: 128-130) points out that “a taxonomy is a system of classifying 
things” and that “(...) in natural languages [it] is not so much a neat classification of 
everything, but quite well developed and compact taxonomies for specific domains of 
experience”. Thus, the writer Alice Walker could be explained following these notions. 
Consider the following schema:  
 
“To call something by a name above the 
basic level actually tells you very little 
about the entity in question” (Taylor 2002: 
132). 
 
      BASIC LEVEL  
 
 
“To call something by a name below the 
basic level adds relatively little information 
vis-à-vis naming it at the basic level or 
naming it by other subordinate terms” 









Therefore, writer in the writer Alice Walker achieves its reference point status as a 
consequence of being a basic level concept in the light of the fact that “basic level 
categories (...) cut up reality in maximally informative categories” (Taylor 1995: 50), 
and also “because of their schematicity, it is difficult, if not impossible, to form a 
mental image of concepts above the basic level. (...) [O]ne way of characterizing the 
basic level is to say it is the highest level in a taxonomy at which one is able to form a 
mental image of a concept” (Taylor 2002: 132). So, U1 is used as a reference point due 
to the fact that it is a basic level category with maximally informative features whose 
aim is to set the context for the hearer. Thus, when conceptualizing, the basic level 
feature of the common noun is used as the bridge to evoke and reach the target of our 
linguistic act. In face of this “when R is actually used as a reference point – it is the 
target thereby reached that now becomes prominent in the sense of being the focus of 
C’s conception. Even as it fulfils its reference-point function, R recedes into the 
background in favour of T (...)” (Langacker 1993: 6), which becomes the head of the 
construction. Now, consider the following four-step process (Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8) in 
the creation of a close apposition like the writer Alice Walker:  
 
Figure 5. The conceptualizer establishes         Figure 6. Possible targets for the  
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Figure 7. Selection of the target element    Figure 8. A prototypical close apposition  
                                                                                        following to the reference point  







     
 Using the reference point model, we can somehow reconcile Keizer’s (2005, 
2007a) thesis that the first noun is always the head with Acuña-Fariña’s (1996) proposal 
that in this specific case the proper noun, the second noun, is the head. It cannot be said 
that the first noun functions as the head of the structure at any moment, but it is true that 
in the process of the creation of a close apposition of the Det (definite article) + N 
(common) + N (proper) type, it enjoys a certain degree of ‘head’ prominence. However, 
this position is abandoned when the target word, that is, the proper noun, is reached. It 
functions as the head of the whole structure, causing the retreat of the first noun into the 
background as a modifying element. Therefore, the following could be considered to be 
the prototypical close appositive schema.  
 
(1) (Det) RP(N, common) H(N, proper) (Mod) 
 
It has been argued that the reference point word signals the head of the structure. 
So, why can the common noun not be the head of the structure? If we consider that the 
 
              Alice Walker 
         writer 
D 
 
            Alice Walker 













common noun is the head, and advocate a Det + N (head) + N (modifier) structure, we 
are effectively pointing out that the definite article is the reference point. But this is not 
possible, given that it does not offer any semantic link, that is, it does not evoke an array 
of semantic possibilities from which we can choose one and use it as the head of the 
whole structure. The target element of a reference point must be “identified by virtue of 
being located in the reference point’s dominion” (Langacker 2009: 47), and definite 
articles do not have the linguistic possibility of evoking a dominion. In short, the 
definite article does not enjoy “semantic prominence”, one of the main features of 
reference point organization, as we have seen. Therefore, the weak functional meaning 
of the definite article does not allow it to function as a reference point.  
 
 It has been also pointed out that close apposition is a grammatical relation and as 
such, the figure/ground organization influences its analysis; at the same time, this also 
explains the internal syntactic organization of prototypical close appositions advocated 
in the present work. Figure/ground organization can be addressed in a more technical 
way in such cases: “[t]he technical term for ‘figure within a profiled relation’ is 
TRAJECTOR (...). The less prominent entity in the relation is termed LANDMARK 
(...)” (Van Hoek 1995: 316). If we apply these notions to a close apposition like the 
writer Alice Walker we can see how N1, the common noun, is the landmark, and N2, 
the proper name, is the trajector. Moreover, as we have seen, the write Alice Walker 
means the Alice Walker who is a writer. If we then change the appositive structure and 
the noun phrase into a clause, the result is: Alice Walker is a writer. The proper name 
becomes the subject of the clause, a fact which supports the N2 headedness of the writer 
Alice Walker because “the grammatical relation subject is defined in CG as ‘trajector’ of 
a profiled process (Langacker 1987a: 231). The subject is therefore the nominal that 





functions as the figure within the processual relation profiled by the verb” (Van Hoek 
1995: 317). Hence, the head within the close appositive becomes the subject within the 
clause, and in both cases the proper noun is the relevant element. 
 
 So, prototypical close appositions of the type th writer Alice Walker are best 
described as grammatical constructions which show a clear N2 head structure. The 
reference point model clarifies that the semantic prominence of each noun leads us to 
this conclusion given a taxonomic organization of the words.  
 
4.3 The members of the CA network 
The aim of this section is to analyse the range of constructions commonly classed as 
close appositives. All the members that make up the close appositive family encompass 
commonalities and differences, which itself proves their uniqueness as specific 
constructions. Additionally, this analysis will demonstrate the distinct functional roles 
of this varied group of constructions. 
 
4.3.1 The my sister Cath/ my sister the dancer types 
Perhaps at first glance a comparative analysis of the types of constructions my si ter 
Cath and the writer Alice Walker might be seen as a waste of time, in that both are 
composed of the same constituents, in the same constituent order. However, a careful 
study of their syntactic structures reveals that their internal configurations are of two 
different constructions with distinct linguistic possibilities. A specific internal 
organisation for the writer Alice Walker has been proposed in the preceding section. 
This is in part due to the fact that one of the traces of constituency that seems evident in 
this construction type links the definite article and the proper noun. Moreover, the 





determiner-proper noun links show that this construction means ‘[the Alice Walker] 
who is a writer’, which is a good indicator that meaning, the main target of linguistic 
use, is once again the main source of difference between two instances of the same 
construction. The natural association of the determiner and the proper noun in the writer 
Alice Walker is not possible for my sister Cath, one of the reasons being that there is not 
even a thread of constituency indicating that this phrase means ‘my Cath who is a 
sister’. As a logical consequence, in a structure such as my ister Cath nothing links the 
determiner and the last noun, and the only possibility is that my relates to sister 
unequivocally. 
 It must be noted here that the Possessive + N (common) + N (proper) 
construction allows a wider range of tokens in N1 position. Remember that the Det (def. 
art.) + N (common) + N (proper) construction only allows words related to professions 
in line with social reference function (*the friend Alice Walker). However, the 
possessive close appositive construction includes among its members a more variegated 
group of words (my friend Judit, my aunt Carmen, my dog Boss, etc). Therefore, the 
possibilities of usage are more extensive, and the unique social reference function 
disappears. In fact, the combination of words with a social referent, such as writer,
doctor, pilot, etc. and with a possessive determiner within the same close appositive 
construction sounds somewhat strange. Consider, for example, the *my dentist Ana 
structure. A loose appositive construction would probably sound better than a close 
apposition here. Thus, in addition to differences in their meaning, these two structures 
show different selection options with respect to the N1 position. 
Meaning links the possessive determiner and the common noun unambiguously, 
but could it be asserted that it relates to sister only? Apparently, this is not so clear. 
Keizer (2007a: 45 ff.) contends that a structure like (2) is the most adequate 





representation for the majority of close appositive types, including the one with 
possessive determiners: 
 
(2) Det [[N] Np]]  
 
However, even though the same internal structure is alleged for CAs with a possessive 
and those with a definite article, it is also considered that definiteness and 
possessiveness show different features. The main reason for this is the decisive 
difference between the writer Alice Walker and my sister Cath in terms of grounding. 
Keizer seeks an intermediate position between, Burton-Roberts (1975) and Acuña-
Fariña (1996). Burton-Roberts analysed the writer Alice Walker as a [Mod + Head] 
structure and, rather surprisingly, kept the same analysis for the my sister Cath 
structure, despite the fact that the possessive does not point to the proper noun in the 
latter (see section 3.3.3). He reaches this conclusion by means of a model that allows 
him to invoke different derivational transformations and the same surface outcome in 
order to achieve his purpose. On the other hand, Keizer’s account comes closer to 
Acuña-Fariña’s (1996) analysis in that she does not rely on derivations; the central idea 
is that since the possessive does not have scope over both nouns and points only to the 
common noun, this is the head of the structure. Thus, Keizer (2007a) recognises that the 
possessive feature of the determiner does not affect the last noun and that the head of 
the structure is the first noun. However, she restricts the differences between the writer 
Alice Walker and my sister Cath to a difference in grounding, and, what is more, one 
that is not reflected in constituency terms. She supports her position in the following 
way: 
 





(...) I believe that it is important to differentiate the features of definiteness 
and possessiveness. This will be achieved by analysing the possessive 
pronoun not as a determiner (with scope over the NP as a whole), but as a 
modifier or specifier of the first noun only. After all, definiteness and 
possessiveness are features of a different nature: definiteness is primarily a 
pragmatic feature, reflecting the speaker´s assumptions about the 
(un)identifiability of the referent for the hearer, while possessiveness is a 
semantic feature, reflecting a property of the intended referent –or, more 
accurately, relation between this referent and some other entity (…). It 
seems therefore plausible to assume that these two functions are performed 
by different linguistic elements. 
Differentiating between the features of definiteness and possessiveness in 
this way also makes it possible to treat both types of close appositions in a 
similar way (Keizer 2007a: 46-7).  
 
Keizer’s desire to find a unique structure for all the different types of close apposition 
may lead her to conclude, somewhat radically, that they are all internally equal. But, as 
was shown with the previous specific case of the writer Alice Walker, it is also possible, 
following the reference point model, to see the Poss + N + N construction as having a 
different syntactic organization.  
 
 The main difference with respect to the Det + N + N construction is that here the 
reference point word is the possessive determiner my. Consider the following: 
 
(...) I ascribe the basic and universal nature of possessives to the pairing of 
an essential image-schematic ability with a fundamental conceptual 
archetype, in fact, with several such archetypes. The image-schematic 
ability is not that of mere association (conceptual co-occurrence), but rather 
the intrinsically asymmetrical reference-point relationship. What all 
possessive locutions have in common, I suggest, is that one entity (the one 
we call the possessor) is invoked as a reference point for purposes of 





establishing mental contact with another (the possessed), (...) Langacker 
(1993: 8). 
 
The possessive determiner deserves the reference point label because of its anchoring 
features. It acts like a seed containing properties from which something may germinate. 
In this specific case, the possessive determiner offers an array of possibilities of 
possession. It makes implicit reference to other linguistic elements which may be used 
as the target of the conceptualizer. Langacker (p.24) refers to this phenomenon as “the 
reference point dominion” which “provides a context with respect to which an 
expression is interpreted (...)”. Therefore, the possessive my offers a specific and 
concrete context in which the speaker can easily choose the target word. Figure 9 
illustrates the internal links between the possessive reference point and the target 
element, the common noun: 
 
Figure 9. Internal links in a reference point-target relation of a [Poss + N 








As can be seen, the functioning here is the same as in the case of the the writer Alice 
Walker construction, but on this occasion the reference point is the possessive 
 
                                         common noun 










determiner. “C invokes R as a reference point to mentally access T, [this] is posited for 
all possessives, constituting their schematic characterization” (Langacker 2009: 84). 
The reference point analysis leaves us with a Poss + N (head) + N (modifier) 
structure which does not clarify if in a NP + NP configuration like that, the referent of 
the entire phrase must be identifiable only through the first NP. I consider that that is the 
case in loose apposition. Lekakou & Szendröi (2007) offer a more solid objection 
against the double NP analysis of CA (see also Burton-Roberts (1975); section 3.3.3). 
As we have seen, they argue in favour of an endocentric structure with two heads which 
project the third, superordinate, NP via ‘R-role identification’. On this view, if both NPs 
are referends, close apposition will not be possible when they pick out the same 
referent. However, reference to the same individual is not incompatible with a formal 
construal of the same individual from two comparable angles, since referential 
coherence is usually constructed in this way (Levy 1979: 193). It is therefore useful to 
take into account the distinction between identical reference and identical denotation. 
The latter would be sensitive to Lekakou & Szendröi constraints on ‘NP synthesization’, 
and would also violate Goldberg (1995) Principle of the No Synonymy of Form 
(Bolinger 1968: 127; Givón 1985; Langacker 1985; Wierzbicka 1988), whereas the 
former would not. This would explain why *the Bard Shakespeare, nd *my Bard 
Shakespeare are ungrammatical. Their restrictions on usage depend mainly on the 
existence of two referential NPs. However these problems are solved if we abandon 
both the traditional theory (two equal, referential heads) and Keizer view that in a NP + 
NP construction, if the head is inside the first NP, this must identify a referent by itself.  
It seems, then, that in a structure like my sister the dancer, where my refers to 
sister and not to dancer, the most adequate solution is simply to assume sist r as the 
profile determinant, as the reference point model also suggests. As a consequence, the 





dancer must be a predicative, modifying phrase. The idea of a predicative NP with a 
definite determiner without referential powers is of course not new. In Saul was the prey 
of obscure emotions or Gareth, the heir to a huge state, was not a happy soul, such NPs 
are unproblematic (the first example having a copula that mediates between the two 
NPs, and the second not even that). I am, then, simply claiming that they may occur 
inside “integrated NPs” (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 1350 ff.).  
 
In sum, the difference between the construction under analysis and the CA 
prototype is that in my sister Cath the head element is located in N1 position. The 
grounding element, the possessive determiner, is the constituent that makes the 
difference. Its semantic prominence establishes it as the reference point of the 
construction, contrary to the definite determiner in the writer Alice Walker, causing the 
reorganization of the functions of the CA constituents into a clear N1 head- N2 modifier 
structure. 
 
4.3.2 The Alice Walker the writer type 
The taxonomic links between this construction and its family member the writer Alice 
Walker are undeniable. Both involve the very same types of words: a definite article, a 
common noun (designating a profession) and a proper noun (a family name); and both 
have a similar meaning (in both cases Alice Walker is a writer). But these chains of 
resemblances are not enough to justify treating them as two identical structures. 
Moreover, if we take into account examples like K rmit the frog, we realize that 
differences are even more prominent in comparison with the CA prototype. Thus, the 
Kermit the frog structure could be considered as a subtype within the N (proper) + Det 
(def. art) + N (common) type as we will see in section 4.3.2.1. Thus, as in all families, 





similarities affect basic elements but a closer analysis reveals differences which make 
all families of constructions rich and varied.   
 
Such differences must be analysed. In the first place, the syntactic connection 
between the definite article and the proper noun argued for the writer Alice Walker is 
not present in Alice Walker the writer, with the definite article relating to the common 
noun only. This is also an indication of the fact that the reference point model does not 
apply to this type of CA, as was the case with the the writer Alice Walker construction. 
In the second place, even though these constructions make reference to the same feature 
of the same individual, their connotations are sometimes rather different. Consider 
example (3) as an example of the the writer Alice Walker type and (4) and (5) as 
examples of the Alice Walker the writer type: 
 
(3) When receiving his Oscar, the actor Tom Hanks left his mark on the room 
with a speech that touched the audience so profoundly that he received the 
best ovation of the night.  
(4)  In an interview for the BBC, Alan Smith was surprised when Martin Reese 
the astronomer told him about his latest discoveries. 
(5) Hey, you, yes you at the bar, it’s you, Barbara, the girl who broke 
more hearts at high school, yes, Barbara the heartbreaker.  
 
It seems to me that examples (4) and (5) have certain features that distinguish 
them from the proper noun + definite article + common noun construction. In the case 
of (4), the close apposition is a good instance of what could be considered a hybrid 
between close apposition and loose apposition. I do not contend Martin Reese the 





astronomer should carry a comma or any other type of punctuation mark, but, simply, 
that the example sounds less forced and more natural when a sort of demarcating use of 
tonicity after the proper noun is used. In the case of example (5), not only can it be 
argued that it constitutes a better contrast with example (3) but also that its meaning is 
noticeably different. To begin with, the common noun in (5) does not denote a 
professional occupation, as was considered to occur in prototypical close appositions. In 
fact, Keizer (2007a: 46) points out that “it may be argued that (…) the second element 
may loose its discourse connection to become more of a general characterization, 
serving as a nickname or as a part of the proper noun: Edward the Confessor, William 
the Conqueror or Charles the Simple”. In (5), the heartbreaker indicates the personality 
of an individual and not her professional occupation. The use of common nouns with no 
social reference within a close apposition has become a prolific and widespread in 
English. These are normally used in order to identify a person by means of his/her most 
salient feature; features like a strong character, being of an open nature or a conciliatory 
character are the source of many such structures, as with Margaret the peacemaker or 
Catherine the troublemaker. A particular feature of this type of structure is the 
capitalization of the common noun. When, with the passing of time, the common noun 
remains linked to the proper noun, it acquires a naming or appellative function. In fact, 
it could be considered as a kind of surname. Moreover, in the case of Barbara the 
heartbreaker, the linguistic environment changes as a consequence of the meaning 
implied by the whole structure. Personality – used in order to refer to one person – does 
not have the same social relevance as a profession. In this sense, meaning changes, as 
we have seen, but so too do the possibilities for reversibility, in that ?e heartbreaker 
Barbara does not sound as natural as the writer Alice Walker. 





An important characteristic of the Alice Walker the writer pattern is that it seems 
to be able to extend the range of common nouns that can appear in this type of CA. 
Notice that in (5) the heartbreaker (in Barbara the heartbreaker) is not a profession, 
but, in some way or another sounds as if the profession of the girl in question were 
heartbreaking. In this way, predicative NPs can be used to denote the fact that it is 
perfectly common to refer to an individual by means of the attribute that defines him or 
her to perfection. The widespread use of this type of construction is an emergent 
property that developed from one of the most basic meanings of most prototypical close 
appositions, that is, to identify people by profession. Thus, in saying Barbara the 
heartbreaker it could be suggested that Barbara’s main occupation in life has been to 
break hearts. This property is emergent because the other close appositive types do not 
have it. It is, therefore, specific to the Alice Walker the writer type, and must be listed 
(Goldberg 1995).  
Now consider the structure of this pattern. In the first place, the construction 
Barbara the heartbreaker is used to refer to an individual named Barbara and not to 
somebody known from a previous context that has been identified as the heartbreaker. 
As a consequence, it makes sense to take the proper noun as the head of this type of 
construction, as well as in its reversed family member the the writer Alice Walker 
construction. However, in this specific case the head of the construction occupies the 
N1 position (N (proper) (head) + Det (def. art.) + N (common)). Differences in 
meaning, then, are in tune with differences in syntactic structure. These minimal 
variations, including simple word order rearrangements even inside the NP, cause 
meaning change (Bolinger 1968: 127; Langacker 1985; Wierzbicka 1988; Goldberg 
1995: 3, 67). In the second place, the dependent character of the heartbreaker makes the 
use of the proper noun obligatory because if we leave it out, the heartbreaker will have 





to acquire referential specificity to select a referent (it is certainly not the same to say 
Barbara the heartbreaker would not have problems in a situation like that and the 
heartbreaker would not have problems in a situation like that). Therefore, the bipartite 
character attached to the notion of apposition ([NP + NP]) seems to be confirmed in this 
type of construction.  
It must be noticed here that while other CAs can be integrated in existing 
nominal paradigms, this is impossible for the type currently under analysis (Acuña-
Fariña 1996: 40). Thus, one can imagine th small dog, the brown cat, the great Alice 
Walker, and the writer Alice Walker as all exhibiting a [Det + Premodifier + Head] 
schema. We can also draw a paradigm schema for my sister the dancer, my sister in the 
bank, my sister here, and my sister Cath. However, no schema can be delineated for 
Alice Walker the writer: Alice Walker the writer, *Alice Walker writer, *Alice Walker in 
the conference, *Alice Walker here. In this respect, the representational map of this 
specific construction is characterised by the fact that the internal features of the 
structure do not always point in the same direction. Even so, such a peculiarity is not a 
problem for the perfect co-existence of these different structural tendencies. Moreover, 
if we think of these structural biases as activation paths (on the neural basis of meaning, 
see Feldman 2006: 105 ff., and references therein; see also Langacker 2006: 141), then 
this means that the entire collection of activation paths must be considered to influence 
the meaning and the structure of the construction. The difference between many CAs 
and more obviously endocentric NPs such as the red car or the woollen jumper is that 
the activation paths of the former splash outwardly more, creating a more blurred 
overall map, while those of the latter are both more unidirectional and more strongly 
canalyzed due to the fact that they conform to an extremely frequent NP form (of the 
kind that is usually assumed to be the default for all NPs in X-bar accounts).  





So just as in the writer Alice Walker neither noun is as profiled as the entire 
NOM constituent, so in Alice Walker the writer the otherwise clear formal internal 
structure of the construction is less profiled than the composite name meaning that it 
evokes.  
 
4.3.2.1   The Kermit the Frog type  
It is clear that this instance of close apposition must be included within the N (proper) + 
Det (def. art.) + N (common) type described in the section above. However, its internal 
and meaning features suggest that its analysis varies with respect to Alice Walker the 
writer. Its reversibility is one of the main differences with respect to the other instances 
of the type; all the examples that have been analysed so far could be reversed, in fact, 
the Alice Walker the writer construction is considered to be the result of the changing of 
positions of the nouns in the quintessential close apposition the writer Alice Walker. 
Yet, reversibility is not found among the constructional features of this specific 
structure (Pegasus the horse, *?the horse Pegasus; Rizzo the Rat, *?the Rat Rizzo; 
Rowlf the Dog, *?the Dog Rowlf). It seems as if this pattern projects a fossilized 
structure, that is, a structure that does not allow changes (*the Frog Kermit). Another 
important characteristic of this specific example is the fact that the common noun does 
not even make minimal allusion to a possible profession (like in Barbara the 
heartbreaker, not to mention Alice Walker the writer), and, as already mentioned, the 
profession of one individual is one of the most basic meanings of prototypical close 
appositions; the meaning that we infer from examples like Kermit the Frog, though, has 
nothing to do with professions. Maybe this is an aspect of the growing character of the 
close appositive network: from a social role (the writer) to the most salient feature (the 
heartbreaker) and as far as explicit ordinary reference (the frog). These three different 





instances imply an undeniable linguistic reality that cannot be denied, the fact that one 















The evolution and consequent expansion of the notion of close apposition has  
 
 
The example under analysis here demonstrates that, at the same time that the CA 
construction evolves, the fossilization of its structures becomes more prominent, that is, 
the further the construction expands the more fossilized it becomes. With respect to the 
type involved here, Kermit the Frog, and those types most closely related to it, Alice 
Walker the writer and Barbara the heartbreaker, it could be contended that fossilization 
is a consequence of the type of common noun used in U2 position. The prototypical CA 
CLOSE APPOSITION: proper noun + definite article + common noun 
Alice Walker the writer 
social referent (profession) 
CLOSE APPOSITION: proper noun + definite article + common noun 
Barbara the heartbreaker 
most salient characteristic 
CLOSE APPOSITION: proper noun + definite article + common noun 
Kermit the Frog 
ordinary reference 





character of writer and its social reference provides the Alice Walker the writer type 
with more possibilities of syntactic ordering and constituent order. In the case of 
Barbara the heartbreaker, these possibilities decrease but there is still a minimal chance 
of syntactic reordering. In our society professions and social roles can be almost as 
specific and personal as proper names. Indeed, there is only one president (President 
Obama) with respect to a country, and only one pope (Pope Francis I) with respect to 
the world (see section 4.3.3). The final step in the fossilization of the N (proper) + Det 
(def. art.) + N (common) structure is Kermit the Frog. It shows a fixed constituent order 
more than obvious, as we have seen. This ‘fixity’ can be seen as the result of a gradual 
expansion of close apposition. The main cause of this fixity is the use of a common 
noun, frog, which evokes a meaning so unspecific that it would be impossible to 
identify the referent to which it makes reference, contrary to writer and heartbreaker. In 
addition to this,  frog evokes neither a profession nor a social role. Therefore, the proper 
noun must be used in the first place, in that it is the one responsible for the identification 
of the referent of the whole structure.   
 
4.3.3 The King Henry VIII type 
One of the main features of the close appositive construction in general is that it evokes 
a social referent (see Acuña-Fariña 2009; see also section 3.3.7). This feature is 
maximize in the use of the King Henry VIII structure, whose social referent is unique if 
we are talking about a particular country, or even with respect to the whole world, as in 
the case of Pope Francis I. More specifically and with respect to the construction at 
issue here, its structure depends to such a great extent on its use in the media that it is 
sometimes considered as belonging only to the language of the media. In fact, the same 
structure has been in common use since Middle English (late 11th century; e.g. Mater 





Latimer), a period in which ‘the media’ and the journalists, strictly speaking, did not 
exit (see Biber & Gray 2011).  
 Even so, the most disconcerting feature of this type of CA structure is the non-
use of the determiner which, although of a different nature, is present in the rest of the 
CA members (the writer Alice Walker, my sister Cath, a friend John who’s ....). Were it 
not for the lack of the determiner, this structure would be identical to the CA prototype, 
the writer Alice Walker. This is disconcerting in that singular common nouns require a 
determiner in order to be used grammatically (*cat ate the food vs. the cat ate the food). 
On the other hand, whenever a proper noun is premodified, a determiner must 
obligatorily be used (John drank two bottles of water vs. *Thirsty John drank two 
bottles of water vs. A thirsty John drank two bottles of water). However, in King Henry, 
where Henry is premodified by a common noun, there is no determiner and the 
construction is perfectly grammatical.  
 
The omnipresent determiner of the CA construction allows certain types of 
grammatical tests with respect to members of the CA group. One such test is 
reversibility option which was taken to be one of the main tests that structures must pass 
before they were considered appositions. The non-use of the definite article implied that 
the syntactic possibilities of this structure are reduced and reversibility is the main 
affected feature (see Matthews 1981: 227-229; or section 3.3.4). The lack of the 
determiner in King Henry does not facilitate the reversibility of the nominal elements 
(*Henry King), which itself causes the fossilization of the structure. This fossilization 
implies that the structure has acquired some idiosyncratic features that reduce the 
number of nouns that can be used in the U1 position. One can say King Henry but not 
Sovereign Henry, or Mount Everest but not Mountain Everest (see Matthews 1981: 228; 





or section 3.3.4). In this respect, the structure is also a good illustration of the use 
speakers make of language, in that language can be seen here to influence the structure 
of some constructions. If language had a strict, perfectly delineated design, any noun 
could occupy the N1 position.  
 
The lack of the determiner is perhaps one the most outstanding issues relating to 
this construction, due to the fact that the King Henry st ucture may be accompanied by a 
determiner, the King Henry, although its use is not very common, at least in Anglo-
Saxon languages (German Köning Heinrich, in Danish Kong Henry, in Dutch Koning 
Henry), on the contrary, in Romance languages the determiner is obligatorily used 
(Spanish el rey Enrique, Galician o rei Enrique, Catalan el rei Enric, French le roi 
Henri, Portuguese o rei Enrique). If the determiner is included in this construction, the 
external similarities between the resulting structure and that of the writer Alice Walker 
are extremely obvious. However, when possible constituents are added to the nominal 
group their internal links are quite different. Consider the following examples:  
 
(6) Raul Castro receives former US President James Carter. 
(7) Raul Castro receives former US President.  
(8) *Raul Castro receives former US James Carter. 
(9) US President Barack Obama says he is open to arming rebel fighters. 
(10) US President says he is open to arming rebel fighters.  
(11) *US Barack Obama says he is open to arming rebel fighters.   
(12) US First Lady Michelle Obama waves to the photographers as she goes for 
a walk in downtown Marbella.  





(13) US First Lady waves to the photographers as she goes for a walk in 
downtown Marbella.  
(14) *US Michelle Obama waves to the photographers as she goes for a walk in 
downtown Marbella.  
 
All these examples demonstrate that the pre-pre-modifiers do not accompany the head 
of the construction, that is, the proper noun, as happens in the famous writer Alice 
Walker (the famous Alice Walker; see section 4.2). On the contrary, and as seen in these 
examples, the pre-pre-modifier accompanies the common noun, modifier of the head 
proper noun. Another relevant point with respect to the possible modifiers that may 
appear in this construction is that the construction only allows a reduced number of 
adjectives. Only those words related to nationalities, governmental, royal or noble 
issues are allowed. The fact that only a certain and specific group of adjectives can be 
used here indicates that the common noun has some kind of salience (similar to the 
common noun in the writer Alice Walker, which is the reference point).  
 
In light of the previous evidence that the King Henry structure shows some 
peculiarities with respect to the other members of the CA family, it will be useful now 
to say something about its internal constituency, which seems to be a rather 
unproblematic. The King Henry construction has an N (common) + N (proper) internal 
structure whose functions are modifier and head, respectively. As briefly mentioned 
above, the similarities between this structure and the writer Alice Walker are evident. 
By virtue of this similitude, it could be asserted that King Henry is the result of the 
deletion of the definite article. This deletion is possible as a consequence of the title 
connotations that he common noun king has acquired, which confer on the noun a 





certain type of grounding function. Given these changes, the internal constituency of 
this type of structure can also be explained using the reference point model, which we 
previously applied to the CA prototype. Therefore, as in the relation established 
between the nominal elements in the write Alice Walker, the common noun King is the 
reference point word which is evoked in order to achieve the target of the 
communicative act, that is, the common noun, Henry, as Figures 7 and 8 illustrate: 
 
Figure 10. Selection of the reference                        Figure 11. Selection of the target 







       
 
Thus, it can be contended that King Henry shows a clear U2 headedness, as with the CA 
prototype, the writer Alice Walker. The proper noun is the head, premodified by a 
common noun which shows no determiner, a fact which can easily be explained by 
taking into account the social connotations that it has acquired. The lack of the 







                       King  
R 
 
              Henry                
              
         King  
R 
T 





4.3.4 The the word ‘courtesy’ type 
One of the main tenets of Construction Grammar is that constructions develop specific 
functions and contain specific meanings. In that sense, it cannot be denied that this type 
of close apposition is as clear an illustration as one might find of a tight meaning-form 
correspondence, and as Lee (1952: 270) has pointed out this CA is “almost unavoidable, 
for clarity´s sake, in any usage involving words being talked of as words”. As we have 
already noted, a binominal structure was traditionally the principal idea in dealing with 
close appositions, and it is mainly for this – it binominal appearance – that the 
construction has been treated as a prototypical close apposition. However, this 
‘binominalism’ cannot be counted among the features of the the word ‘courtesy’ type. 
As Lee notes, in any careful examination the omission test will be used to reveal 
appositions, because in this way the issue of whether both nominal structures develop 
the same function, it they were functionally equivalent, can be addressed. However, 
when applying the omission test to the construction under analysis here, the omission of 
one of the nominal elements leads to an ungrammatical structure or to a change in 
meaning. Thus, in the word ‘peace’  should be present during all the discourse, the word 
should be present during all the discourse does not have the same meaning as in the 
word ‘peace’, and *peace should be present during all the discourse is completely 
ungrammatical. On occasions, the omission test does yield something akin to syntactic 
equivalence. For instance, in the word ‘ freedom’ is a noun, we can derive freedom is a 
noun. But, even in these cases, to assert that the word is a noun has the same kind of 
meaning as in the word ‘ freedom’  is a noun is surely wrong. Therefore, the 
metalinguistic meaning of these constructions is only achieved by means of a factor 
external to the construction itself. So, in the word ‘ freedom’  is a noun, the predicate is a 





noun makes it easy to understand freedom metalinguistically; in the word ‘ freedom’  is 
not necessary, freedom is not necessary is certainly not intended.  
With respect to its headedness, this construction has a clear N1 centre, and as a 
consequence all the modifiers and complements included in the sentences where this 
type of CA appears must refer to the first noun. Clear examples of such N1 headedness 
are easily found in languages like Spanish with rich inflectional systems. For example, 
when N1 and N2 differ in gender, agreement is established with N1 (me gusta el 
nombre (masc) Catalina (fem) porque es muy sonoro (masc)/ ‘I like the name Catalina 
because there is a certain musical ring to it’). Moreover, it is clear that, contrary to the 
writer Alice Walker, in the word ‘courtesy’ we do not use the article to refer to the 
second nominal member: ???the ‘ freedom’  that is a word. At the same time, with the 
meaning conferred by the the word ‘freedom’ construction and its semantic differences 
with respect to the writer Alice Walker, it must be pointed out that the reference point 
model cannot be applied to this construction in the same way as to the definite article + 
noun (common) + noun (proper) construction. Used as a syntactic test to reveal the 
internal syntactic organization of grammatical structures where possible (in the previous 
case, for example, the common noun functioned as the reference point of the proper 
noun-head element), the reference point model cannot be applied to the he word 
‘courtesy’ construction. The selection restrictions of this construction clearly point out 
that N1 deserves head status. Those restrictions are the only possible test permiting us 
argue in favour of a syntactic structure of the form (definite article + N (head) + N). 
From a functional and cognitive point of view, there are two other characteristics of this 
construction that define it clearly: its ‘fixity’, allowing only the definite determiner th  
(*this word courtesy, ???two words courtesy), and its closed fixed form, which allows 
its identifiability as such, as a specific construction.  





Therefore, the the word ‘courtesy’ type is an example of a CA member which 
shows a clear N1 headedness structure given meaning connotations as well as a fixed, 
fossilized syntactic organization.  
  
4.3.5 The ‘a friend John [who’s in linguistics]’ type 
Until now we have been dealing with close appositions with a clear ‘definite’ character. 
However, not all types of structures included under the label CA share this feature. The 
main interest of this pattern is that it is the only kind of indefinite CA. One of the main 
issues with close appositive constructions is that they use definite elements as 
determiners, an idea contrary to Keizer (2007a: 32 ff.) who uses this construction to 
reject this quasi-obligatory definite character of the determiner. Together with the 
indefinite article a, the pattern also occurs with indefinite this and that (Givón 1993: vol 
II; 204 ff.). Examples (15)-(18) below are drawn from Keizer’s corpus: 
 
(15) I have a friend John who´s in Linguistics with me. 
(16) He also has to put up with a soppy elder brother Robert who is 
forever mooning about some girl or other and a sister Ethel who has 
all the brisk no-nonsense superiority of a true Wodehouse gel. 
(17) Oh, I remember I was talking to his bloke Mark some sort of … this 
really old friend of mine. 
(18) We had a lecture by that guy Rene Weis over there. 
 
In the analysis of this pattern, two features of this pattern that must be taken into 
account. The first is that such a type of construction is severely constrained. This can be 
appreciated in two different ways: first, the common nouns involved in this pattern 





contain “very low lexical information” (Burton-Roberts 1975: 398), words likefri nd, 
child, guy, chap, bloke, plus a number of others. The second is thatreversibility is 
possible although it implies the abandonment of the CA construction in favour of the 
LA one: He also has to put up with Robert, a soppy elder brother who is(...). The 
second important feature is that when selectional restrictions affect the construction, 
they affect the first noun only. This indicates that even though reversibility is an option, 
not all instances of this type of CA construction allow it (as already discussed with 
Kermit the Frog). Reversibility is impossible in cases where its use results in strings of 
the form ???I have a John, which are clearly ungrammatical (without elaborate 
pragmatic remediation). This suggests a clear N1 centre and this clear N1 headedness in 
turn constitutes another argument in favour of the thesis that close appositions are not 
double-headed constructions, at least not generally.   
On a deeper analysis, considering differences in the use of one type of 
determiner or another reveals the division of the construction into two subtypes: those 
which include this or that as determiners and those with an indefinite article. As already 
seen, the first difference between both subtypes implies reversibility; those with an 
indefinite article become ungrammatical if the nominal elements exchange positions. 
Another important difference has to do with ‘fixity’, and this involves thi and that. To 
great extent, the this-that subtype involves semantically vague nouns such as ch p, lad, 
bloke, fellow and guy. Specific constructions like this guy Mark, this bloke John and this 
chap Eric are characterized by a very particular discourse function: they introduce an 
individual by his/her name together with a common noun which indicates that the 
individual in question is not well-known to the addressee. Notice that for this very 
specific functional role the indefinite article a is normally prohibited (*a guy John, what 
does he think he’s doing? A would sound odd instead of with is/that in (17) and (18) 





above). The construction is thus completely frozen. Maybe this state of having been 
frozen is more deliberate/ functional than it seems. In fact, a certain degree of distance 
could be the very reason for using the construction. For example, in saying this uy 
Smith, is he coming or not?, the speaker could be indicating that he is not close to the 
individual referred to, and may even be implying an attitude of rejection rather than 
plain unfamiliarity in stricto senso. It seems plausible that the construction is the result 
of a grammaticalization process whereby the third degree of familiarity and/or the 
distance that it encodes were routinized after the form provided by the non-restrictive 
version (this guy, comma, John, comma → this guy John). This transition from LA to 
CA perfectly illustrates the inheritance links between these two types of appositive 
structures (Goldberg 1995: 72-74). However, inheritance does not mean that the ‘heir’ 
receives all the features of the source construction. Thus, when inheritance occurs, the 
new construction develops a highly specific profile. In the case here, the new pattern 
does not inherit the openness of loose apposition, which would allow the insertion of 
any kind of modification (this guy we met the other day, John; that guy over there at the 
counter, John), on the contrary, the construction this guy John does not even accept 
adjectival premodifiers easily. In fact, it sounds better if the whole NP is used as a topic 
separated from the sentence by means of intonational marks (??this shallow girl Eve,  
she is always gossiping!; ??that interesting chap Eric, is he coming?). In the same way, 
PPs are not easily allowed without intonational detachment inside the NP itself: *this 
chap in the library Eric. To conclude, then, I consider that the ‘distancing’ effect of this 
type of structures is unique to them, an emergent property developed during the 
transition from LA to this particular type of CA, as a function of its degree of 
conventionalization or fixity.  
 





The second subtype can be seen in examples (15) and (16) above. It differs from 
other types of CA mainly in that it is usually employed with first names only (but bear 
in mind my sister Cath and Kermit the Frog). If it is compared with the prototype, the 
writer Alice Walker, we find that a first difference lies in the fact that prototypical close 
appositions require a full name to identify an individual by his/her profession (the writer 
Alice Walker vs. *the writer Alice). In that respect, the pattern under analysis could be 
seen as an extension of this more classic type which has developed its appellative and 
identification function to the maximum. It must be taken into account that it even admits 
quantification: well, I have two friends John who are in linguistics (notice: *two John 
friends, *two friend Johns). This means that, apart from having a clear N1 centre, the 
referential power of the proper noun is not going to be among the features of this 
construction. The proper noun John does not point to any referent; it is used to denote a 
characteristic that may be shared by an indefinite set of individuals, and this 
characteristic is that they share something in common: a name.  
It is interesting to note that all the examples that Keizer (2007a) uses in her 
account of “indefinite appositions” occur in object position and are followed by relative 
clauses (as in (15) and (16) above). It is possible that her oral corpus contains a greater 
variety of cases and that we are simply not aware of them. But in fact this combination, 
[V a friend X who’s …], is a typical recursive schema in conversation. Moreover, 
starting off a sentence with a string ???A friend John who’s in linguistics can do that, 
would be very strange. This is a consequence of the grounding system. The structure I 
have a friend John who’s in linguistics with me has as its grounding element I have, an 
element outside the NP itself, which is an inheritance from the parent construction my 
friend John provided via the possessive determiner. I have is actually very similar to a 
possessive determiner (my) in terms of grounding the reference of a riend John in the 





discourse. In that way, the reference point model, previously applied to the Poss + N + 
N construction, may explain the internal structure of this type of indefinite CAs.  The 
verb have is used as the reference point for the target element fri d, which, as noted 
above, functions as the head of the construction. 
 
4.3.6 The we women, you men type 
This type of structure is considered to be a classic example of close apposition. 
Together with the appositive analysis that some grammarians offered, authors such as 
Postal (1966: 201-225), Burton-Roberts (1975: 393), and Huddleston (1984: 233 ff) 
have also put forward the theory that the first constituent in this type of structure must 
be considered a type of article. Postal defends such a view on the grounds that, at least 
superficially, in certain configurations personal pronouns such as we, you, and us have 
“the same privileges of occurrence” (Hockett 1955: 99 ff.) as ordinary determiners. 
Thus, just as one can say you boys are always acting wrongly, one can also say 
the/these/those boys are always acting wrongly. Postal also contends that this 
construction cannot be included within the appositive family because it can be found in 
question and negative structures where ‘apposition’ is not allowed. Such an assertion, 
however, cannot stand because it is clear that he means here loose appositives rather 
than close appositions, given that such restrictions do not apply to the latter. In this way, 
the we women construction cannot be accounted according to Postal’s proposal. In fact, 
if personal pronouns could occur in the same place as determiners, examples (19), (20), 
(21) and (22) would not be ungrammatical. On the contrary, if we replace the pronoun 
by the definite article the, these strings are rendered perfect:  
 
(19) a. *I teacher                     





      b. *you teacher                 
      c. *he teacher                   
                     d. *they teacher 
(20) *I teacher who Sue prefers. 
(21) *She teacher who Sue prefers. Compare: We/you teacher who Sue prefers. 
(22) *Greatest ones don´t do that. Compare: The Greatest ones don´t do that.  
 
Postal’s theory that pronouns act like determiners, then, is not supported by the 
evidence. In all the constructions mentioned above, the U2 position must be filled with 
a whole noun phrase (*you teacher vs. you the teacher), in order to be grammatical. The 
use of the pronoun does not just allow a bare common noun, as in the case with ‘true’ 
determiners. So, if personal pronouns, in this type of construction, do not emulate 
determiners, then the notion of close apposition is the most appropriate one to refer to 
these structures given, that pronouns develop the same functions as prototypical NPs. 
As a consequence, the we women construction must be analysed as a close apposition, 
in that it is made up by two NPs. Delorme & Dougherty (1972:11) consider that the 
relationship between examples like you, girls, and you girls  “provide[s] evidence that 
stress, intonation, pauses, etc. are not necessarily revealing in specifying underlying 
constituent structure or semantic interpretation”. However, this idea is also 
problematical, as the following paradigm illustrates (Acuña-Fariña 1996, 2006b): 
 
(23)   a. *I the girl                    g. we the girls 
           b. *you the girl                h. you the girls 
           c. *she the girl                 i. *they the girls 
           d. *I a girl                        j. we girls 





           e. *you a girl                   k. you girls 
           f. *she a girl                    l. *they girls 
 
With respect to this paradigm, we can understand why the singular forms are 
wrong: if U2 is used in order to specify who is meant by U1, then with a singular 
referent, the speaker and hearer need no further specification in that the use a pronoun 
implies that they surely know the antecedent, a fact which makes the ‘apposition’ non-
essential. However, there seems to be no strong reason why the third person singular 
cannot be further specified, since one can distinguish among several third parties in a 
given context. Besides this, the reason why the third person plural is also wrong is not 
easy to explain, especially since in the objective case we do find such forms in informal 
spoken English (I don’t like them doctors). 
 
Inserting punctuation marks between U1 and U2 solves most, if not all, of these 
forms (that is, transforming them into LAs; see Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 374). 
Taking these structures into account, several rules could be stipulated, but the fact 
remains that these constructions only admit first and second person plural personal 
pronouns and the accusative third person plural. This almost whimsical use of the 
pronouns is incompatible with both the determiner view and the CA view. In a nutshell, 
the construction must be learned and stored as such. As such, what must be learned does 
not amount to much: only four fixed personal pronouns (we, you, us, them) and a fixed 
set of nouns (names of professions and a few generic nouns like men, women, boys and 
girls). As a consequence recognisability is not a problem, due to the limited productivity 
of the construction (we women/men/doctors/linguists/singers/actors, etc.). 
 





As regards the issue of headedness, the fact that the pronoun has superior 
indexical power than the noun in U2 position suggests that it is the head; after all, in the 
context of an office in which both men and women are present, saying ‘we men are 
lazy’ does not entail that men in general are lazy but it that part of ‘we’ is necessarily 
so, the speaker at least. However, in addition to Postal (1966), Huddleston & Pullum 
(2002: 374) also take the opposite view contending that we, you and us are “personal 
determinatives” (…) “exactly parallel to other definite determiners such as 
demonstratives and the definite article in, for example, permitting the universal 
quantifier as a predeterminer”. Thus, one can truly say all we supporters of a federal 
Europe, but not *all we will win the argument. Whether that is enough on its own for 
the determiner thesis to hold is a moot point, especially given the restrictions shown in 
(19)-(22) above. In a constructionist framework, the determiner thesis and the 
appositive thesis can simply be seen as reflecting simultaneous features of the same 
construction, with neither of the two managing to coerce it into a pristine necessary-and-
sufficient kind of superordinate form. Whatever their internal structure, however, the 
recognizability of the whole construction is never in great danger. Its neat formal 
specifications make for easy categorization, and categorization is all that is needed for it 
to become an effective symbolic package including the meaning (which is, of course, 
the ultimate goal). In other words, once again their internal structure need not be 
resolved. In this sense, the rigid formal make-up of the construction makes it similar to 
other “syntactic nuts” (Culicover 1999) such as the let alone construction (Fillmore et 
al. 1988) which have a peculiar syntax, usually a mixture of closed morphology and the 
possibility of open variables which may be filled productively (Jackendoff 2008: 15). 
This affords them a private space inside the close appositive network of constructions. 
 





4.4 Close appositions and their network structure 
The constructions examined thus far demonstrate that they build among them a 
constructional community characterized by (1) a superficial N + N schematic make-up, 
(2) which means that U1 is U2, and (3) that all the possible structures included under 
the label close apposition make up a static relation between N1 and N2 (Varantola 
1993). These three specific features are so inherent to the notion of close apposition that 
no other construction shows them all. This fact greatly constrains the CA conceptual 
space a priori, that is, its syntactic and categorical features turn it into a legitimate 
object of linguistic study.  
That conceptual space is even more circumscribed in that there are a number of 
important additional features that most of the individual constructions also share. The 
first is that these constructions are semantically restrictive (my sister Cath, for instance, 
is not just any sister). The second is that most of them are short, fixed NP formulas 
which require little recognition and processing time. The third and probably the most 
important characteristic is that, adopting Hawkins’ (2004: 32 ff.) terminology somewhat 
loosely, those CAs considered prototypical (the writer Alice Walker, my sister Cath) 
construct NP by Det. More narrowly, they start with a classic determiner which projects 
NP at the top of the structure, thus facilitating the CRD (‘constituent recognition 
domain’) by EIC (‘early immediate constituency’). Coupled with the form, there is no 
doubt that all these constructions also project one referend at the top too not two or 
more. All restrictions on the expansion of the constructions, their fixity, testify to this: 
as we have seen, if the moment the first noun of a structure like the writer Alice Walker 
receives even minimal elaboration, the language-users’ processing system begins to 
activate a referential path, and this is incompatible with another active referential path 
‘under the same roof’ (*the writer of the century Alice Walker vs. the writer of the 





century, Alice Walker). This is a general requirement of the structure of nominal 
phrases, not just of apposition, but the fact that in close appositives there is at least a 
semblance of binominal constituency has generally made it possible to regard CA and 
apposition in general precisely as the exception to the general rule. This view (that CA 
has two or more referential heads) cannot be sustained. In addition to the classic 
objections of Burton-Roberts (1975), which are aimed specifically at appositive 
constructions (see section 3.3.3), the ungrammaticality of (24) below illustrates the i-
within-i principle which, according to Chomsky (1981), is not allowed within arguments 
in general (see Williams 1982). In (24) the whole NP cannot have the same referential 
index as one of its parts. Only a cross-illocutionary move such as the one that LAs 
usually provide can salvage such forms (Doron 1992; Acuña-Fariña 2006a: 13): 
 
(24) *[His i own worst enemy]i lost the election again. 
(25) Johni, [hisi own worst enemy]i, lost the election again. 
 
This requirement that only one referential pole is possible at the top is important. It is 
often noted that grammars tend to avoid underspecification and structural ambiguity for 
processing reasons. For instance, when discussing categorical squishes like the –ing 
form in I am tired of that feeding the animals all day (with the –ing string a mixture of 
clause and NP),  Aarts (2007: 233) points out that languages tend to avoid true hybridity 
because “cases where the categorial scales are perfectly balanced are presumably hard 
to process mentally”. Aarts is of the opinion that in cases of intersective gradience 
(understood as the existence of strings which display properties of two different 
categories which are therefore said to converge), one can always “count” the opposing 
properties and decide on a specific constituent structure for a specific analysis.  





In the present work I argue in favour of the idea that close appositive structures 
are mono-headed binominal constructions (although headedness is not perfectly clear in 
some constructions). At the same time, I contend that headedness is not as static a 
position as the overall form of close apposition happens to be. In light of this, the 
pattern the writer Alice Walker is analysed as a nominal structure with two nominal 
elements and one nominal head. Likewise, the idea that this structure, as well those of 
its sister structures, shows a superficial fixed structure which does not allow too much 
modification is also accepted. However, it also seems to me relevant here to voice the 
opinion that its internal configuration is more varied than has sometimes been posited. 
The use of a construction like the actor Tom Hanks or the writer Alice Walker, or any of 
those structures made up by a Det + common noun + proper name requires the use of a 
mental path whose final destination is the profile determinant of the whole construction. 
At the same time, this path offers cues to arrive at the final meaning of the structure. In 
the same way, the my sister Cath construction supports the internal variation of some 
constructions of the close appositive network. This construction requires a mental 
process which suggests a certain degree complexity in the internal constituency of some 
CA structures.  
However, some of the members of the close appositive family show a fixed, 
static configuration. This is the case with Alice Walker the writer whose internal 
structure is clear but ‘shallow’ in that the entire phrase projects a name at the top which 
demotes the internal structure of the construction and promotes the top itself. Likewise, 
in the we women pattern, a rich internal constituency is incompatible with the 
insurmountable difficulties of deciding which N is the profile determinant. Be that as it 
may, I take the line that these indeterminacies are part of the close appositive network 
character. As such, such indeterminacies do not matter much because all these 





constructions are rather fixed, extremely well-demarcated constructional schemas which 
are recognised directly as such short, sharply delimited phrasal forms which are 
processed as avalanches (MacWhinney 2001), as rigid neural routines. 
In other words, as far as CA headedness is concerned, it appears to me that, just 
as close appositions differ in headedness, they also show different internal elaboration. 
Some of them show an important degree of internal complexity (the writer Alice 
Walker, my sister Cath) but others are characterized by their fixed character (we women, 
Kermit the Frog). Those appositive constructions which contain an initial determiner, it 
seems, are the ones showing more internal complexity. Therefore, it could be said that 
the prototypical close appositive schema ((Det) RP(N) H(N) (Mod)) is the result of an 
inheritance process from the NP schema (Det + N) which allows a certain degree of 
internal complexity, and that this complexity disappears once fossilization affects the 
CA construction. Thus, componentiality can be seen as a means of reaching meaning, 
but, when meaning can be reached safely anyway, componentiality is not obligatory. In 
the grammar of the NP, meaning amounts to the activation of one referent, and as long 
as the close appositive constructions we have examined stick to their strict formal 
specifications, they all project single unambiguous referents. So, meaning, the sine qua 
non of language, is not in danger. The forms which are in danger are those idealized, 
strict syntactic structures that had to stick to a perfect delineated paradigm. 
 
The grammar of English makes sure that, despite poor internal elaboration and 
even conflicting attracting schemas exerting their influence on the same form (as in the 
writer Alice Walker construction or the we women construction), the different kinds of 
CAs all remain unique patterns with unique, if not very different, functional jobs. Apart 
from this, the rigidity of each pattern is also correspondingly unique. Thus, the pattern 





the writer Alice Walker shows an external make-up which only allows words that 
designate professions and the like in U1 position, and involves full names or family 
names as U2s. Its reversibility is one of its main features but, at the same time, this 
means that the resulting construction acquires a different functional range of application 
and an extended type frequency, which leads to the use of this construction with words 
that are not strictly professions: Barbara the heartbreaker. But the use of this pattern 
goes further, because it has spread in such a way that N2 may be fulfilled by a common 
noun which has nothing at all to do with a profession: Kermit the Frog. Moreover, it 
seems that the further the extension goes, the more fixed it becomes, that is, a 
construction like Kermit the Frog does not allow reversibility in any sense, and its 
internal complexity wholly disappears. In the case of a different construction such as my 
sister Cath, the use of a profession is possible, but a CA construction would not be the 
most appropiate pattern, or at least it would not be as acceptable as a LA one (compare 
??my dentist Ana Martínez / my dentist, Ana Martínez). Strings such as ??my writer 
Alice Walker, ??your teacher Tom Harald, or ??his astronomer Martin Rees are 
decidedly odd (compare my favourite writer, Alice Walker). This pattern is perfectly and 
naturally used when family nouns, or one of a few generic nouns like friend, colleague, 
classmate are used in U1 position. As a consequence of the obligatory use of a 
possessive determiner demanded by this construction (*the sister Cath), reversibility is 
not possible. The pattern the word ‘courtesy’ is as closed and fixed as one can possibly 
expect: its main and unique meaning is a metalinguistic one which implies that the first 
element must be a metalinguistic noun such as word or expression. Reversibility is not 
possible either. The a friend John who’s … pattern might appear to be the indefinite 
counterpart of my friend John, yet the differences between these two constructions 
outweigh the similarities. In the first place, friend can exist in the two patterns, but the 





range of nouns allowed by each construction in general is very different: a bloke Mike 
who … / *my bloke Mike, a chap John-something / *his chap John). In the second 
place, the contexts where these two patterns appear are quite different too, the a friend 
John who’s … pattern usually occurs in informal English with only two or three fixed 
introductory formulas: I know a guy X who …, I have a friend X who …. The pattern is 
expandable by definition since the extra predication that must attach to the proper noun 
is the one giving it discourse grounding. The (sub)type his guy James Woods involves a 
very small number of nouns in N1 position: chap, lad, bloke, fellow and guy are perhaps 
the most frequent. This means that its type frequency is drastically reduced, a fact which 
contributes to the fixed character of the construction. Finally, the we women 
construction only allows a very specific set of words, the personal pronouns: we, you, us 
and them. Therefore, its type frequency is almost null, contributing to the freezing of the 
construction. Except for construction types the writer Alice Walker and Alice Walker the 
writer, none are reversible a clear indicator of the absence of true functional 
equivalence, which is traditionally considered as one of the main tests for appositive 
identification.  
 
Although the members of the close appositive family develop different functions 
and their respective forms are extremely constrained leading to unique form-meaning 
ensembles, the close apposition network exists because the constructions are 
nevertheless interconnected to a very high degree. Apart from the overarching N + N 
schema, the predicative BE relation and the semi-static construal of CAs, the density of 
the ties that link all these constructions contributes to the conceptual, formal, and even 
ontological reality of the overall construction. These taxonomic ties (Goldberg 1995) 
connect all the constructions and define a region in grammatical space by means of the 





sheer density of the ties. Thus, for instance, the constructions the writer Alice Walker 
and Alice Walker the writer share the fact that they express occupations. If, in the case 
of we women and my sister Cath we choose to say we doctors and my sister the dancer, 
then these constructions may also code occupations and the like. With respect to 
constructions such as my sister Cath, Alice Walker the writer, and a/this guy Ritchie, all 
are connected by the fact that they contain proper nouns. The constructions the writer 
Alice Walker and Alice Walker the writer are reversible, and thus, practically identical 
formally. The constructions my sister Cath and a friend John who… share the same type 
of common noun in U1 position. The construction we doctors is linked to we the 
doctors and this in turn to John Martin the doctor. Finally, for the present purposes, the 
constructions my sister Cath, Alice Walker the writer, a/this friend John, and the word 
‘ freedom’ all share a feature which is considered to represent the prototypical schematic 
structure of CA at large: a [NP + NP] form where the first NP is the referential centre 
and profile determinant of the whole phrase. However, even though the [NP + NP] 
schema preserves the binomial appearance, this does not mean that the two NPs are 
truly equifunctional (Lekakou & Szendröi 2007). Viewing meaning as a collection of 
activation paths helps explain the connection between one CA and the rest: the 
differences between the various constructions are as real as their commonalities, which 
are to be seen as shared (parts of) activation paths only.  
Differences and commonalities, then, together create the CA space, but above 
them all there is something which characterizes all these constructions, and that is their 
meaning. For instance, the almost identical the writer X and X the writer are 
consistently different with respect to their discourse functions: as already noted, the 
contrastive interpretation that is so natural for X the writer is hardly natural for the 
writer X; the latter is very common in journalistic texts involving communication 





between two individuals with little shared knowledge; the former rests on some sort of 
lexicalised familiarity with the referent in question, and is more like a title. The 
important point here is that the formal specifications of each construction is associated 
with a conventional interpretation. Therefore, given that these parent specifications and 
the shared features mentioned at the beginning of this section cannot account for the 
specific meaning and function of each construction, these must be listed.  
We must now focus on the conceptual space that emerges from the fruitful 
linkage of the different formal spaces, and ask in particular whether it captures a 
polysemous or a monosemous category. As previously seen, the majority of the close 
constructions examined here are rather fixed, highly conventionalised schemas with 
little or no ‘drifting’ potential, that is with little room for peripheral branching. Take the 
singer Elaine Paige. The first noun cannot easily reach its maximal expansion without 
intonational detachment (*the singer that played Florence Elaine Paige; compare the 
singer that played Florence, Elaine Paige) and premodification of the phrase is severely 
limited in that it works best if aimed at the proper noun (which makes it a very limited 
option in practice). The same can be said of the type Amancio Ortega the businessman: 
Amancio Ortega the businessman who revolutionized the fashion world sounds bad 
without intonational breaks. The ring of a conventionalised title demands no 
peripherality pretensions. The apparent combination of two types that yields my sister 
the dance Cath does not easily admit even a single extra word, such as a first name or a 
last name: ???my sister the dancer Cath Willow (if pronounced in one phonological 
phrase). The defective paradigm that integrates the we boys construction, which we saw 
in section 4.3.6, is even more constrained, in that only the first and second person plural 
forms and the third person plural accusative are admitted. In short, the CA map is rather 
reined in by the overarching schema that captures all the members and the distance 





between the schema and the instances leans to the minimal. This usually signals a 
monosemous schematic category.  
 
4.5 Conclusions about the close appositive phenomenon 
Traditional grammar treated close apposition as a construction exhibiting a double-
headed structure. This idea cannot be rejected out of hand because such a structural 
distribution is evident in structures like my sister the dancer and Alice Walker the 
writer. However, this does not mean that the [NP + NP] constituency entails two 
referential heads. There is no such a thing as a double headed nominal structure in the 
grammar of English. Moreover, two or more referential paths are never projected in 
integrated noun phrases, appositive or not. Therefore, the CA network comprises such a 
variegated group that it veers away from the mathematical idea of uniformed structures. 
I contend that close apposition instantiates nominal constructional diversity, a fact 
which would single it out as one of the best examples supporting the idea that linguistic 
structures are not mathematical operations. In this sense, they are more like biological 
entities than mathematical ones.  
Moreover, if constructions are considered as primitive components of grammar, 
they must be recognized as symbolic units. The recognition of this symbolic character is 
well described by Goldberg & Jackendoff (2004), who contend that: (1) constructions 
may have unusual syntax, as in:  
 
(26) Our friends won’t buy this analysis, let alone the next one we 
propose (let alone construction), 
(27) One more pseudo generalisation a d/or I´m giving up (NP and/or S 
construction), 





(2) but, that they may also have standard syntax, although some special meaning is 
attached to the construction, a fact which implies special restrictions. In (28) below the 
special meaning is the resultative: 
 
(28) Fred watered the plant flat, 
 
(3) and, finally, they also have standard syntax, but the standard syntactic position is 
occupied by a special element that signals the construction: 
 
(29) Bill belched his way out of the restaurant (way construction). 
(30) We’re twisting the night away (time-away construction) 
 
If we apply these three features to the different CA constructions, most of them fall 
under form number 3 (with the we boys type perhaps corresponding to number 1). This 
is probably because the clear overall nominal form of the constructions, and the three 
main parent specifications that feed into this form constrain it a great deal. The fact that 
most of these constructions are semantically restrictive, short, easily activated NP 
formulas which project only one referent (like ordinary NPs) helps constrain the 
network too. Then, various features conspire to create segments which, even when 
internally unstable, are nevertheless externally stable: the lack of excessive drift, the 
strong conventionalization of each of the forms, their relative frequency of occurrence, 
their long entrenchment in the language, and the existence of conflicting and competing 
sanctioning noun phrase schemas exerting their influence on the constituency and 
maybe even on the origin of some of these constructions. Their external stability is 
granted from the top, by the construction as a whole, which must be listed with a subtly 





specialised functional role, and must enjoy a place in the representational organization 




























































Binominal noun phrases: your brat of a brother 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This last chapter will focus on the analysis of a type of structure which is included 
within the NP category and which perfectly exemplifies the variety and diversity of this 
category as proposed in the present study. Structures composed of a Det + N + of + a  
N are considered to be binominal constructions (see Aarts 1998). given that they contain 
two nominal elements. Other structures exist that contain two nominal elements, such as 
the close appositions examined in chapters 3 and 4. However, the main difference is that 
in binominal noun phrases both nominals are joined together by the preposition f 
which renders the construction, at first sight, more prototypically a NP than classic close 
appositions. Let us first consider the following examples:  
 
(1) An angel of a girl 
(2) The fool of a fellow 
(3) Your brat of a brother 
(4) That idiot of a prime minister 
(5) This idiot of a filmmaker 
(6) One hell of a beating 
(7) Each and every jewel of a national park 
(8) Those fools of a crew 
 
As we might expect, the structures under analysis in this chapter have been the subject 
of differing opinions by a variety of linguist, from N1 headedness put forward by 





Poutsma (1926) to the N2 headedness of Aarts (1998) and Keizer (2007a). For now, we 
will set this issue to one aside, a detailed account of these different points of view being 
given in section 5.3.   
Consider the role of definiteness and indefiniteness in these binominals. It is 
sometimes concluded that this type of structure can only be indefinite. In fact, the ICE-
GB corpus only contains examples with indefinite articles. (9)-(10) (taken from Keizer 
2007a: 86) illustrate this:   
 
(9) Then they’ll be like rats in a pit until he makes sense, and you gave him one 
hell of a beating. 
(10) Well he has an absolute beast of a ball.  
 
However, this does not mean that binominal NPs can only allow indefinite articles in 
the first determiner (from now on Det1) position. As seen in examples (1)-(8), definite 
articles, possessive pronouns and demonstratives like this and that can also be used. On 
the contrary, the second determiner (henceforth Det2) position can only be filled with 
the indefinite article a. The fixed indefinite Det2 character is a key feature in the 
analysis of structures like your brat of a brother, as we will see in section 5.4.  
With respect to the nouns, there are not too many restrictions as to which type of 
noun can be used or not (see sections 5.3 and 5.3.4; Keizer 2007a), with the only 
exception that the first noun (N1) must have an evaluative character (with respect to this 
evaluative character, see section 5.4.2 for a different point of view; also see Aarts 1998: 
121). Another characteristic feature is that the nominal elements used in this 
construction are usually common nouns, even though examples with proper nouns are 





also possible in both the N1 and the N2 position, though not very common, as in (11)-
(13):  
 
(11) A Kate Moss of a wine  
(12) A Hitler of a man 
(13) That fool of a John 
 
As for the position of the second noun (N2), the only restriction is that it can never be 
filled by a pronoun, hence examples like (14) are not grammatical. It is also considered 
that mass nouns are not possible in this position, as shown in example (15) (see Keizer 
2007a: 92; section 5.3.4):  
 
(14) *that jerk of him 
(15) *a wonder of gold 
 
Therefore, binominal structures are open constructions with a few idiomatic cases, the 
most common one being that hell of a problem, with many semantic variations within 
the scarce grammatical constraints which affect the construction.  
 
5.2 The external form of binominal noun phrases  
As briefly noted in the previous section, this type of structure is composed of a 
determiner, a noun, the preposition f, the indefinite article a and another noun. In order 
to further understand the different possible syntactic analyses of these five grammatical 
elements, each will now by described in detail.  
 





5.2.1 The Det1 position  
The Det1 position, contrary to the Det2 position, allows a varied range of different 
elements. The Det1 function may be developed by:  
 
• indefinite articles (a hell of a problem) 
•  indefinite determiners (one hell of a beating) 
•  distributive determinatives (each and every jewel of a national park)  
• definite determiners (the hell of a problem)  
• possessive pronouns (your brat of a brother)  
• demonstratives (this rag of a dress, that fool of a professor) 
 
 One important feature of the Det1 position is that the number of the determiner 
is singular in the great majority of the examples. However, given the variable character 
of linguistic expressions, there are always exceptions to rules, and this is the case here. 
Thus, with the aim of being exhaustive, the following instances must be taken into 
account:  
 
(16) Those fools of a crew 
(17) Those idiots of a family 
(18) Those fools of a royal family 
 
As can be seen, the Det1 position may be filled by a demonstrative in its plural form. 
Given this plurality, such examples cause us some problems when analysing their 
internal syntactic structure with respect to the singular instances. However, we will 
leave this issue for then moment and return to it in section 5.4. 





 Definite determines are also used in the Det1 position of the Binominal Noun 
Phrase (henceforth BNP) construction. As in ordinary NPs, this means that the whole 
structure is definite. However, as BNPs can be considered not to form part of the 
prototypical NP schema, the fact that the Det1 position is filled by an indefinite 
determiner like a or one does not imply that the whole structure is indefinite. Consider 
these two examples:  
 
(19) An angel of a girl 
(20) A giant of a man 
 
At a first sight, and given the use of the indefinite article, these two examples do not 
seem to make reference to a very specific girl or man. Yet the fact is that, due to the use 
of an evaluative noun in N1 position, the whole construction seems to make reference to 
a known and specific referent. Therefore, for the time being, I consider that BNPs 
always imply a definite referent. 
 
5.2.2 The N1 position    
Even though it is often thought that this type of structure is not widely used (see section 
5.3.3 and Aarts 1998), one can find many different examples of the BNP construction 
which include all manner of nouns in the N1 position. As already mentioned, the main 
feature of the first noun in this construction is that it must offer an evaluative 
description (as for this evaluative feature, see section 5.4.2). As such, the nouns that can 
be found in this position are typically jerk, wretch, scoundrel, mess, sexist, prince, and 
the like, that is, all those nouns which seem to be used as an attribute in a copular 
structure. Consider (21)-(24): 





(21) A fool of a chairman 
(22) A chairman who is a fool 
(23) A sexist of a director 
(24) A director who is a sexist 
 
 In fact, Quirk et al. (1985: 1284-1285) consider that this type of structure shows 
a clear predicate relation between the two nominal elements, and consequently, it allows 
a perfect transformation of the BNP into a copular sentence.  
 The absence of a restricted group of nouns that can be used in the BNP 
construction indicates its open nature. Therefore, since the main meaning associated 
with the form of the prototypical NP construction is one of reference (both definite and 
indefinite), the one linked to the BNP construction is that of predicational reference. By 
now it is clear that BNPs are constructions which imply an evaluative singular 
reference, with some exceptions which show plurality as we will see in section 5.4.3. 
 
5.2.3 The of “element” 
The preposition of  in binominal noun phrases develops, at first sight, a function similar 
to that used in common NPs with a PP complement, as in the author of a book. 
However, given the different analyses provided by different authors, its role may vary, 
and hence one can conclude that its role differs quite differently from that of a common 
NP. Thus, the syntactic function of may not be that of a typical preposition (see 









5.2.4 The Det2 position 
The second determiner used in binomial noun phrases is perhaps the most idiomatic 
feature of this type of structure. This is a consequence of the fact that only the indefinite 
article is allowed in this position. Consider these examples:  
 
(25) That mess of a theory  
(26) *That mess of that theory 
(27) This rag of a dress 
(28) *This rag of the dress  
 
It looks like the grammatical features of the BNP construction wholly depend on the 
function developed by the indefinite article a in the Det2 position. Its obligatory 
character is, at least, an important feature to take into account given that none of the 
possible constituents of a common NP are obligatory. For the moment we will leave this 
issue, as it will be dealt with in section 5.4.   
  
5.2.5 The N2 position 
This is the most open position in this type of construction. In fact, this openness renders 
the N2 position as the most prototypical one with respect to traditional NPs given that 
almost any type of noun can develop this role.  
 
5.3 Different analyses of the construction 
The following sections aim to present the different possible analyses of the BNP 
construction. As already noted, the main debate about BNPs was around headedness, 
that is, the question of which of the two nouns is the head of the whole construction. 





Poutsma (1926) discussed this problem but did not solve it. From his point of view, if 
BNPs can be paraphrased, it can be suggested that the first noun is the head. Thus, if a 
BNP like the greatest traveller of a prince turns into “He was the greatest traveller as 
princes go’ or ‘He was the greatest traveller in the person of a prince’, there is no other 
possibility than accepting the N1 headedness. In that way, the second noun is the 
complement of the preposition of that is considered to be “of a merely constructional 
force” (Poutsma 1926: 769). However, the issue was not so straightforward, and other 
instances of the BNP construction did not fit in his analysis. Thus, that fool of a 
policeman resembles a common NP premodified by an adjective (see McCawley 1988, 
and section 5.3.1), and in fact that foolish policeman conveys the same meaning as the 
BNP. Consequently, in this case, the noun in the N1 position functions as the modifier 
of the head in the N2 position, according to Poutsma.  
 Poutsma’s analysis actually captures the basic linguistic debate about BNPs. In 
fact he reaches the conclusion that both N1-headedness and N2-headedness are possible. 
Linguists like Abney (1987) clearly contend that the underlying structure of BNPs is 
one where the only possible location of headedness is in the N1 position, with no room 
for exceptions: the BNP construction is a common NP with an of-phrase as 
complement. As well as in Poutsma (1926), this conclusion resolves around syntactic 
mimicry, with the difference that in this case it concentrates on preserving the 
‘uniformed’ syntactic pattern of prototypical NPs. A somewhat different approach is 
that of Kruisinga & Erades (1932) who are of the opinion that there is no point in 
arguing about headedness in this type of construction. They maintain a neutral position 
in which neither of the two nouns dominates over the other, leading to the conclusion 
that BNPs are actually appositive constructions (under the supposition that appositions 
are double-headed structures).  





 The following sections provide four of the most important analyses of BNPs.  In 
the line with what we have seen above, there are those who propose N2 as the only 
possibility for headedness (McCawley 1988). Others contend exactly the contrary, that 
N1 is the head (Napoli 1989). Yet others argue in favour of N2 as the head and N1 as 
part of a complex premodifer (Aarts 1998; Keizer 2007a). Using different arguments 
and different grammatical perspectives, these works draw an exhaustive structural map 
of the BNP construction.  
 
5.3.1 BNP as a modifier-head structure 
In this section we will look at the analysis proposed by McCawley (1988) for BNPs. 
The most salient feature of his analysis is that nouns in the N1 position ‘“mimic” 
adjectives’ (McCawley 1988: 740). The main idea is that N1 is in a predicate position 
with respect to N2. Consider the following examples taken from McCawley:  
 
(29) a. This sentence is difficult to translate.  
               b. This sentence is a bitch to translate.  
 
(30) a. This is a difficult problem.  
               b. This is a bitch of a problem. 
 
These examples illustrate the mimicry effect of nouns in a predicate position. The 
adjectives in the a. examples are mimicked by the b. counterparts. The pre-nominal 
position commonly occupied by adjectives is now fulfilled by the combination of a 
common noun, the preposition of and the indefinite article a. The combination of these 
three elements allows for the creation of a new construction which conveys the same 





meaning as the original adjective, that is, “[b]oth difficult and bitch here serve 
semantically as modifiers of problem” (p. 740, emphasis added). Moreover, both the 
noun and the adjective precede the modified N2. This is the first hint of what 
McCawley’s final analysis of BNPs will be; if N1 is a modifier, it is in need of an 
element to be modified. This pre-conclusion weighs in favour of a modifier-head 
structure for BNPs. 
 As hinted above, the use of a noun in a predicate position causes the emergence 
of a different construction. The essence of such a difference is that, in this specific case, 
the resulting construction contains two more elements: a preposition and an indefinite 
article which are not present when using the adjective in the same position. Contrary to 
what might be thought, the addition of these two elements “serve[s] to put the AN14 into 
a surface configuration such as the noun permits: it is preceded by an article and 
followed by what appears to be a prepositional phrase” (p. 740). In McCawley’s words 
“an AN has a meaning of a type that is normally expressed by an adjective but 
nonetheless belongs to the lexical category N” (p. 741). In such a situation, the noun in 
the N1 position gives rise to a “compromise between the semantic and the syntactic 
demands of the AN” (p. 741). As a result, two different analyses of the same structure 
are possible. In the first of these N1 functions as a common adjective, and in which case 
the preposition of and the indefinite article a are ignored, as in (31a); in the second 
possible analysis, N1 is treated as what it is, a common noun, of as a preposition and 




                                                           
14 AN stands for Adjective Noun, a notion taken from Ross (1973).  





(31)  a.                                 NP 
 
                                       Det                                         N 
                                         a                                             
 
                                                                    A                                 N 
                                                                   bitch                                      
 
        N 
                                                                                                (of a) problem 
 
 
 b.                           NP                           
  
                                   Det                                 N 
                                     a                                    
                                                        N                                 P 
                                                      bitch                              
                                                                              P                       NP 
                                                                              of                                         
                                                                                           Det                   N 
                                                                                             a                        
                                                                                                               problem 
 
At first blush, the syntactic tree in (31b) could easily be misunderstood and N1 
considered the construction. However, McCawley rushes to clarify that “it is really 
problem that is the head” (p. 741), in doing so directly pointing out that its internal 
syntactic organization is as shown in (32):  
 
(32) Det1 + N1 (Modifier) + of + a + N2 (Head)  





A further reason for this analysis is number in both of the nouns in BNP 
structures. The relevance of this feature is that plurality causes alterations in the BNP 
construction which lead to ungrammatical instances. Examples like the ones in (33) are 
considered to deviate from the BNP construction:  
 
(33) a. ?Finnegans Wake and Ulysses are bitches of books to read.  
               b. *Finnegans Wake and Ulysses are a bitch of books to read.  
               c. *Finnegans Wake and Ulysses are bitches of a book to read.  
               d. *Finnegans Wake and Ulysses are a bitch of a book to read.  
               e. ?Finnegans Wake and Ulysses are both a bitch of a book to read.  
 
The main reason for considering these examples ungrammatical, or at least 
grammatically dubious is that contrary to the previous ones they contain plural nouns. 
The use of these plural nouns makes it possible to delete both determiners, in which 
case the essence of the BNP construction disappears, and what’s more, the grammatical 
validity of these structures is affected. McCawley’s stance as to the ungrammaticality of 
such examples hinges on the fact that “a plural form of either word defeats the illusion 
that the other word is the semantic or the syntactic head, as the case may be” (p. 743). 
This analysis is based on syntactic mimicry, that is, if it is not possible for the N1 
constituent to mimic the adjective construction in common NPs, then the structure is not 
possible. Thus, in the specific case of the examples in (33), none of the structure in (31a 
and b) can be applied to these examples. As a consequence, the success of the mimicry 
is compromised. Moreover, if “the constituents of the particular example render one of 
the two structures [(31a and b)] blatantly ill-formed, it is unacceptable” (p. 743). 
Therefore, N1 functions semantically as an adjective, and as such it cannot be plural. On 





the other hand, N1 is a noun with regards to syntax. This implies that the noun in the 
first nominal position definitely develops a modifier function, in which case it is not 
allowed to show a plural form.  
  
 On the whole, and following the analysis developed so far, BNPs are nominal 
constructions with two nouns. The N1 position develops, with no exception, a modifier 
function with respect to N2, which is considered to be the head of the whole 
construction. However, McCawley’s analysis does not solve what we can consider the 
most essential and intricate part of BNPs, that is, both Det positions and the preposition 
of. Their roles within the construction are not specified, neither their syntactic links with 
the nouns nor simply their syntactic organization and functions. The only reference to 
these elements is that they are avoided when N1 is treated as an adjective, or they are 
given the same distribution as a common NP with a PP modifier/complement. For this 
reason, this analysis seems to be incomplete.  
 
5.3.2 BNP as a head-modifier structure 
On different lines from McCawley (1988), Napoli (1989) begins the analysis of BNPs 
with this radical assertion (Napoli 1989: 210):  
 
I will show here that the English NP [that crook of a chairman] is 
syntactically and semantically an ordinary NP (emphasis added).  
 









(34)                    N’’                      
 
                                                                 N’ 
                                                                PP 
 
                        Spec                     N            P                    NP       
 
                         that                  crook          of             a chairman   
 
Moreover, BNPs can appear in all the positions where prototypical NPs occur. 
Likewise, these structures can undergo NP movement, trigger Subject-Verb agreement, 
they are non-propositional, and they behave like Referential Expressions with respect to 
the Binding condition in the Generative Grammar framework (see Haegeman 1991). 
All these shared functions are considered by Napoli as constituting a definite solution 
for yielding to structural NP commonality.  
 
 From the perspective of Generative Grammar, the framework used by Napoli, 
the common NP status of that crook of a chairman is also due to its internal structure. 
Hence, this type of structure “break[s] down into a specifier, a noun and a PP” (pp. 
211). Again, this analysis seems to be possible in view of the fact that the specifier 
position allows for the use of the same elements as in ordinary NPs: determiners, 
numerals, quantifiers, demonstratives, etc., with the demonstratives that and this and 
the indefinite determiners a and one being the most common in BNP structures. It 
might be added that the fact that the BNP construction only allows for the use of these 
specific elements in the Det1 position seems to indicate that there exist some sort of 
restrictions in this construction which are not present in ordinary NPs. This could, then, 





be seen as a descriptive sign of the exceptional character of this type of NP. For now, 
consider these examples taken from Napoli (1989), instantiating what she considers to 
be all the possible specifiers in BNP structures:  
 
(35) That gem of a centerfielder  
(36) This rag of a dress  
(37) A wretch of a boy  
(38) (He’s) one prince of a friend  
 
Even though the analyses of Napoli and McCawley diverge quite significantly, both 
observe that BNPs can only be singular15, which stems from the fact that quantifiers 
filling the specifier position can only be singular. Compare these examples:  
 
(39) *Some wretches of boys 
(40) *Most wretches of boys  
(41) Every wretch of a date 
 
One strange conclusion of Napoli’s analysis is her contention that when a possessive is 
used in the specifier position it “belongs semantically to the NP of the PP” (p. 212). 
This happens in:  
 
(42) Your brat of a brother  
(43) Her prince of a husband 
 
                                                           
15 Exceptions are possible, as in those fools of a crew as we will see in section 5.4.  





For all these semantic and syntactic reasons, Napoli posits that the Det1 position cannot 
be anything other than a specifier.  
 
 When dealing with BNPs, one significant point of discussion is the group made 
up by the preposition of, the indefinite article a and the second noun. As might be 
guessed from the above syntactic tree, this group can only be analyzed as “a PP, where 
of is the P and a chairman is its NP object” (p. 212). One of Napoli’s main reasons for 
this conclusion is that the preposition f in BNPs develops the same function as a 
transitive preposition. For the sake of clarification, consider these examples: 
 
(44) We talked of John 
(45) That crook of a chairman 
 
A comparison is made between the preposition of i  example (44) and the ones used in 
the BNPs in examples (42) and (43), and “[i]n the interest of non-proliferation of 
homophonous items that have similar distribution” (p. 212), this leads to the conclusion 
that both prepositions develop the same function. 
 Another feature in favour of the PP analysis is the obligatory indefinite 
character of the second nominal. This obligatory nature of the indefinite article is 
considered to favour such an analysis, given that “indefinite determiners in English 
introduce only NPs” (p. 214). However, this argument seems weak since the definite 
article the can only indicate that the whole construction is an NP and this does not 
allow its use in the Det2 position in BNPs. So, the reason why a is the unique 
possibility in this position must be of a different nature. 
 





Napoli uses as an argument the possible complex character of N2. The N2 
position cannot be premodified or postmodied, but complex nominals are allowed 
within the BNP construction. Consider these examples:  
 
(46) that jerk of a physics teacher  
(47) that bitch of a two-bit hooker 
 
 Finally, a significant feature of BNPs is that this construction does not allow for 
the use of “an AP sister of the N inside the PP. In fact, it resists all kinds of sisters to 
varying degrees” (p. 214), as these examples show:  
 
(48) *That creep of a professor with tenure 
(49) ??That creep of a teacher of physics 
 
Therefore, with no room for exceptions, the [of + a + N2] segment within BNP 
structures cannot be anything other than a common PP complement of the N1 head, 
even despite the obvious restrictions that this implies.   
 
 As briefly discussed above, there appears to be some small degree of variation 
in the internal structure of BNPs. This seems to be caused by the use of a possessive in 
the Det1 position, which for Napoli is the specifier position. As we have seen, the 
possessive is semantically linked to N2, contrary to that, this, a, one and the used in the 
same position. In this case, the ‘special’ semantic link of the possessive seems to 
determine the use of the indefinite article in the Det2 position.  
 





(50) Your jerk of a brother  
(51) that fool of [a/ *the] student  
(52) *That creep of your doctor  
 
Napoli contends, from these examples, that the definite determiner in the Det2 position 
as in (51) and the use of a possessive in the same position in (52) render these structures 
grammatically impossible. However, the possessive feature of (50) implies that the 
brother is ‘yours’. It seems that this indicates: 
 
[…] the requirement that the NP following of be indefinite is not a semantic 
requirement but some sort of morphosyntactic requirement (Napoli 1989: 
214). 
 
Napoli supports such a view by resorting to what she considers the two possible ways 
in which the your-BNP structure can be used. On the one hand your jerk of a brother 
could imply that “your brother falls into the class of jerk brothers, not just into the class 
of jerks” (p. 214). In this case “the possessive goes with the overall NP and not with the 
NP following of” (p. 214) and it can be maintained that the use of an indefinite 
determiner in the Det2 position is semantically motivated. On the other hand, example 
(50) could mean that “you have a brother who is a jerk in some other capacity” (p. 214). 
Consider this example:  
 
(53) Your jerk of a brother left me high and dry.  
 
In this sentence, your brother is considered to be a jerk in his facet as a lover, not as a 
brother. “So here the possessive adjective goes only with the NP following f” (p. 215).  





 More evidence in favour of the [of + a + N2] sequence as a PP complement is 
that N2 cannot have any sister of any type, which is considered by Napoli to be a 
morphosyntactic requirement rather than a semantic one. Consider these two examples:  
 
(54) ?? That creep of a teacher of physics 
(55) That jerk of a physics professor 
 
Thus, the complex nominal example (55) “is better that the analytic construction [in 
example (54)] that corresponds to it semantically” (p. 215).  
 
 By way of an interim summary here, and even though, as Napoli herself admits, 
the evidence is not great, it must be concluded that given the absence of unfavourable 
evidence to the contrary, in that crook of a chairman “of is a P and (…) it forms a PP 
with the NP following it” (p. 215). Moreover, the evidence also allows for the 
conclusion that the elements that occur in N1 position “are only those that can appear as 
the head of regular NPs” (p. 216). Nevertheless it must also be noted that Napoli fails to 
recognize that only those nouns that seem to be able to develop an evaluative function 
with respect to the N2 can be used in the N1 position (see section 5.4). Also, she 
contends that these elements can only be “N[s] or N[s] plus [their] AP sister[s]” (p. 
217). All this evidence and the conclusions thus drawn seem to lead us to only one 
possibility, that BNPs fit exactly and uniquely with the structure shown in (34) above.  
 Now let us consider the relation between the N1 head and the PP complement. 
Labelled as a null P, the preposition of  can introduce “non-prepositional arguments of a 
head N” (p. 221). Likewise, prepositional objects of a nominal head contain a 
preposition which is selected by the head. On the contrary, when the PP following N1 is 





not an argument of the N, the prepositions that can be used are more varied. In the face 
of this information – that the use of the preposition of as the unique possibility within 
BNPs, and the syntactic tree in (34) – “this of introduces an argument of the head N” (p. 
221). 
 
 Thus, it is considered that a predicate relation is established between N1 and 
N2. Napoli posits that “the head N of our NP functions as a predicate taking the NP 
following of as its subject role player” (p. 223) in which case the determiner in the Det1 
position, the specifier in her terms, “specifies the entire NP” (p. 222). As is well known, 
the element in the Det2 position is always a, but in the Det1 position the determiner 
may vary. This implies that when the determiner is definite “the entire NP is interpreted 
as definite” (p. 222). Examples (56) and (57) illustrate this explanation:  
 
(56) Some people consider GB a mess of a theory. 
(57) *Some people consider GB that mess of a theory. 
 
“(…) the position following GB must be filled by a predicate. And we see that it is the 
initial specifier on our NP that determines whether or not it is easily interpreted as a 
predicate” (p. 223). For this reason, Napoli asserts that “the initial specifier serves as 
the specifier for the entire NP” (p. 223).  
 
 This predicate relation between the N1 head and the NP following of must be 
based on a comparison with the selectional restrictions of copular sentences. To begin 
with, this predication relation involves some specific selectional restrictions, one of 
them being the fact that a predicate must take only one role player. In this specific case 





“the NP following of must be [the] subject role player” (p. 223). Another important 
feature is that, as well as being in a copular sentence, the N1 head and the NP following 
of “must match each other for semantic gender and/ or number” (p. 223). The 
predication relation within BNPs is also maintained in that the N1 head “bear[s] the 
same semantic relationship to the NP following of that the corresponding predicate 
bears towards its subject role player in indisputable cases of predication constructions” 
(p. 223). Another important fact is that the predicate position of N1 must be supported 
by its evaluative character; the more evaluative, the easier it is to consider it a predicate. 
Thus, in the BNP construction “only head Ns that give an evaluative judgement of the 
NP following of can appear” (p. 224) in N1 position, although it is also possible to find 
the following examples:  
 
(58) A hell of a story  
(59) A whale of a story  
(60) A Hitler of a man (repeated here for convenience) 
 
The nouns used in the N1 position in examples (58)-(60) are not evaluative per s , but 
as a consequence of metaphorical extension or association as in the case of hell and 
whale, or because of acquired connotation, as with Hitler, hese words are allowed to be 
used in an evaluative sense. On closer inspection, we realize that Napoli is aware of the 
fact that only a specific type of nouns is allowed in the N1 position, yet she does not 
consider this feature relevant for the analysis of BNPs.  
 That the NP following of is the subject role player in a predicate relation implies 
some changes at the level of the overall NP. That is, if the BNP is used referentially, the 
overall reference is “that of the NP following of as predicated of by the head N” (p. 





224). Thus, at the semantic level, when pointing out the main element for the 
elaboration of meaning:  
 
(…) the NP following of is the crucial one in determining the referent of the 
overall NP (Napoli 1989: 224). 
 
In essence, N2 is considered to be the semantic head within a BNP construction given 
that it “satisfies selectional restrictions put on the overall NP from external context” (p. 
224). This is illustrated here:  
 
(61) I’d like to marry a flower of a girl.  
 
However, it could be contended that this example also allows going further with the 
head-modifier analysis and thus that it would be more logical and appropriate to talk of 
only one head, semantically and syntactically. We can appreciate in the above sentence 
that the intention is to marry a girl, not a flower. For this reason, the selection 
restrictions of this sentence are definitely satisfied if girl  is considered the head in both 
senses (see section 5.4.2)  
 On the contrary, the following example seems to favour Napoli’s analysis:  
 
(62) *a crook of unspeakable stupidity of a chairman 
 
This sentence argues in favour of the idea that the PP of a chairman is an argument of 
the N1 head given that “in regular NPs we have a strong preference for such PP 
modifiers to follow arguments of the head N” (p. 227). In this way, “the preference to 
place post-head modifiers after arguments in regular NPs becomes a requirement in our 





construction” (p. 227). Another important issue relating to the ungrammaticality of a 
structure such as the one in example (62) is that the head N1 in BNPs must be “adjacent 
to the head N of the NP following of with only the minimal intervenors” (p. 227). The 
main function of this adjacency is not to disturb the “intricate semantic relationship” (p. 
227) between N1 and N2. Thus, this construction only allows for the use of what are 
considered minimal intervenors, that is, the preposition of and the indefinite article a. In 
that respect:  
 
(…) of is the null P and a is the indefinite specifier used purely as a 
grammatical word when the nominal it introduces is predicative (as 
contrasted to its semantic role with referential NPs). Thus both intervenors 
here are grammatical formative intervenors and not semantic intervenors 
(Napoli 1989: 227). 
 
 With Napoli’s analysis we come to the conclusion that language must be 
analysed as a fixed, static system where all possible types of constructions must stick to 
a uniformed design. BNPs should therefore be considered common NPs with an 
internal form and an external one. Semantics plays its role one its own and syntax acts 
separately. Your brat of a brother is a traditional NP. Such a conclusion is not easily 
acceptable, given that the great majority of its elements do not develop their standard 
roles: a syntactic head which is a predicate, a preposition of which does not have a 
grammatical role, a Det2 position which only allows for the use of the indefinite article 
a, etc. For all these reason, it would be more fitting to consider BNPs as part of the NP 
network but as atypical instances that constitute a specific construction, one which is 
different from that of ordinary NPs.   
 
 





5.3.3 BNP as a modifier phrase-head structure 
I will now move on to discuss Aarts’ (1998) analysis of BNPs. If the main problem 
with the BNP construction is the fact that there is no consensus about its internal 
structure, and if there is a constant tug-of-war about how to divide this type of structure 
into segments, Aarts (1998: 118) is of the opinion that:  
 
 (…) there are phenomena that pose serious problems for a grammar that 
places too rigid and dogmatic an emphasis on the segmentation into 
constituents.  
 
Thus, even though there is “the need for syntactic theory to be firmly based on phase 
structure and constituency” (p. 118), there are also groups of examples in languages 
that seem to escape any structural uniformity. Aarts sees our BNP construction as one 
such group, and as such, this construction “will be seen to be intractable as regards a 
straightforward phrase structure treatment” (p. 118).  
 
 Despite the difficulty in classifying BNPs, Aarts considers that the semantic and 
syntactic features of a structure like a hell of a problem are so interesting that they must 
be analysed. However, the only common ground amongst linguists about the semantic 
characteristics of BNPs – and this seems to be the only feature for which Aarts is in 
agreement with McCawley (1988) and Napoli (1989) – is the subject-predicate 
relationship between N1 and N2. Provided that N1 shows a property of the referent of 
N2 and that this relationship is “internal to a nominal projection” (p. 118), the fact that 
the subject expression follows the predicate is one of the several signs indicating the 
exceptional grammatical character of the BNP construction. With respect to the 
syntactic features of the construction, the problem lies also in the identification of the 





head of the structure. The misleading character of the head element is the main source 
of the problem because on a first look it seems clear that this construction is a common 
NP with a PP complement, in which case N1 is the head; and yet, from Aarts’s 
perspective, “it can in fact be shown that N2 functions as the head in BNPs, both 
syntactically and semantically” (p. 119). Thus, his analysis is in the line with 
McCawley’s with respect to headedness, and it with that of Napoli in the case of the 
semantic head.  
 As regards the role developed by the preposition of, one of the most discussed 
issues of BNPs, Aarts distances himself from all previous analyses, and contends that 
“while it looks like a preposition, it can be shown that it does not introduce a typical PP 
complement to N1” (p. 119). It is here that the most remarkable aspect of Aarts’s 
analysis is to be found: the treatment of the preposition of i  the following structure:  
 
(63) [NP a [hell of a] problem] 
 
 Before getting involved in a detailed study of Aart’s analysis, it is worthwhile 
considering a general description of the elements that can be used in the BNP 
construction according to Aarts. As for the Det1 position, it sounds odd if the definite 
determiner the is used in this position, even though in some combinations its use is 
grammatically correct:  
 
(64) * The lout of a businessman 
(65) The rascal of a landlord 
 





In relation to the N1 position, this can be filled by proper nouns as well as 
common nouns:  
 
(66) a Kate Moss of a wine (repeated here for convenience) 
 
With respect to the second nominal, the N2 position must be preceded by the indefinite 
article a. As already seen, the Det2 position should be obligatorily fulfilled by the 
indefinite article a, which would indicate that BNPs could only be singular. However, 
contrary to Napoli and McCawley, Aarts considers that plurality is possible, and in such 
cases the determiner preceding N2 would be zero as in: 
 
(67) Those fools of doctors 
 
Another important feature is that N2 can never be a pronoun: 
 
(68) *Those bullies of them  
 
With respect to these examples and the special features they show, Aarts (p. 121) 
contends that “BNPs are infrequent…” and that the most common sequence in this type 
of construction is the hell of a construction. Following Austin (1980), this sequence 
involves a simile or a metaphor and for this reason could be called ‘figurative’. This 
contrasts with the ‘literal’ type, that miser of a manager, in which N2 is assigned to N1. 
Being part of the ‘figurative’ group, BNPs can belong to idiomatic coinages, where we 
find examples like a hell of a …., a heck of a….; or to free coinages, a skyscraper of a 
man, a rat of a schoolkid. It must be noted that the idiomatic examples are fixed in the 





sense that, for example, N2 cannot be pluralized, *those hells of problems. As far as 
premodification is concerned, not all types of adjectives are allowed as premodifiers in 
idiomatic cases. Thus, an absolute hell of a problem is correct but a dreadful hell of a 
problem is not possible. On the contrary, literal examples do not show any type of 
problem with respect to premodification of N1, as in, that useless prude of a counsellor. 
In the case of N2, premodification shows no problems, as in  hell of a nice guy. This 
demonstrates that “the left-hand portion of BNPs is more fixed than the right–hand 
portion (…)” (p. 122).  
 
 Going more deeply into the internal architecture of BNPs from both a semantic 
and a syntactic point of view, Aarts addresses the headedness problem. His first 
consideration is that in order to identify the head of the overall construction “we might 
ask which of the two nominals in these constructions satisfies the selectional 
restrictions imposed on the construction as a whole” (p. 123). The selectional-
restriction test is perhaps the one that first comes to mind for this type of grammatical 
problem. However, “selectional restrictions are known to be an unreliable test for 
determining headedness (…)” (p. 124). Thus, it would be more useful to look for an 
alternative way of establishing the head in a BNP construction. Aarts proposes the 
following criteria:  
 
• First, using a semantic criterion, the element which the overall phrase is 
a ‘kind of’ must be the head of the BNP structure.  
• Second, the head element can be found by looking at the 
morphosyntactic locus of the structure. If pluralization is the most 
important inflection in NPs, and if we pluralize a structure like that fool 





of a doctor, the resulting structure would indicate the head element. 
However, this does not seem to solve much of the problem since both 
nouns take the plural –s mark, those fools of doctors.  
• The third criterion applies to the subcategorizand role, that is, the 
element that is subcategorized with regard to its complements. In this 
case, N1 seems to exhibit all the features for developing this role, given 
that the following PP could be considered as its complement. Despite 
this, such an analysis would be wrong because “the of-phrase in BNPs in 
no way resembles what are normally analyzed as PP complements” (p. 
128). As a general observation, it must be pointed out that “in BNPs 
there is no semantic relationship between N1 and the following of-
phrase” (p.128). In light of this, N1 cannot be the subcategorizand of the 
structure, and as such it cannot be the head of the overall phrase.   
• A fourth criterion would be to identify the governor element, that is, that 
unit which determines the morphosyntactic form of a sister unit. But this 
criterion is of no help here, in that “neither N1 nor N2 can be said to 
determine the morphosyntactic shape of any of its neighbouring 
constituents” (p. 130).  
• The fifth and final criterion is based on the fact that the head element is 
the obligatory one. This might lead us to consider that N2 is the head. 
However, this is not a convincing solution because, in context, the 
identification of the head in BNPs does not seem so straightforward. 
Consider these examples:  
 
(69) I consider Istanbul a wonder of a city. 





(70) I consider Istanbul a city. 
(71) I consider Istanbul a wonder city.  
 
Examples (69)-(71) indicate that “N2 cannot occur as a ‘bare nominal” 
(p. 131). Therefore, in literal cases of the BNP construction both N1 and 
N2 can be left out. It can only be certainly contended that it is in the 
idiomatic cases (a hell of a problem) where the N2 is obligatory.  
 
According to Aarts, all these tests and criteria lead us to conclusion that even though 
none definitively identify the head in BNP structures, “other [tests] offer support for the 
contention that N2 is the head in BNPs” (p. 131).  
 
 We turn now to the role of the first determiner in BNP structures. The 
discussion around this position hinges on the question of which nominal accompanies 
the first determiner. On a first reading it seems reasonable that Det1 determines N1, 
but, since first readings are not very reliable with BNPs, a deeper analysis is required. 
Aarts takes a strong line here, arguing that the Det1 “position must be construed to 
enter into a relationship with N2, not N1” (p. 131). Additionally, if Det1 specifies N2, 
this means that the BNP is definite, in which case “Det2 should not be taken to specify 
N2” (p. 132) due to its obligatorily indefinite character.   
 Hence, if the Det1 position shows an exceptional link with N2, the modifiers of 
N1 seem to exemplify also the divergence of BNPs from ordinary NPs. Consider the 
following example: 
 
(72) This oceanic barge of a woman 





(73) Some shrinking violet of a civil servant 
(74) A curate’s egg of a book  
 
As might be expected, the N1 premodifiers in these examples modify N1. However, 
there are some examples of BNPs that diverge form this ‘obvious’ expectation.  
 
(75) Another bitchy iceberg of a woman 
 
In light of examples such as (75), we must accept that on some occasions there exists 
“the possibility that modifiers that immediately precede N1 modify N2” (p. 133). 
However, there is still the possibility that in some BNPs it is not clear which nominal is 
modified by the modifier preceding N1: 
 
(76) A crescent-shaped jewel of an island  
(77) The clumsy oaf of a newscaster  
(78) That senseless maniac of a driver 
 
 In essence, “the highest specifier in BNPs, Det1, determines N2, (…) [and] pre-
N1 modifiers sometimes modify N1, sometimes N2” (p. 134).  
  
 Our next concern is the detailed analysis of the [of + a + N2] sequence, so 
characteristic of BNPs, and in fact this serves as the persuasive element in the final 
conclusion of Aart’s approach. His analysis starts from the premise that this sequence 
can never be the complement of N1. In support of such a thesis, consider these 
examples:  





(79) The destroyer of education of a minister 
(80) This manipulator of people of a mayor 
 
In these two examples, the sequences of education and of people are clear complements 
of destroyer and manipulator respectively, “[…] but this being so, f a minister and of 
a mayor cannot also complement [both N1 in examples (79) and (80)], because 
destroyer and manipulator are two-place predicates, which take only one internal 
argument. As we have seen, these data militate against the N + PP analysis of BNPs, 
[…]” (p. 134). Were this not enough to demonstrate that the PP analysis is not the most 
appropriate one, there is yet more evidence, such as the movement of the PP 
complement. Consider these examples: 
 
(81) A monster of a machine 
(82) *[of machine]i, it was [a monster t1] 
(83) *[a monster t1] was delivered [of a machine]i  
 
This example does not allow movement, a fact which clearly indicates that the 
sequence cannot be considered a complement of N1. If we compare this type of 
structure with of-NP sequences which are complements to a head noun, we see that 
movement is possible:  
 
(84) A copy of the exams regulations 
(85) [a copy t1] was received [of the exams regulations]i 
 





 There is indeed further evidence to suggest that the [of + a + N2] string does not 
form a constituent, and this relates to coordination. In a BNP construction we cannot 
coordinate two of-NP sequences, as shown in example (86), given that the resulting 
structure is ungrammatical:   
 
(86) *She called him a bastard [of a husband] and [of a father]  
 
On the contrary we can say: 
 
(87) They sent us a copy [of the exam paper] and [of the exam regulations] 
 
Example (87), as a grammatical example of a PP complement of a noun, allows for the 
coordination of more complements of the head.  
 
 Finally, the PP complement analysis falls apart if topicalization is taken into 
account. If the [of + a + N2] string in BNPs were a common PP complement of N1, 
stranding the preposition would be possible. Compare these two examples, in which 
(88) shows an NP structure with a PP complement and (89) a BNP structure:  
 
(88) The exam paper, they sent us a copy of 
(89) *An exam, we had to take a bitch of 
 
By virtue of this evidence, “hell of a is treated as a complex modifier parallel to 
hellish” (p. 136, emphasis added).  
 





 According to Aarts, the, it was a forgone conclusion that the resulting structure 
of BNPs would be the one instantiated in (90), in view of the fact that “of-NP sequences 
in BNPs have a different status form of-NP sequences in NPs involving regular nominal 
complements” (p. 136):  
 
            (90)                              NP 
                            Spec                                   NP 
   
                                                           MP16           NP 
                                                                                     
 
                                                             N 
 
                              a                       hell of a          problem 
 
 This structure obliges us to compare it to an NP premodified by an Adjective 
Phase (AP), in which case it can be contended that “both N1 of a sequences and APs as 
modifiers occur in structurally the same position” (p. 148).  
  






                                                           
16 MP stands for Modifier Phrase 





(91)                                  NP 
                                  Spec                                                  N’ 
                                                NP                              N’ 
    NP 
                                                Det           N’ 
 
                                                                 N                                          N 
     
                                    your   Ø indef      brat             of a                 brother 
  
 The most intriguing element here is the node made up by of a. It does not seem 
very logical to put these two elements together. However, this formation can be 
considered “as a syncategorematic formation in adjunct position. There is some 
evidence for treating this string as a unit, and this concerns the fact that in many BNPs 
the of a sequence seems to have become dysfunctional, and can often be left out 
altogether” (p. 150) as in:  
 
(92) A simpleton of a judge  
(93) A simpleton judge  
 
These two examples illustrate the adjunct position posited by Aarts. Even so, there are 
some instances of the BNP construction which do not allow this analysis. In such cases, 
“of a seems to function as a pragmatic marker, which signals that phrases that contain it 
should receive an evaluative reading” (p. 150) on the view that a barge woman is not 
equivalent to a barge of a woman. 





 The above syntactic trees, (90) and (91), lead to the following analysis for 
structures like your brat of a brother:  
 
(94)                                N 
                           Spec                                         N’ 
                                                             MP                   N’ 
    N 
 
       your                         brat of a            brother 
 
Some objections might be raised about the MP brat of a, the most obvious one being 
that as a modifier it is atypical. However, there are instances of other NPs, like a
number of problems and these sorts of ideas, where the strings number of and sorts of 
are considered as modifying phrases. Moreover, putting together N1 + of + a could also 
reflect “the way we process BNPs. The question is ‘how’?” (p. 151).  
  
 The analysis in (94) could be explained as a process of grammaticalization. 
BNPs show idiomatization (a hell of a problem) and phonological reduction (/helǝvǝ/), 
two features of grammaticalization (Hopper & Traugott 2003: 64-65). “The trigger for 
this grammaticalization process could be the fact that N1 has at some point in time lost 
its ability to assign a theta role. This resulted in a realignment of of a with N1” (p. 152). 
Aarts considers this hypothesis very attractive, but he is also conscious of the 
difficulties of finding evidence in its favour.  
 Hence, it seems more plausible to think of BNPs in terms of processing. Using 
Kajita’s (1977) dynamic model of syntax as a basis, Aarts is also of the opinion that 





“certain syntactic groupings are rearranged” (p. 152). Consider these examples from 
Kajita as a way of illustrating this process of grouping:  
 
(95) Those people are far from innocent.  
(96) [AP [Adj. far] [PP from innocent]] 
(97) [AP [Adv. far from] [Adj. innocent]] 
(98) [AP [Adv. hardly] [Adj. innocent]] 
 
Under this grouping process “the string far from is reinterpreted as an adverb” (p. 153), 
a fact which is supported by instances like (99): 
 
(99) It far from exhausts the relevant consideration.  
 
It is argued that the main “factor for reinterpretation is the existence of what Kajita calls 
a ‘head-nonhead conflict’ (i.e. a conflict between in ocent and far)” (p. 153). The 
problem of the MP brat of a could be resolved by applying this ‘head-nonhead conflict’ 
to BNPs, in such a way “that an NP like [(100)] is reinterpreted as in [(101)], by 
analogy to [(102)]” (p. 153):  
 
(100) [NP a [fool [PP of a solicitor]] 
(101) [NP a [fool of a] solicitor] 
(102) [NP a [foolish] solicitor] 
 
 In answer to the question of how we process BNPs, Aarts formalises “Kajita’s 
idea of head-nonhead conflict by looking at BNPs in the context of a theory of parsing” 





(p. 153). Assuming left-to-right processing, as postulated in Hawkins (1994), the 
sequence in (103) would be parsed as in (104): 
 
(103) Det1 N1 of Det2 N2 
(104) [NP Det [N’ N1 [PP of a N2]]] 
 
Aarts’ hypothesis is that “when the N2-head is reached, backtracking ensues and the 
structure is reanalysed as in [(105)]” (p. 154): 
 
(105) [NP Det [N’ [MP N-of a] [N’ N]]] 
 
What leads Aarts to this conclusion is that the structure in (103) “is semantically 
uninterpretable” (p. 154), that is, backtracking is necessary because “[e]ssentially, 
[(103)] is a garden path structure” (p. 154). This parsing analysis and consequent 
conclusion is, in Aarts’ opinion, a better solution than the grammaticalization 
hypothesis for the analysis of brat of a, hell of a as a complex modifier, as a MP, given 
that it “does not assume that the N1 + PP analysis (…) is available at any time, merely 
that the grammar initially erroneously assigns this structure to BNPs” (p. 154-155, 
emphasis in the original).  
 
 The principal aim of Aarts’s paper was to show that in BNP structures the N2 
element is the head and that the N1 element is the modifier of the structure. However, in 
consideration of Heine’s et al’s hypothesis (1991: 233), and the conclusions he draws 
therein, it seems that syntax might more usefully be viewed in a different way.  
 





Syntax, then, should be seen as a flexible system, in which there may be a 
tension between desiring to arrange elements rigidly into categories and 
constituents and recognising the possibility of unexpected configurations, or 
of shifts in patterns taking place diachronically or synchronically (Aarts 
1998: 155).  
 
5.3.4 BNP as a construction with two different underlying representations 
The final section on the different analyses made of BNPs will discuss Keizer’s (2007a) 
study. A book about English NPs could not ignore such a construction given that, as 
seen in the previous sections, a morass of problems resolves around its internal 
structure. Keizer considers the paraphrasing of BNPs into copular sentences (Quirk et 
al. (1985: 1284-1285), the N1 predicate position (Napoli 1989: 222; Den Dikken 2006), 
the correspondence of N1 + of + a with an adjective, and the idea that N2 determines 
the overall phrase (Quirk et al. 1985: 1285; Napoli 1989: 224; Aarts (1998: 124). All 
these aspects of the BNP construction lead her (2007: 87) to propose:  
 
(…) two (…) underlying representations, whereby the differences in 
interpretation will be accounted for in terms of a difference in the scope of 
the predicative noun. 
 
These two underlying representations are based on the fact that Keizer agrees with Den 
Dikken (2006: 162-165) in his contention that BNPs are of two different types. In Den 
Dikken’s terms BNPs are divided into Comparative Qualitative Binominal Noun 
Phrases as in example (106), and Attributive Qualitative Binominal Noun Phrases, as in 
(107):  
 
(106) A jewel of a village  





(107) An idiot of a doctor 
 
It is considered that a comparison is drawn in example (106) between the village, the 
referent of the structure, and the property described in N1, that is, jewel. On the other 
hand, in example (107) the property of being an idiot in the N1 position is ascribed to 
the referent in the N2 position in his or her facet as a doctor. These two different 
interpretations lead Keizer to the conclusion that two different relationships are 
established between N1 and N2, predicate and subject respectively. Moreover, the 
functions cannot be interchanged and it is always N1 which ascribes a property to N2, 
and as such it must always be the predicate. It is worth pointing out that even though 
Keizer agrees with this distinction, she states that she is “not sure that it is justified to 
assume two completely different underlying structures” (p. 87), and for this reason she 
uses the term underlying representations instead of underlying structures. 
 Bearing in mind this idea that the BNP examples can be divided into two 
different underlying representations, it will be useful for us here before arriving at any 
final conclusions, to examine Keizer’s description of BNPs in some detail.  
 
 Based on the fact that the ICE-GB Corpus only contains BNPs with an 
indefinite article in Det1 position, as noted above in section 5.1, Keizer is of opinion 
that the great majority of examples must include the indefinite article a in Det1 
position. In fact, it could be considered that the use of a is the prototypical use in Det1 
position in BNPs. She is also aware, though, that elements like possessive pronouns can 
also be used in this position. However, its use implies certain special characteristics. In 
the case of the possessive pronoun, it “notionally determines the second noun” (p. 88) 
as shown in (108)-(109):  





(108) Her nitwit of a husband  
(109) Her husband is a nitwit 
 
Demonstratives like that and this are also possible for the Det1 position in binominal 
constructions. But its use implies certain special features which are not shown when the 
indefinite article a is used. In particular and apart form the usual anaphoric function of 
demonstratives, that “is perfectly acceptable when the binominal is first-mentioned” (p. 
88) as in (110):  
 
(110) Many years ago I was singing in school, and that idiot of a principal got 
so mad at me that he yelled ‘I wish you’d get lost and spent the rest of 
your life singing to the walls’.  
 
In the case of this, and also apart from its anaphoric use, this demonstrative acquires an 
‘introductory’ use when included in BNPs. Example (111) includes an instance of this 
use:  
 
(111) A few of us were admiring one of the guy’s new pocket knife. While one 
guy had it open and holding it up, this idiot of a supervisor, trying to be a 
smartass, grabbed onto the blade. He startled the guy holding it and he 
brought the knife down. The idiot got a nice slash on his palm and had to 
have stitches. Good leader material.  
 





An exceptional function of Det1 in BNPs is also that of the indefinite determiner one. It 
“has a reinforcing function, strengthening the evaluative force of the first noun” (p. 89). 
Consider example (112):  
 
(112) Then they’ll be like rats in a pit until he makes sense, and you gave him 
one hell of a beating.  
 
Although the definite article the is the most frequent determiner in common NPs, its use 
in BNPs renders it special with respect to the general characteristics of this 
construction. In essence, it “can be used when the binominal is used to refer to some 
identifiable entity” (p. 89). In example (113), the fellow has already been introduced 
when he is explicitly mentioned:  
 
(113) When I heard her dismiss the footman, I stepped up to him and asked 
him, what little lady that was? And held a little chat with him about what a 
pretty child it was with her, and how genteel and well-carriaged the lady, 
the eldest, would be: how womanish, and how grave; and the fool of a 
fellow told me presently who she was… 
 
Finally, Keizer considers that on some occasions it is possible to find quantifiers in 
BNPs, especially with singular nouns in the N1 position, as here: 
 
(114) So the EPA and the NPS suffer the first because the Conservatives would 
be happy if every national forest was open to logging interests and e ch 
and every jewel of a national park was ready for privatization.  





 Aside from those features of BNPs that we have seen in the preceding sections, 
Keizer, on the whole, advocates that these Det1 elements show exceptional features 
when used in BNPs. It is my impression that that ‘exceptionality’ is a hint that BNPs 
represent the varied character of the NP category as a construction by itself. I will 
return to this issue in section 5.4.  
 
 As with other advocates of plural BNPs as a grammatical option, Keizer 
considers that the obligatory use of the indefinite article a in the Det2 position is merely 
assumed in most accounts, as she herself also accepts, but with the exception of “when 
N2 is plural, (…) a bare plural is used” (p. 90), as in (115):  
 
(115) Those wretches of boys 
 
 As regards the N1 position, the noun must be singular. However, as seen, “for 
some (British) speakers a plural is acceptable” (p. 90). Consider the following 
examples:  
 
(116) ?Those fools of policemen  
(117) Those Chinese chopsticks of knitting needles 
 
However, there are some examples which indicate that the plural form is less 
grammatical than the singular one, and these seem to be those which take the form of a 
quantifier. Again, this is, of course, a matter of idiolectal discrepancy, given that for 
American speakers only the singular form is possible; on the contrary, British speakers 
generally consider the following examples to be acceptable:  





(118) We discovered two absolute jewels of islands.  
(119) Over the years we have had several gems of centerfielders.  
(120) They have two horrid little monsters of children.  
 
 As hinted in previous sections, the N1 position could be fulfilled by a proper 
noun, as in example (121): 
 
(121) A Miss Havisham of a piano 
 
Keizer considers that this use highlights “the non-referential nature of N1” (p. 90). It is 
clear that N1 makes no reference to the person denoted by the proper noun.  
 
 As for the N2 position, some constraints seem to affect it. Typically, a count 
noun occupies this position but it is also possible to find examples with proper nouns, 
as in (122). What seem to be wholly excluded from this position are mass nouns. In a 
footnote, Keizer contends that if a mass noun is included in the N2 position “a 
qualifying reading will be triggered” (p. 92), as in example (123). Apart from the 
qualifying reading which Keizer advocates, it must be pointed out that the use of a mass 
noun does not allow for the use of the indefinite article a in the Det2 position. In such 
cases, the essence of the BNP construction seems to be lost:  
 
(122) That creep of a James 
(123) A jewel of glass 
 





To my mind, the use of proper nouns in the N2 position, after an indefinite article, 
could be seen as a means of tackling the problem of the  N1 + of + a from a different 
perspective and considering it as a unit. This issue will be dealt with in more depth in 
section 5.4.  
 
 As far as modification is concerned, only premodifiers are allowed, in which 
case both nouns show the same restrictions. Premodifiers of N2 have scope only over 
N2; however, for premodifiers of N1 two possibilities exist. Thus, if these have “an 
intensifying function, [they] will be interpreted as having scope over N1 only” (p. 92) 
as in example (124). On the contrary, if the “function is descriptive, it may have scope 
over the construction as a whole” (p. 92), as in example (125):  
 
(124) The great fool of a young doctor  
(125) A crescent-shaped jewel of a South Sea island 
 
 Lastly, the constituent of is, as in most other analyses, the major source 
disagreement, and consequently the element which causes most discussion. If of is 
considered to develop the same role as a common preposition (Napoli 1989), then the 
head of the construction is N1. On the other hand, if it is not given the status of a 
preposition, it must form part of a complex modifier (Aarts 1998), in which case the 
head is N2. Therefore, the role of the preposition of in BNP structures depends on the 
analysis of headedness in binominal constructions.  
 The headedness problem should be dealt with by paying special attention to 
semantic criteria, given that “semantic selection is really the only semantic criteria that 
are in some way relevant to these constructions” (p. 95). Due to the importance of 





semantics when dealing with headedness in BNPs, the obligatory and omissible 
character of the nominal elements must be studied in depth. Given the predication 
relation between the two nouns, “one may expect (…) to be possible for either element 
to be used independently” (p. 95). Consider the following examples:  
 
(126) She doesn’t want to talk to this idiot of a prime minister.  
(127) She doesn’t want to talk to this idiot.  
(128) She doesn’t want to talk to this prime minister.  
 
It seems that these criteria do not resolve the headedness problem to any great extent. 
However, on closer inspection we realize that when BNPs are used in a metaphorical 
sense, as in examples (129)-(131), below, “it is the second noun which satisfies the 
selection restrictions of the verb, while the first noun is used figuratively. This means 
that on a literal use only N2 can replace the construction as a whole” (p. 95).  
 
(129) I met a colourless little mouse of a woman yesterday.  
(130) *I met a colourless little mouse yesterday.  
(131) I met a woman yesterday.   
 
It is also possible to find examples such as those in (132)-(134), where the second 
nominal does not contain relevant information, in which case it is more semantically 
useful to resort to N1, and where the informational content of N2 would in any case be 
implied:  
 
(132) I detest that rotten little fig of a human being.  





(133) I detest that rotten little fig.  
(134) ? I detest that human being.  
 
 “This clearly suggests that N2 functions as the semantic head of the 
construction, with N1 fulfilling a predicative (modifying) function” (p. 96). Therefore, 
it seems that exceptions to the rule, such as metaphoric uses of BNPs, are helpful in 
solving the problem of headedness in the light of these facts. Being explicit or implicit, 
the semantic relevance of the second noun in BNPs is obvious.  
 
 As for the syntactic criteria, it seems that the traditional tests are not very 
helpful in the case of BNPs, as already seen in section 5.3.3. In the same vein as Aarts 
(1998), Keizer considers that “subject-verb agreement and establishing the 
morphosyntactic locus are largely irrelevant: since the two nominal parts typically 
agree in number, both parts show number agreement with the verb (…)” (p. 96). As 
regards extraposition and topicalization, these tests are not helpful either. Even though 
Napoli (1989) concludes that the [of + a + N2] sequence cannot be extraposed, in 
Keizer’s opinion this “does not prove that they are complements; it may, for instance, 
simply be due to the fact that this string does not form a constituent” (p. 97). Finally, 
concord must be an alternative test, but this also seems to be of little use when applied 
to BNPs, in that it throws up the same basic problem as the subject-verb agreement test, 
due to the fact that neither of the nominals differs in (syntactic) number.  
With regard to pragmatic criteria, pronominalization seems to be the most 
appropriate tests for identifying the head in BNP structures. It can be asserted that “(…) 
not surprisingly, both definite and indefinite pronouns can be used to refer back to the 
binominal expression as a whole” (p. 99), as the following examples show:  





(135) We employed a plonker of a plumber to do the bathroom.  
(136) He really made a mess of things.  
(137) I’m afraid we employed one, too, for our kitchen.  
 
With respect to the indefinite pronoun o e, its use bolsters the idea of an N2-headed 
structure. Consider this example:  
 
(138) We had an absolute beast of a party; the next one won’t be so good, I’m 
sure.  
 
If the indefinite pronoun takes as its antecedent the head of the structure, then example 
(138) clearly indicates that “it is N2 which functions as the head of a binominal 
construction” (p. 100). Moreover, one cannot be used to replace the N1 element, as 
shown in examples (139) and (140):  
 
(139) He had a hell of a time getting from one part of the country to the other.  
(140) *I had (a) one of a row because I refused to even try.  
 
In view of the preceding examples, we can only conclude that “(…) the behaviour of 
binominal constructions with regard to pronominalization can best be accounted for by 
assuming N2 to be the head of the construction” (p. 100-101).  
 
 As further evidence for the view that N2 is the head, Keizer points out that the 
use of possessive determiners in the Det1 position “notionally (i.e. semantically) 
specifies the second noun” (p. 101). Additionally, “since one and the same elements 





cannot be marked twice for the possessive, the second noun in these constructions 
cannot have its own possessive postmodifier” (p. 101). This is shown in examples 
(141)-(143):  
 
(141) Her jerk of a brother  
(142) Her brother is a jerk 
(143) *Her jerk of a brother of hers 
 
These examples also illustrate that “generally speaking the first determiner specifies the 
second noun rather than the first” (p. 101). In fact, when the N2 element is a proper 
noun, it is not possible to use an indefinite article in the Det1 position, contrary to the 
case with the Det2 position, which preservers its indefinite character. Consider the 
following examples:  
 
(144) *A creep of a James  
(145) *An angel of a Rebecca 
 
The ungrammaticality of these examples serves as evidence for the rather obvious fact 
that “whereas the first determiner specifies the second noun, the second determiner 
does not” (p. 101).  
 However, this theory cannot account for examples with a demonstrative 
determiner. In examples such as (146), “Det1 seems to specify N1, both syntactically 
and semantically” (p. 101).  
 
(146) Those prejudiced fools of a jury were totally unreliable.  





In fact, when the BNP structure is used anaphorically, those examples which contain 
that in Det1 position seem to allow the demonstrative to specify either noun. Consider:  
 
(147) ‘That would have been all right,’ he went on, ‘but, just as he was about to 
throw the dynamite, the fish swam away and what do you think at idiot 
of a boy did?  
 
Here, both that idiot and that boy are possible. However, with boy the definite 
determiner the is preferred. Thus, the identifiably of the referent in this example 
depends on the use of that even though its function is not the typical one that it has in 
common NPs. In this specific example, the demonstrative has “the pragmatic function 
of intensifying the evaluative judgment given by the speaker” (p. 102). In any case, the 
function of that [in BNPs] is to strengthen the force of the speaker’s judgement. This 
strengthening function of that is, however, not exclusive of BNPs, given that its use can 
be also be found in common NPs which contain evaluative adjectives, as in that diotic 
boy. This, according to Keizer, leads us to the conclusion that “[t]this can best be 
accounted for by assuming that the ‘N1 + of + a’-string functions as a modifier of the 
second noun” (p.102). 
 As already hinted, this particular use of that can also be found for the indefinite 
determiner one. In BNPs as well as in common NPs, one does not have a numerical 
meaning, “it has a reinforcing function, strengthening the evaluative force of the 
modifying first noun” (p. 102) as in example (148):  
 





(148) Loudest. This is one beast of a system. Whether you like your music loud 
or louder, the Mustang GT audio system is designed to deliver mucho ear-
blistering musico directly to your supplicating eardrums.  
 
All in all, then, such examples seem to favour the idea that:  
 
(…) N2 functions as the syntactic and semantic head of the 
constructions, at least, where the first determiner takes the form of an 
article, a possessive pronoun or the indefinite determiner one.  
 
Keizer leaves as an open question the problem posed by structures like those fools of a 
crew. The plural form of the determiner is the major issue in this structure, given that, if 
Det1 specifies N2, then there is a tacit problem of number incongruence which leads to 
ungrammaticality (see section 5.4).  
 
 Keizer’s analysis leads her to the conclusion that in BNP structures N2 is the 
head, and allows her to state the following:  
 
This means that headedness can still be seen as essentially a semantico-
pragmatic notion, supported by formal and discourse evidence, instead of an 
independent syntactic notion without a semantic or pragmatic basis.  
 
 Examples like a wonder of a city, a crescent-shaped jewel of an island and a 
fool of a doctor support and illustrate this conclusion. Their degree of complexity of 
these three examples moves from a fairly straightforward to more complex. In a 
wonder of a city, city is the overall referent and wonder describes the head. By contrast, 
an absolute jewel of a crescent-shaped island has a more intricate structure. Applying 





Keizer’s idea that BNPs can show two different types of underlying representations, 
this example exemplifies one of these two possibilities here.  
 
(149) [NP [Det a] [ExtN [A crescent-shaped] [ExtN [MP jewel of an] [N-head 
island]]]] 
 
That is, “while N2 allows us to identify the type of entity referred to (an island), N2 
compares this island to a jewel. The outer ExtN further describes this jewel of an island 
as crescent-shaped” (p. 106). The other possible underlying representation can be found 
in examples of the type a fool of a doctor. In this case the underlying structure is as 
shown here:  
 
(150) [NP [Det a] [ExtN [[MP fool of a] [N-head doctor]]]] 
 
This structure is considered to represent an attributive binominal construction in which 
“the MP fool of a does not modify the referent, but the property described by N2. This 
results in the attributive interpretation, according to which the property described by N1 
evaluates the professional ability of the referent; not the referent him- or herself” (p. 
107).  
 The as yet unsolved BNP structure those fools of a jury seems to threaten the 
possibility that all the members of the BNP construction conform to a unique internal 
configuration. In light of the fact that the agreement test aligns this structure with N1-
headedness (those fools of a jury were totally unreliable), it appears that there is no 
possibility of structural homogeneity here. However, this seems to be a problem for 
NPs in general given that those ordinary NPs which include a collective noun do not 





allow for the use of a plural demonstrative determiner; *those jury were a bunch of 
prejudiced fools. Moreover, the use of the singular demonstrative that with such words 
as collectives (jury) is at least grammatically dubious; ?that jury were a bunch of 
prejudiced fools. The only grammatical possibility seems to be the definite determiner 
the, which is unmarked for singular and plural: the jury were a bunch of prejudiced 
fools.  In this way, “rather than the incompatibility of a plural determiner and a singular 
noun, it is the nature of the demonstrative which excludes these examples” (Keizer 
2007a: 108). Indeed, once Det1 is applied to N1, it is considered to reinforce the 
speaker’s subjective evaluation, as dealt with previously in this section. And since the 
goal of using a BNP is to express an evaluative judgement, the idea of the incompatible 
nature of the demonstrative with such examples strengths the reinforcing function given 
that “number agreement between Det1 and N1 may be interpreted as a way of 
expressing this crucial pragmatic relation” (p. 108).  
 
 On the whole, Keizer’s view is that all examples showing a BNP structure form 
a “homogeneous group and one and the same overall analysis” (p. 108) regardless of 
some problematic cases. In any case, these problematic examples do in themselves 
serve to undermine the homogeneous structural pattern, bur rather are to be considered 
this only means that they must be considered as non-prototypical. Thus, in the BNP 
construction, headedness is located in the N2 position, and N1 is part of a complex 
modifier.  
 
5.4 A constructional analysis of binominal noun phrases 
The works analysed in the preceding sections can be used as the point of departure for a 
new syntactic analysis of BNPs. In the following sections, I will be explore the notion 





that BNPs are members of the NP category, a fact which strengths the idea of diversity 
within grammatical categories. BNPs form part of the NP network, which includes the 
most common to the most unusual structures of the NP category. That said, it should 
not be expected that this type of structure must always conform to the prototypical NP 
configuration. In that way, the following analysis hold that categories are composed 
more by exceptions than prototypes.  
 
5.4.1 Structural parallelisms 
If we can establish a parallelism between two similar structures we may in this way 
arrive at a comfortable solution to the problems posed by BNPs. One approach to 
explaining the use of hell of a would be to draw a comparison between BNPs like a h ll 
of a problem and what Brems (2003) considers ‘measure nouns’ (also MN), such as a 
lot of problems. The outstanding feature of these two structures is that both allow 
phonological reduction leading to changes in the morphology of their most 
characteristic constituents, that is, hell of a and a lot of. These two strings can be 
spelled as helluva and lotta, respectively. Given that both structures suffer the same 
linguistic changes, it could be contended that both of them undergo the same process of 
changing due to similar internal dynamics. In view of the fact that both structures 
belong to the NP category and considering the network approach to language (Taylor 
1995; see also Rosch 1973, 1978; Lakoff 1987; Aarts, Denison, Keizer & Popova 2004; 
and Aarts 2007), it makes sense to think that, given the closely related position of these 
two structures in the network, their structural changes exert a mutual influence. As 
already seen, syntactic mimicry (see McCawley 1988; also section 5.3.1) allows the 
establishment of a grammatical similarity between the function of hell of a and an 
adjectival premodifier, hellish. It sounds more logical to establish this mimic effect 





between hell of a and a lot of, provided that both are closely related to each other. They 
do indeed contain the same elements, and there is no need to change the nature of the 
constituents that make up the structure, as in the case of the adjectival premodifier. 
Thus, the relation between a hell of a problem and a lot of problems seems to be 
affected by the fact that “[c]onstructions which are closely related to each other (…) 
prime each other more rapidly than those which are further apart in the network” 
(Trousdale17). As such, I am of the idea that within the NP network a lot of is closer to 
hell of a than the use of NP premodifiers.  
 
 It is usually considered that behind the change from a lot of to lotta there is a 
process of grammaticalization of which a lot of “is included to represent the fully 
grammaticalized predecessor of the MNs [(Measure Nouns)] (…)” (Brems 2003: 309). 
Instances like sorta and kinda whose origins are a sort of and a kind of respectively, can 
also be found. It has been demonstrated that this type of structure undergoes a previous 
process of delexicalization prior to a process of grammaticalization (Brems 2003). 
Other instances that illustrate such a process are a bunch of, heap of and pile of, 
showing different degrees of grammaticalization. 
 Whether hell of a has suffered a process of actual grammaticalization remains to 
be demonstrated. This is not the place for such a demonstration, yet it cannot be denied 
that, considering instances such as a helluva problem, it is possible to argue in favour of 
the hypothesis that this phonological reduction resembles that of lotta. 
 The specific case of helluva is also discussed by Trousdale18, who also shows 
how this structure has suffered a process of constructional change. Under the 
assumption that all constructions are organized in a network, which implies that 
                                                           
17 These notes have been taken from a course given by Trousdale in Vigo, April 2012. 
18 These notes have been taken from a course given by Trousdale in Vigo, April 2012. 





“instances of use form part of the network; [that] the network is dynamic and constantly 
evolving through the interplay between language structure and language use; [and that] 
conventionalization of patterns occurs when tokens are used frequently” (Trousdale19), 
it can be concluded that new constructions emerge in the network due to language use. 
In this light, the hell of a construction undergoes a process of constructionalization after 
which it is considered the “hell micro-construction” (Trousdale20). As such, it has gone 
from being a constitutive binominal construction to an evaluative binominal 
construction, thence to become a degree modifier construction, according to Trousdale. 
This also allows him to note that “the H micro-construction becomes aligned with other 
‘ex’-binominals (e.g. a lot of, and a shred of) (…)”. Therefore, the phonological 
reduction of hell of a and the fact that it evolves into a micro-construction are indicators 
of the internal distribution of a hell of a problem in particular, and of BNPs in general. 
At the same time, this highlights the secondary relevance of N1 vis-à-vis the primary 
position of N2 within the BNP construction. Brems (2003) and Trousdale lead me to 
think that only those elements which are semantically weak undergo processes of 
change such as grammaticalization (preceded by a process of delexicalization) and 
constructionalization, a fact which weighs in favour of the idea that semantic strength 
determines the main constituent among the possible constituents of a construction. In 
fact, the delexicalization process could be seen as a process suffered by those elements 
which are semantically weak within a specific construction, as is the case in BNPs.   
  
 As seen in section 5.3.2., Napoli (1989) considers that BNPs are common NPs. 
However, a chair of a kitchen, a common NP, and a hell of a problem, a BNP, show 
perhaps more differences than similarities. Having considered the special functions of 
                                                           
19 These notes have been taken from a course given by Trousdale in Vigo, April 2012. 
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the determiners, the role of the of element and the function developed by N1 in BNPs, 
we cannot maintain that these two structures fall within exactly the same construction. 
If we take into account their productivity, we realize that they differ in this feature too: 
while common NPs show a high degree of productivity, the BNP construction reveals 
only a semi-productive pattern. Moreover, if we look at certain instances of the BNP 
construction like a hell of a problem, it must be contended that its degree of 
productivity is almost null. Additionally, common NPs show a bottom-up configuration 
while BNPs are a clear example of a top-down configuration and a fixed, frozen form.   
 
 On the whole, the phonological reduction, the structural similarity between lotta 
and helluva and the low degree of productivity of BNPs (null on some occasions) are 
all indicative of binominal constructions which point in the direction of a N1-modifier 
and N2-head structure. This is perhaps indicative of a highly entrenched instance of 
language, whose idiosyncratic character could be used as an argument against the idea 
that the rest of the (not so highly entrenched) examples of the BNP construction do not 
fit the modifier-head internal configuration argued for in the present section. For this 
reason, the following sections aim to demonstrate that BNPs, even though they belong 
to the NP category, do not share the ordinary NP configuration.  
 
5.4.2 The headedness issue 
All parts of the present work thus far have dealt with the headedness question within 
grammatical structures. The literature, as we have seen, includes an extensive and 
varied range of points of view, including the opinion that certain structures are headless 
instances of the language (Dryer 2004; see section 2.5.2). BNPs look like ordinary NPs 
but they actually deviate from the general NP norm. It is in principle quite shocking 





that two structures can develop the same syntactic function even when their internal 
configurations are so different. Yet the fact that their syntactic roles are the same within 
a higher structure, a clause for example, could indicate that the main element in both 
constructions is the same. That is to say, nouns are the heads in the general category of 
NPs, and hence in BNPs nouns must also be the main element. It simply happens that in 
this construction we have two nouns. The present section will sketch out some ideas as 
means of arguing for the theory that the second noun is a more appropriate candidate 
for the head position.  
  
 The previous section has introduced the idea that those structures belonging to 
the BNP construction are instances of a modifier-head configuration, given certain 
special features. It is true that  hell of a problem shows a highly entrenched status in 
the language, a fact which favours this specific configuration. However, the modifier-
head organization can also be applied to the other the instances that fall within the BNP 
label. Obviously, the evidence previously used in order to support this syntactic 
organization cannot be applied to all these other examples, but other reasons exist that 
support the modifier-head structure here.  
 
 To begin with, special attention should be paid to the positional features of 
nouns in the N1 position in BNPs and the restrictions they show. Only those common 
nouns showing some type of evaluative character can be used in this position. It is also 
possible to find proper nouns developing this role but only those which, given certain 
social repercussions, have acquired some evaluative characteristics related to the most 
outstanding feature of the specific referent. Thus, it is possible to find well-known 
examples, such as (151) and (152), both repeated here for convenience:  





(151) A Hitler of a man  
(152) A Kate Moss of a wine 
 
On the contrary, the following examples are not possible:  
 
(153) *A chair of a woman 
(154) *A plate of a child 
 
The main problem with (153) and (154) is that chair and plate do not offer any 
possibility of evaluation of woman and child, respectively. Both N1s are useless for the 
purpose of using a BNP. The evaluative target of its use is not achieved given that the 
use of these elements does not provide any possibility for the description of N2. On the 
contrary, in:  
 
(155) Your turtle of a sister 
 
the best known and characteristic feature of N1 is applied to N2, that is, the slowness of 
a turtle is applied to the way somebody walks or in some other way behaves; whereas 
in example (156):  
 
(156) *Your lampshade of a son  
 
no feature is automatically applied to ‘your son’, given that the noun used in the N1 
position does not have any noteworthy feature that can be used to evaluate the noun in 
the N2 position.  





 With respect to this evaluative feature of the first noun, it must be pointed out 
here that we should abandon the idea that one of the main features of the N1 is that it 
must be evaluative. It would be more adequate to think that the evaluative features are 
given by the construction itself and not by the noun. In this sense, it might be thought 
that any noun could be used in the N1 position, a fact that would not explain the 
ungrammaticality of examples like (153), (154) and (156). However, if BNPs are 
compared with other evaluative constructions like attributive sentences, this idea does 
seem more appealing. Take the following examples:  
 
(157) The brat broke the plates  
(158) Your brother is a brat 
 
In example (157), brat is used as what it is, a common noun with no sense of 
evaluation. On the contrary, brat functions as an attribute in example (158) acquiring 
some sort of evaluative character. Thus, in the same way as the meaning of the 
attributive sentence construction changes the features of the noun, the same happens in 
the BNP construction. It is the construction which provides meaning, and in this 
specific case the meaning is evaluative. Moreover, and with respect to the noun in 
particular, just as it is not grammatical to say: 
 
(159) *Your brother is a lampshade  
 
it is not possible to accept examples (153), (154) and (156) as grammatical. Therefore, 
those nouns used in the N1 position are not evaluative per se; the construction is the 
thing which is evaluative.  





 This conclusion leads us once again to the idea that language is about meaning, 
and that all the possible linguistic structures contained in a grammar are there in the 
service of what speakers want to communicate, that is, the meaning they want to 
convey. In this specific case, language offers the possibility of using two different 
structures, a copular sentence with an attribute and a BNP. Consider the following 
examples: 
 
(160) Your sister is slow 
(161) Your sister is a turtle 
 
These two examples of copular sentences code roughly the same meaning as the BNP, 
even though the constructions used are different. It can be contended that the BNP 
construction is the nominal counterpart of copular sentences with an NP attribute, a 
feature not possible in a common NPs (*a turtle sister). I do not deny, then, that a 
predicate relation exists between the two nouns (Quirk et al 1985; McCawley 1988; 
Napoli 1989; Aarts 1998 and Keizer 2007a). As previously noted, this is the only point 
where linguists seem to be in agreement about BNPs, although, their explanations for 
this BNP feature diverge quite significantly depending on the framework. In the present 
section, this predicate relation is considered to be evidence in favour of a modifier-head 
structure of BNPs. Consider this diagram:  
 
(162) that jerk of a doctor 
                   
                that doctor is a jerk 
 





This switching of positions supports the idea that Det1 accompanies N2, and I would 
dare to suggest that Det2 determines N1, a feature that would explain the obligatory 
indefinite character of Det2.  
 
 All of the BNP constituents show special and unique functions, but the element 
that perhaps seems to develop the most unusual role is the indefinite article a in the 
Det2 position. To begin with, if we assume that Det2 determines N1, this entails a 
configuration in which the determiner is postponed to its nominal head, which sounds 
completely ungrammatical in English. However, we are not dealing with a common 
NP. Rather, the question to ask at this juncture is: how we can argue for this theory on 
grammatical grounds? 
 As a first approximation, consider the interchange of positions when 
transforming a BNP into a copular sentence. Whenever an attribute is used in a copular 
sentence, it is always preceded by the indefinite article a. Hence:  
 
(163) This theory is a mess  
(164) That director is a sexist  
(165) Your brother is a jerk   
(166) The chairman is  acrook 
 
These sentences are all counterparts of the following BNPs:  
 
(167) This mess of a theory  
(168) That sexist of a director  
(169) Your jerk of a brother  





(170) The crook of a chairman 
 
My aim here is to illustrate that, given that exceptional features are acquired by the 
elements once used in the BNP construction, its most characteristic string (N1 + of + a) 
also shows a particular and extraordinary organization which is extended to the whole 
construction.  
 
 Another point to bear in mind is that the reference of the overall structure is not 
indefinite. The BNP construction is only used when the speaker makes reference to a 
very specific and well known referent. So, it seems illogical to maintain that, if N2 is 
considered to be the head of the structure and the overall reference is definite, the 
indefinite article a determines the second nominal. It can even be contended that its 
position is merely syntactical with respect to N2, in the sense that, semantically, Det2 
has nothing to do with N2. Hence, Det1 determines N2 and there is no other possibility 
than to accept that N1 is determined by Det2.  
  
 The potential for referentiality of the BNP construction suggests that it is always 
definite and concrete. In fact, the overall construction projects definiteness. The idea is 
that BNPs simply do not allow indefinite reference. Even in examples like the 
following, indefiniteness is not appreciated:  
 
(171) An angel of a girl  
 
This example includes not only the constructional indefinite Det2 but the indefinite 
article a in the Det1 position. Yet it implies a very concrete reference. The overall 





meaning of this structure makes reference to a well known girl, unlike common 
indefinite NPs. On light of this, I contend that the BNP construction involves definite 
reference as one of the main characteristics of the construction.  
 The definite character of the BNP construction can also be supported by means 
of ungrammatical examples:  
 
(172) *A creep of a James  
 
No word can be more specific than a proper noun, hence the use of James in this 
example argues in favour of the constructional definiteness of BNPs. Example (171) is 
grammatical even though a is used in the Det1 position because, grammatically, an 
indefinite article may accompany a common noun. On the contrary, example (172) is 
ungrammatical because of the definite character of the proper noun, which cannot be 
determined by an indefinite article. In addition, the definite character of the overall 
construction increases the ungrammaticality of this specific structure.  
  
5.4.3 Agreement in special cases of the BNP construction 
We turn now to the question of agreement in BNPs. This section is intended as 
additional evidence in favour of the modifier-head structure proposed in the previous 
sections. Hence, in this specific case, we will deal with the structure those fools of a 
crew which is a good illustration of the problem at hand, and also shows the complexity 
of the BNP phenomenon.  
 Those fools of a crew could be considered the exception within the exception, 
that is, BNPs are exceptions to the common NP category, and those fools of a crew is 
an exception within the BNP construction given that Det1 and N1 show a plural form. 





At first glance seems impossible to include this structure within the structural 
explanation offered in the previous section, in that Det1 and N2 do not show number 
agreement, *those crew. Therefore, should this structure be given a new and different 
configuration to that of the rest of BNPs? The present work argues in favour of the idea 
that all syntactic structures show exceptions to the norm. Thus, if those fools of a crew 
does not fit the modifier-head structure of BNPs, this is not necessarily a major problem 
for the theory as a whole. However, my intention here is to demonstrate that all BNPs 
show a modifier-head internal organization. The exceptional character here lies in the 
fact that even when the first determiner does not fit the singular form of the N2 head, 
exceptionally, it does conform to the general internal structural form of the BNP 
construction.  
 Another important issue related to exceptionality within grammatical categories 
is that those exceptional structures tend to exhibit special uses that must also be 
included within the description of the construction. Moreover, these uses also highlight 
the most characteristic features of the prototypical structure; thus those fools of a crew 
could help us to show and confirm the head element in BNPs.  
 
  As seen in Aarts (1998) (see section 5.3.3) and Keizer (2007a) (see section 
5.3.4), the traditionally applied syntactic and semantic criteria are not very useful when 
dealing with the internal syntactic configuration of BNPs. This is why agreement is a 
relevant on resolving the issue. And if we are to consider agreement, it is almost 
unavoidable that the agreement hierarchy developed by Corbett (1979, 2004, 2006) be 
taken into account. Therefore, in this section Corbett’s agreement hierarchy will be 
used with the aim of solving the headedness dilemma of the BNP construction. The 





hierarchy is represented in the following schema, where “these four positions represent 





Corbett (p. 207) explains the agreement hierarchy in the following terms:  
 
For any controller that permits alternative agreements, as we move 
rightwards along the Agreement Hierarchy, the likelihood of agreement with 
greater semantic justification will increase monotonically (that is, with no 
intervening decrease).  
 
If we apply this hierarchical organization to those fools of a crew, the structure falls 
under the attributive position, where syntactic agreement is the rule to follow, given 
that the more rightwards we move, the more semantic the agreement relation becomes. 
It seems that our structure fits the hierarchy, in that the first determiner agrees in 
number with the first noun. So, considering the external appearance of this structure, 
one must accept that Det1 accompanies N1. The problem, though, is still not solved. 
The formally singular N2 shows the special feature of being semantically plural, a 
feature which complicates the analysis of the structure.  
 In this respect, and considering the role of semantics in modelling syntactic 
structure proposed throughout the present work, the plural meaning of the second noun, 
and consequently the N2 position in the general BNP construction – considered the 
head locus in the BNP construction – is the feature that must be taken into account in 
order to resolve the internal structure of those fools of a crew and that of BNPs in 
         attributive > predicate > relative pronoun > personal pronoun  





general. Therefore, the feature values of the whole construction can be determined if 
N2 is considered the main element of the structure, in which case we must talk of 
semantic rather than syntactic agreement. Moreover, as confirmed by Reid (1991) 
“collective nouns in the singular (…) trigger plurality on the verb more frequently than 
do individual nouns (…)” (Berg 1998: 34). It is for this reason that we can find 
instances such as the following:   
 
(173) Those fools of a crew ere drinking all the night long.  
(174) Besides, once this business is concluded you shall be able to live together   
in the open, free of those fools of a royal family.  
(175) I totally agree with you!!! Those idiots of a jury letting the monster get 
way with murder of that poor innocent little girl!!! 
 
 Another important factor relating to the proposed semantic agreement in those 
fools of a crew is the physical distance that exists between Det1 and N2. This is also 
discussed by Corbett (2006: 236), who argues that “as the distance between controller 
and target increases, so does the likelihood of semantic agreement”. The structure those 
fools of a crew seems to fit this distance requirement. It is possible, then, to include this 
example among the semantic agreement instances given that between the Det1 and N2 
there exist three elements. On this view, we can only conclude those fools of a crew 
exhibits the modifier-head structure posited for the BNP construction in general.   
 
 Finally, by way of conclusion, we can considered that the most prominent issues 
relating to BNPs, that is, the analysis of the string N1+ of a and the headedness issue, 
have been addressed in such a way that the N1-modifier-N2-head organization seems to 





be the most appropriate analysis for BNPs. This has been achieved through an approach 
which differs from the usual means of eliciting syntactic structure. The comparison 
made between our construction and similar structures can be considered to be a good 
method of analysis since, from the present point of view, all the structures of the 
language are mutually connected on some level, and thus it seems logical that the 
closest will tend to exert the greatest influence on each other; the present case shows its 
most direct influence to be from the structure of a lot of. Its evolution, and consequent 
phonological reduction, explains the internal organization of a hell of, which at the 
same time establishes the basis for further analyses of examples which not yet so 
entrenched, such as your brat of a brother or an angel of a girl. These structures are 
additionally explained by noting the role played by each individual constituent of the 
BNP construction. The extraordinary use of the indefinite article in the Det2 position, 
the role of N1 with an evaluative tone without a preceding indefinite article, and the 
resulting syntactic link between Det1 and N2, all point to the conclusion that the second 
noun is the head of the whole construction. Additionally, the agreement features of 
special instances of the BNP construction, such as t o e fools of a crew, provide a type 
of test that, in the light of the failure of traditional ones, seems to speak in favour of the 
N1 modifier-N2 head structure too. In this specific case, exceptions to the norm, always 
present in the language, help us to explain the internal syntactic structure of the BNP 








































Summary and conclusions 
The intention of this dissertation has been to argue for the view that English Noun 
Phrases do not follow a straightforward, syntactic design. Traditionally considered as 
the easiest and simplest of all the constructions of language, the NP structure has 
turned out to comprise quite a varied group of forms. As a consequence, the NP 
category has provided an excellent illustration of the richness of language.   
 
 Chapter 1 included an exhaustive description of the NP construction. With the 
aim of setting out the most basic elements of the construction, section 1.1 provided a 
description of the Noun Phrase from a rather descriptive point of view. Section 1.2 
dealt with the essential distinction between the head of the NP construction and the 
possible dependents that it may include, which themselves split into complements and 
modifiers. An accurate distinction between the head element and its possible 
complements was a crucial element in the further development of the present work. 
Section 1.3 sought to establish the notion, from the very beginning, that diversity 
within language is one of its most characteristic features, and thus all possible elements 
that could be used in the analysis of the NP construction were set out. A review of the 
variation found in the position of the noun, as well as in all the possible constituents 
that could function as dependents, was also provided in this section. In addition, this 
section included a description of the position of the determiner and all its possible 
variations. Finally, the section closed with some references to cross-linguistic 
examples which support this idea of diversity within the NP construction. Examples 
from Galician, Spanish, Portuguese, French and German were useful to demonstrate 





that, despite its simple appearance, NPs are more complex than might be thought at a 
first glance.  
 In this way, chapter 1 served to cover all the theoretical preliminaries necessary 
for the rest of the study. Chapter 2 opens with an introduction, section 2.1, which 
discussed the headedness issue. The central point here resolved around the necessity of 
a head element within grammatical structures, and NPs in particular. However, the 
main discussion did not concentrate on whether heads are necessary or not in syntax, 
given that the great majority of linguists agree that they are. Different opinions here 
tend to concern the location of the head element within an NP. There were also those 
who contended that the noun is always the head (Matthews 1981; Huddleston & 
Pullum 2002), as well as some who posited that the head element is located in the 
position of the determiner (Hudson 1984; Abney 1987; Longobardi 2001; Taylor 2002; 
Alexiadou, Haegeman & Stavrou 2007). Given this diversity of opinion on such a 
crucial element within a construction, an extended historical and theoretical map of the 
different grammatical frameworks that had analysed the NP construction was needed. 
Thus, section 2.2 included a conventional analysis of NPs. Taking as a basis the 
endocentric theory (Bloomfield 1933) for the syntactic analysis of linguistic 
expressions, and the fact that lexical elements are the heads within these endocentric 
constructions, authors like Hockett (1958) contend that constructions must contain the 
same characteristics as their head, and the head, in NP constructions, could not be any 
element but the nominal one. 
From a quite different perspective, section 2.3 presented the generative point of 
view. As a first step, it was contended that, in fact, until the 80s, generative 
grammarians considered that the noun was the head (Chomsky 1965). However, 
Jackendoff (1977) set a new theory, the X-bar theory, which drastically changed the 





generative position. With respect to phrasal categories, X-bar theory contends that all 
phrasal categories share similar features. In this way, there is no need for the existence 
of four different phrase structure rules to analyse the projections of nouns, verbs, 
adjectives and prepositions. Rather, they all share the same underlying structure. Under 
this view, a new element acquires a central status, and that element is the Specifier. It 
is considered to be the one responsible for the creation of a syntactic category. This 
theory was the basis for a further development of the DP-hypothesis (Abney 1987), 
which posits that the determiner is the head in a [Det + N] structure. This new analysis 
established the idea that the structure of an NP is parallel to that of a sentence. Such a 
parallelism lies in the fact that the highest functional projection dominates the lexical 
element. Thus Abney’s DP analysis rejects the N as the head of the set [Det + N]. As a 
consequence of this new analysis, a new syntactic category, Determiner Phrase (DP), 
appeared in linguistics. DPs are considered as projections of the noun. The DP 
hypothesis is also supported by Giorgi & Longobardi (1991: 133), who developed the 
Argument Uniqueness Principle in order to argue for DP structure. With this principle 
they contend that “only one argument may occur in each Spec position”. It applies to 
syntactic structures which follow the X-bar theory. All in all, the generative approach 
only allows functional elements to project syntactic categories.  
 Section 2.4 provided a discussion of the issue from the perspective of Cognitive 
Grammar. Under the main tenet that language is about meaning, cognitive 
grammarians reject the central position of syntax in linguistic analyses. All linguistic 
elements contain meaning, even the most functional ones. In this way, given that 
determiners contain meaning, they are considered to be the head in a [Det + N] 
structure. Cognitive Grammar defines the head of a structure as that element whose 
profile corresponds to the profile of the whole structure (Langacker 1991). When 





dealing with grammatical constructions and in particular with NPs, analyses from the 
cognitive point of view contend that it is essential to take into account the grounding 
function. In fact, this is treated as the main function within the elaboration of an NP 
(Langacker 2004) and also as the final step. It must be noted that the functional 
element is the one determining the transformation of a noun into an NP via the 
grounding function. This means that for Cognitive Grammar the determiner is in some 
sense the central element within an NP. Taylor (2002: 346-349) also considers that 
grounding is the main process in the formation of an NP. But, although the determiner 
is the crucial element in the creation of an NP, it cannot project an NP by itself. Thus, a 
relation of co-dependence is established between the functional and the lexical 
element. However, this co-dependency is not equitable and the determiner is again 
given more prominence when elaborating an NP. It can be concluded that Cognitive 
Grammar provides the determiner with a more relevant position in the elaboration of 
NPs in view of the fact that it is the grounding constituent and as such the ‘profile 
determinant’ of the whole structure. But, it must also be said that its relevance is not of 
the same degree as that assigned to it within the generative framework.  
 Section 2.5 included two syntactic analyses of the NP structure which deviate 
from the previous ones. Section 2.5.1 dealt with the work of Ball (2004), who contends 
that Noun Phrases are exocentric structures where both elements, the determiner and 
the noun, are heads, the main reason why this theory is called bi-polar. Neither of the 
elements is dependent on the other. From the semantic point of view, Ball considers 
that the noun is the most important element. As for the syntactic one, the determiner is 
considered as the element which differentiates a noun from a verb. In this theory, the 
meaning of the whole NP depends on the equal contribution of the noun and the 





determiner. The content of the noun is projected by the determiner given that as a 
lexical category it cannot create a syntactic category by itself. 
 Section 2.5.2 presented the work of Dryer (2004), which provides an analysis 
which is wholly different from all those preceding it. The main idea is that Noun 
Phrases are headless structures. This analysis begins with the fact that some languages 
have NPs but do not have nouns among their constituents, as is the case with Nkore-
Kiga, a Bantu language spoken in Uganda. Dryer explores six possible approaches in 
order to demonstrate his theory. Thus, he considers ellipsis; the noun as the modifier; 
modifiers as the head; determiners as the head; headlessness; that all NPs are headless 
structures. Having considered all these possibilities, he concludes that the final one is 
the most satisfactory and that the notion head is not really necessary.  
 Section 2.6, the last section of chapter 2, presented the framework to be used in 
the present work. Taking Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987a, 1991) and 
Construction Grammar (Goldberg 1995, 2006) as frames of reference, this section 
argued in favour of the idea that the most appropriate analysis of an ordinary NP is that 
which takes the noun to be the head. In order to set out the theoretical basis of 
Construction Grammar (cf. 2.6.1), section 2.6.1.1 offered some general theoretical 
preliminaries regarding the constructional framework. Then, section 2.6.1.2, dealt with 
the grounding function of the determiner in relation to the act of communication. The 
context of communication is strengthened when the participants share a coordinated 
mental reference (Fauconier 1985), and as previously seen, the use of the determiner 
guarantees the sharing of the same context by speakers and hearers. However, before 
using the determiners, language users need to fix in their minds a certain number of 
lexical elements which evoke the different types within the context of discourse. Those 
are called the onstage elements, and are related to the current discourse space (CDS) 





(Langacker 2004). When speakers and hearers share the same CDS, a frame is created 
which reflects the immediate scope of attention for the participants. Whenever a new 
discourse is created, the discourse space must be updated, which provokes the use of 
different linguistic types, that is, of new lexical elements in order to set a new context 
of communication in the mental references of both speaker and hearer. As can be 
appreciated, context is of great importance in the creation of meaning, and even though 
determiners are essential for the grounding of the referential elements, they cannot 
create meaning on their own. The use of the determiners depends on the lexical 
elements which construct the discourse space and provide the act of communication 
with meaning.  
Such a theory can be applied directly to the NP construction if we pay attention 
to the informational status of the referents in the context. The constituents used in the 
formation of an NP depend on the informational features of the noun. Thus, the use of 
a definite or indefinite determiner depends mainly on this information. As a 
consequence, the direction of encoding is from noun to determiner. 
 Section 2.6.1.3 looked at the notion of meaning in relation to the NP 
construction. In terms of Cognitive Grammar, conceptualization is the elaboration of 
meaning of a grammatical category or linguistic element. In this respect, the section 
provided an explanation of the internal syntactic organization of NPs, looking at the 
meaning of the whole construction. From a constructionist perspective, the NP 
construction offers a schematic meaning, that of a determined entity. The construction 
offers a generalization, and its general meaning is specified once the nominal element 
is used. That is, the schematicity of the NP construction is specified by means of 
lexical elements which are the basic building blocks of meaning which we use to 
categorize the world (Aitchison 1987, 1989). This section also dealt with the idea of 





subcategorization. This notion supports N-headedness in the sense that whenever a 
verb needs to be subcategorized, it depends on the content of the lexical word which is 
subcategorized, not on its grounding features. Thus, the meaning of the expression 
depends on the lexical items which make up the discourse frame, which at the same 
time select their own dependent elements, as is the case with determiners. Therefore, 
the semantic content of lexical elements seems to be the main guiding feature when 
developing grammatical categories (Zwicky 1985; Jiménez-Juliá 2000), and NPs in 
particular. That means that the noun must be considered the head in ordinary NP 
structures given it semantic strength.  
 Section 2.6.2 focussed on some changes in the cognitive model as regards the 
NP construction. To begin with, section 2.6.2.1 considered the position of the noun 
with respect to discourse frames. If the discourse frames influence the meaning of 
determiners, and if these frames are the product of the nouns within the mental spaces, 
then their use depends mainly on the nouns. This is further supported by Figure 3 (p. 
88), in which it is shown that the semantic features of the determiner are not directly 
projected in the highest structure. Thus, its semantic features are taken into account 
once we deal with the noun, but not with the NP. Both the semantic features of the 
noun, influenced by the semantics of the determiner, and also its syntactic features, that 
is, as head of the NP, are projected in the higher structure.  
 Finally, section 2.6.2.1.1 is devoted to the individual analysis of the determiner. 
It is considered as a schema, that is, a device of grammatical description. Langacker21 
points out that a schema is a template that represents sets of expressions, whose 
abstracted commonality is only observable at certain levels of specificity. A 
determiner, then, represents an abstract commonality for the type of lexical element 
                                                           
21 These notes were taken from a course imparted by Langacker in Madrid, March 2008.  





which requires a template. As previously seen, the grounding function of the 
determiner provides it with head status, according to many authors (for example, 
Taylor 2002). However, it is difficult to accept the idea of a schematic constituent that 
projects such a specific structure as an NP. The schematicity of the determiner could be 
solved by taking into account the fact that, to a certain degree, the lexicon contains 
more abstract schemata from which actual items can “inherit” properties (Jackendoff 
2002). So, determiners, having a certain degree of semantic content, can be considered 
as part of the lexicon, as additional meaningful complements for the proper lexical 
items.  
 Grammatical constructions may be expressions (of any size), or schemas 
abstracted from expressions in order to capture their commonality (Langacker22). From 
the point of view of Construction Grammar, constructions are in need of specificity. In 
the specific case of NPs, the specificity of the NP is due to the use of a noun, not that 
of a determiner. Furthermore, the commonality of a grammatical construction like an 
NP is that the noun uses the determiner as a template. The syntactic role of the noun, 
then, is the governing position within an NP, that is, the head.   
 The commonality of a construction can be also recognised in less prototypical 
elements. Thus, an NP may contain an adjective or an –ing form in the syntactic 
position of the noun. This is possible given that the [Det + N] construction is adapted 
to the adjective or the -ing form providing them with the syntactic capacities of NPs. 
The constructional meaning of prototypical NPs is adapted to the novel element until it 
fits. The non-prototypicality of the novel lexical items, and the fact that the structures 
they project are grammatical, show the varied character of the NP construction.   
 
                                                           
22 These notes were also taken from a course given by Langacker in Madrid, March 2008.  





 Given that variety seemed to be an option for the NP category, chapter 3 dealt 
with the close appositive construction. The main goal of this chapter was to provide the 
reader with some theoretical background to this grammatical construction as a 
preparation for chapter 4. Thus, after a brief introduction in section 3.1, section 3.2 
offered a theoretical account of the main differences between close apposition and 
loose apposition. Loose apposition has often been considered by grammarians to be the 
only possibility for this category. Thus, taking semantics into account, Bitea (1977) 
considers that loose apposition is apposition par excellence (cf. 3.2.2). In a similar 
vein, Koktová (1985) sees pragmatics as offering the main arguments in favour of the 
idea that only those structures which contain two nominal elements separated by a 
punctuation mark can be considered true appositions (cf. 3.2.3), and it is clear that 
these are only loose appositions. Next, section 3.2.4 considered Meyer’s (1989) 
contention that in order to provide an exhaustive analysis of the notion of apposition 
one must take into account the semantic and pragmatic features of the construction, but 
that the analysis would not be complete if syntactic criteria are not also considered. 
Finally, section 3.2.5 discussed the study by Acuña-Fariña (1999). He posits that too 
many structures are included under the appositive label, leading to an unclear 
definition of the notion. He goes on to propose a new analysis which redefines the 
notion. Section 3.2.6 then concluded that loose appositions have managed to occupy a 
relatively dominant place in the literature, and that the close appositive type was in 
need of a more exhaustive study and analysis. Thus, section 3.3 was devoted to a study 
of the different analyses that have been made of the CA construction.  
 This section begins with a very brief introduction to the main points of 
discussion relating to CAs (cf. 3.3.1), that is, which of the two nominal elements is the 
head of the construction. Following this, various works are discussed in chronological 





order. Thus, section 3.3.2 considered Hockett’s classic (1955) analysis, which contends 
that given the difficulties in identifying the head and the attribute in this type of 
structures, the most satisfying solution is to treat CA as an endocentric construction 
with two heads. Hence, headedness in close appositive structures is found in both 
nominal elements. In section 3.3.3 the analysis of Burton-Roberts (1975) is described, 
one of the main analyses that reject the CA label. The central point of this analysis is 
that the [Det + N + N] structure is a common NP. Applying the generative dictates of 
the 70s, that is, underlying structures, derivations and surface structures, Burton-
Roberts concludes that the surface structure of a CA is the result of a derivation 
process whose point of departure is an underlying NP modified by a relative clause. 
Therefore, the distinctiveness of CA is drastically rejected in light of the fact that the 
internal constituency and constituent links within a [Det + N (common) + N (proper)] 
structure are the same as in prototypical NPs. Section 3.3.4 moved on to Matthews’s 
(1981) analysis, in which CAs are treated as an undifferentiated construction with 
respect to coordination and dependency – complementation and modification. These 
better known notions influence the identification and subsequent characterization of 
apposition. He concludes that the notion of apposition is a type of construction which 
cannot be described following actual instances of the type, given that they show such 
indeterminacy in their form, and that only a paradigmatic case (Det + N (common), 
Det + N (common) e.g. your brother, the poet) can be elucidated, the rest of the 
examples relate to it by means of formal resemblances, which are considered to be 
indeterminate. Section 3.3.5 offered Meyer’s (1991, 1992) account of CAs. His main 
assertion is that CAs are gradable units and that using only syntax is not the best 
method to explain the grammatical properties of this type of structure. Rather, the best 
approach takes into account semantics, pragmatics and syntax in the analysis. Thus, he 





concludes that CA is simply a special case of modification inside the habitual NP 
mould. Section 3.3.6 described Keizer’s (2007a) work, in which an analysis of the CA 
construction is provided. The main conclusion of her study is that the CA construction 
is not a modifier-head structure, as maintained by (Burton-Roberts 1975). Using 
traditional tests like omission and reversibility, she argues in favour of a head-modifier 
structured based on the fact that NP1 does not have the same referential power as NP2, 
which is the reason why N1 is considered the head of the whole apposition. In this 
account, the type of element used in the determiner position is given great relevance. 
As a consequence, the different types of close appositive structures have the same 
structure but different internal links. Thus, the the writer Alice Walker structure is 
considered a head-modifier structure with a determiner having scope over the two 
nouns, but in the case of my sister Cath, the possessive pronoun is not considered a 
determiner but a modifier or specifier with scope only over the first noun. Finally, 
section 3.3.7 dealt with Acuña-Fariña’s (2009) analysis of CAs from a constructional 
point of view. A CA like the poet Burns is considered as the “prototypical” close 
appositive construction. It is assumed to constitute a ‘rich ecological niche’ which 
relates to the rest of the different types of close appositions. As for its internal 
structure, it is considered to be the result of a fusion process of two NP structures, a he 
+ modifier + proper noun, and a the + head noun + modifier. The result is a 
construction with no clear head and with its own specific constrains. Its main features 
are its social referential role and its hybrid structure, easily identifiable from the top 
(despite poor internal elaboration). This undeniable NP origin and the indeterminate 
form of the nominal group make this structure an inchoate NP. 
 





 Chapter 4 presented an analysis of the CA construction in which the 
constructional links between ordinary NPs and the different types of CA structures 
were highlighted in order to better understand the heterogeneous group of instances 
that make up this construction. After a brief introduction to the heterogeneity of CAs 
caused by the different but similar instances that fall under the CA label (cf. 4.1), 
section 4.2 dealt with the CA prototype, the the writer Alice Walker structure. This 
section concentrates on the fact that the [Det (def art) + N (common) + N (proper)] 
structure does not have a poor internal structure. Considering the traditional tests and 
criteria, resulting in analyses that wavered between N1 headedness or N2 headedness, 
this section posits that the structure best fits in a [Det + N (modifier) + N (head)] 
analysis when dealing with prototypical close appositions. This analysis was supported 
by the reference point model (Langacker 1993, 2009), through which it was 
demonstrated that in this specific case the common noun writer is the reference point 
of the structure, given its salience as a basic level concept. N2 headedness was also 
supported by the trajector/landmark organization of grammatical relations. These 
notions once applied to a close apposition like th writer Alice Walker, meant that we 
could contend that U1, the common noun, is the landmark and U2, the proper name, is 
the trajector. Given this analysis, CAs were considered to be hybrids, structures which 
emerge from inheritance and taxonomic ties and having their origin mainly in NPs. 
Moreover, this hybridism was supported by the unique properties of CAs which are 
themselves a by-product of this emergence (Goldberg 1995).  
Section 4.3 comprised a discussion of all the main subtypes of CA. Section 
4.3.1 dealt with the my sister Cath/ my sister the dancer types. Establishing a line of 
comparison between these types and the prototypical the writer Alice Walker, it was 
found that the CA [Det (poss) + N (common) + N (proper)] structure does not show a 





modifier-head structure, but a head-modifier one. The main reason this lies in the 
possessive and the meaning it conveys. Thus, applying the reference point model, it 
could be posited that the possessive determiner is the reference point element given its 
anchoring features. It offers an array of possibilities of possession due to the implicit 
reference to other linguistic elements which may be used as the target of the 
conceptualizer. Section 4.3.2 dealt with the Alice Walker the writer type. Given its 
resemblance to the CA prototype, it could be considered that both of these show the 
same internal constituency. However, the [N (proper) + Det (def art) + N (common)] 
type is better fit under an analysis in which the head element is located in the N1 
position. This CA type may allow in N2 position nouns that do not make reference to 
profession or social role, and thus examples like Barbara the heartbreaker and Kermit 
the Frog are included in this type of CA. The fact that the example Kertmit the Frog is 
included in the [N (proper) + Det (def art) + N (common)] meant that a new section 
was necessary, and thus section 4.3.2.1 was concerned with the analysis of this 
structure. Reversibility was an option for Alice Walker the writer, but it is not possible 
for Kermit the Frog. Meaning was also important in the analysis of this type. One of 
the main characteristics of CAs is that they make reference to a profession or social 
role, but in the case of Kermit the Frog, none of these is achieved, as mentioned. N2 
makes reference to an ordinary referent, frog. Thus, meaning and reversibility lead to 
an analysis where the fixity of the structure is the most salient feature, which also 
implies the obligatory use of the proper noun in the first place, since it is the one which 
identifies a unique individual. Section 4.3.3 presented the King Henry VIII type. The 
feature of social reference of CAs is taken to extremes with this type. Resorting to the 
reference point model as the most useful means of analysing CAs, it was shown that 
the common noun King is the reference point word evoked in order to achieve the 





target of the communicative act, that is, the proper noun, Henry. Hence, this type 
shows a modifier-head structure. Section 4.3.4 then presented the the word ‘courtesy’ 
type. Given that within the constructionist model constructions develop specific 
functions and contain specific meanings, this type is as clear an illustration of the 
meaning-form correspondence as one might find. Its metalinguistic meaning favours a 
clear N1 centre, and, as a consequence, whenever this type is included in a sentence all 
the modifiers and complements must refer to the first noun. Section 4.3.5 went on to 
analyse the ‘a friend John [who’s in linguistics]’ type. The main interest of this pattern 
is in that it is the only kind of indefinite CA. There were also two main features to take 
into account, namely, that this type is severely constrained and that when selection 
restrictions affect the construction, they affect the first noun only. This implies that 
reversibility is not an option for all the instances of this type, and as a consequence it 
shows clear N1 headedness. At the same time, this type could be divided into two 
different subtypes: those which include this or that as determiners; and those with an 
indefinite article. Section 4.3.6 discussed the we women, you men type. The fact that 
the pronoun has a greater indexical power than the noun in U2 position guarantees its 
position as head here. Authors such as Postal (1966) and Huddleston & Pullum (2002) 
consider that the pronoun develops the same function as a determiner. This determiner 
theory cannot be completely rejected, and along with the appositive theory, it is 
considered that both are helpful from a constructionist framework, in the sense that 
neither of them manage to force the we women type into a strict, necessary-and-
sufficient kind of superordinate form. Whatever its internal structure, the 
recognisability of the whole construction is never in great danger. Its formal 
specifications make for easy categorization, and this is all that is needed to reach the 
symbolic package, which includes the meaning. In other words, once again its internal 





structure need not be resolved, and at the same time these features guarantee a space 
for the we women type within the close appositive map.  
Section 4.4 presented a theory based on the previous constructions, positing 
that all CA members form a network of  [N + N] constructions, which means that U1 is 
U2 and that all the possible structures included under the CA label establish a static 
relation between N1 and N2 (Varantola 1993). Furthermore, this close appositive 
network is also characterized by semantic restrictiveness and a short, fixed nominal 
structure which facilitates recognition of it and thus reduces processing time. As for its 
headedness, all the members of the network are mono-headed whose head element 
varies depending on the particular meaning of each specific example. Variation affects 
the head position, but within the network some fixed examples (K rmit the Frog) as 
well as cases of indeterminacy (we women) can be also found. In other words, just as 
close appositions differ in headedness, they also show different internal arrangements. 
They range from an significant degree of internal complexity (the writer Alice Walker, 
my sister Cath) to instances with a frozen structure (w women, Kermit the Frog). 
Despite these differences, all the CA members are highly interconnected given that all 
of them contain several of the following features: they express occupations, contain a 
proper name, allow reversibility and/or show a [NP + NP] schematic structure.  
 
Chapter 5 was concerned with binominal noun phrases as an example of the NP 
category which enlarges the number of constructions that ‘look like NPs’. Section 5.1 
offered an introduction focussing on the main features of BNPs, extensively revisited 
in section 5.2 as the preparation for a subsequent review of different analyses of this 
construction in the literature (cf. 5.3). Once again, the main point of discussion is the 
headedness issue. On the one hand, some consider BNPs as modifier-head structures 





(McCawley 1988; cf. 5.3.1). The most salient feature of this analysis is the view that 
the noun in the N1 position emulates an adjective, and thus N1 is in a predicate 
position with respect to N2. Other writers analyse BNPs as ordinary NPs (Napoli 1989; 
cf. 5.3.2), and yet others posit that the N1, along with the of element and Det2, forms a 
modifier phrase which modifies the N2 head element (Aarts 1998; cf. 5.3.3). Finally, it 
is contended by some that BNPs show two different underlying structures (Keizer 
2007a; cf. 5.3.4) based on the fact that BNPs are of two different types, Comparative 
Qualitative Binominal Noun Phrases and Attributive Qualitative Binominal Noun 
Phrases.  
Finally, section 5.4 showed that a constructional analysis of BNPs is possible. 
To begin with, section 5.4.1 dealt with some structural parallelisms between the BNP 
structure hell of a and the MN (Measure Noun) a lot of (Brems 2003). Both allow 
phonological reduction leading to changes in the morphology (helluva and lotta, 
respectively). Such morphological changes are indicative of the internal structure of 
these structures. Thus, syntactic mimicry plays a role in the identification of the head 
in BNPs if the N2 headedness of MNs is adapted for BNPs, in which case the set [N1 + 
of + a] is similar to a lot of in the sense that it modifies N2. The phonological reduction 
of a lot of is explained by means of a process of grammaticalization. In the case of hell 
of a, it was considered that it underwent a process of constructionalization which 
caused the BNP to become a micro-construction (Trousdale23). Thus, the phonological 
reduction and the micro-construction status pointed towards a N1-modifier-N2-head 
structure for BNPs. In the same way, the productivity of BNPs as opposed to that of 
ordinary NPs also argues in favour of the modifier-head analysis of BNPs.  
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Section 5.4.2 dealt with the headedness issue. The main problem with BNPs 
when identifying the head element is that they contain two nouns. This section argued 
that a modifier-head structure is the most appropriate for this type of construction. 
Such an understanding of the structure was supported by the syntactic locus of nouns 
in the N1 position and the restrictions they show. Only common nouns with a possible 
evaluative character can be used in this position. It was posited that this evaluative 
character was in some way provided by the construction itself and not by the noun. The 
evaluative option was also related to the fact that BNPs are the nominal counterparts of 
copular sentences with an NP attribute. The attribute position, at the same time, 
establishes a line of comparison between the element that seems to develop the most 
unusual role in BNPs, that is, the indefinite article a in the Det2 position. The change 
of positions when transforming a BNP into a copular sentence demonstrates that the 
attribute is always preceded by the indefinite article a, which is maintained in the BNP 
even though it is postponed to its nominal head. The reference of the overall structure 
was also used as an argument in favour of the modifier-head structure. BNPs are only 
used when reference to a very specific and well known referent is made. Thus, there is 
no sense in maintaining that Det2 specifies N2 given the incompatibility of their 
different characters, indefinite and definite respectively. It was then contended that the 
Det2 position is merely syntactical with respect to N2. Therefore, the Det1 position is 
to determine the N2 position, and as a consequence it was contended that the N1 
position is determined by the Det2 position.  
Finally, section 5.4.3 set out some exceptional instances of the BNP 
construction. The structure those fools of a crew was used as an illustration of the 
complexity of BNPs. At the same time, its exceptional plural form supported the 
modifier-head analysis. In relation to its plural form, the agreement options in this 





structure were analysed. The main problem with this example is that Det1 does not 
agree in number with N2 (cf. 5.4.2). However, it was concluded that even when the 
first determiner does not fit the singular form of the N2 head, it determines the second 
noun. This was demonstrated by means of the Agreement Hierarchy (Corbett 1979, 
2004, 2006). Even though, externally, one must accept that Det1 accompanies N1, it 
was argued that the feature values of the whole BNP are better determined if N2 is 
considered the main element of the structure. Thus, the plural meaning of N2 prevails 
over the syntactic order of the structure in which Det1 specifies N2. Hence, we must 
talk of semantic agreement instead of syntactic agreement. In this way, the physical 
distance between Det1 and N2 was also taken into account, which strengthened the 
semantic agreement theory.  
 
In sum, this dissertation has been an attempt to demonstrate that the structure of 
language, and that of NPs in particular, is richer and more varied than is usually 
assumed. All the constructions examined compose a heterogeneous ecological niche 
that is held together (as a category the NP) by the many criss-crossing patterns of 
similarities and differences that can be discerned within it. However, these can only be 
seen in all their individual complexity by avoiding the restrictions of theoretical 
prejudice and instead observing the whole diverse map of constructions for what it is: a 
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Resumen en castellano 
El presente estudio tiene como finalidad analizar la Frases Nominales en la lengua 
inglesa. La Frases Nominales siempre han sido consideras como una de las 
construcciones gramaticales más simples y fáciles de analizar. Pero una vez que se 
analizan a fondo, se concluye que tal construcción incluye un grupo muy variado de 
ejemplos. Así, la categoría gramatical Frase Nominal es un muy buen ejemplo para 
ilustrar la riqueza del lenguaje.  
 
 El capítulo 1, a modo de introducción para el presente estudio, proporciona una 
descripción de la construcción Frase Nominal. De tal modo que la sección 1.1 
proporciona una descripción, desde un punto de vista descriptivo, de  los elementos 
básicos que forman esta construcción. La sección 1.2 incluye las principales diferencias 
que existen entre el núcleo y los complementos de una Frase Nominal, lo cual es de 
vital importancia para el desarrollo del presente estudio. Dada la diversidad de la 
categoría, la sección 1.3 incluye todos los elementos que pueden ser utilizados en una 
Frase Nominal. Finalmente, la sección 1.4 cierra este primer capítulo haciendo 
referencia a ejemplos cross-lingüísticos (gallego, español, portugués, francés y alemán) 
los cuales proporcionan evidencia a favor de la diversidad dentro de la Frase Nominal lo 
que hace que esta construcción sea más compleja de lo que parece a primera vista.  
 
 Dada la teoría descriptiva sobre la Frase Nominal, el capítulo 2 trata el tema de 
la nucleidad dentro de esta construcción. La sección 2.1 gira alrededor de necesidad de 
determinar un núcleo dentro de toda estructura gramatical. La gran mayoría de los 
lingüistas postulan que los núcleos gramaticales son necesarios en sintaxis. En lo que no 
están tan de acuerdo es en localización del núcleo, y en este caso en particular, dentro de 





la Frase Nominal. Unos señalan que el nombre es siempre el núcleo (Matthews 1981; 
Huddleston y Pullum 2002), otros defienden que el elemento principal se encuentra en 
la posición del determinante (Abney 1987; Longobardi 2001; Alexiadou, Haegeman y 
Stravou 2007). De modo que, dada esta variedad de conclusiones sobre un tema tan 
crucial en el estudio sintáctico de una construcción, el presente estudio incluye un 
análisis teórico e histórico de los distintos marcos gramaticales que estudian la Frase 
Nominal. Así, la sección 2.2 incluye el análisis desarrollado por Hockett (1958), que 
tomando la teoría del endocentrismo (Bloomfield 1933) y el hecho de que los elementos 
léxicos son los núcleos en estas construcciones endoncéntricas, concluye que La Frase 
Nominal contiene las mismas características que su núcleo, esto es, el nombre.  
   La sección 2.3 ofrece el punto de vista de la gramática generativa. Hasta los 
años 80, los lingüistas generativos consideraban que el nombre era el núcleo (Chomsky 
1965). Pero con Jackendoff (1977) se establece una nueva teoría, la teoría X-barra, que 
cambia drásticamente el punto de vista generativo. De este modo, todas las categorías 
frasales comparten una misma estructura en vez de cuatro distintas para nombres, 
verbos, adjetivos y preposiciones. Al mismo tiempo, un nuevo elemento adquiere una 
posición central dentro de esta teoría, esto es, el Sp cifier. Se considera que es el 
responsable en la creación de una categoría sintáctica. Este elemento proporciona la 
base para el desarrollo de la hipótesis DP (Abney 1987), que postula que el 
determinante es el núcleo en una Frase Nominal. Como consecuencia, la categoría Frase 
Determinativa aparece en el panorama lingüístico. Esta nueva hipótesis es compartida 
por lingüistas como Giorgi y Longobardi (1991: 133) los cuales desarrollan el Argument 
Uniqueness Principle como apoyo para esta nueva teoría.  De tal modo que, desde el 
punto de vista generativo, solo los elementos funcionales pueden proyectar categorías 
sintácticas.  





 A continuación, la sección 2.4 incluye el punto de vista de la gramática 
cognitiva. Bajo la principal idea de que el lenguaje es significado, los gramáticos 
cognitivos rechazan la idea de que las sintaxis es central en los análisis lingüísticos. 
Todos los elementos lingüísticos contienen significado, incluso los más funcionales. Así 
es como también se considera, desde este punto de vista, que el determinante es el 
núcleo en la Frase Nominal. Para la gramática cognitiva, el núcleo de una estructura es 
aquel cuyo perfil corresponde con el perfil de toda la estructura. En el caso de las Frases 
Nominales, la función de grounding se considera como la principal en su elaboración 
(Langacker 2004; Taylor 2002) y como el paso final. Esta función la desarrolla el 
elemento funcional, esto es, el determinante, que es el encargado de transformar un 
nombre en una Frase Nominal, lo cual le confiere una posición central dentro de la 
estructura. Pero aunque el determinante se considere el núcleo, no puede proyectar una 
Frase Nominal por si solo. Así que se establece una relación de co-dependencia entre el 
elemento funcional y el léxico. A pesar de esta co-dependencia, el determinante se sigue 
considerando como el elemento más relevante en la formación de una Frase Nominal. 
Se pude concluir, que la gramática generativa y la cognitiva, aunque son marcos muy 
opuestos, comparten la teoría del determinante como núcleo, pero cabe decir que la 
gramática cognitiva no proporciona a los elementos funcionales el mismo grado de 
importancia que la gramática generativa.  
 La sección 2.5 revisa dos análisis sintácticos de la Frase Nominal que difieren 
completamente de los vistos previamente. Así, la sección 2.5.1 incluye el trabajo de Ball 
(2004), que sostiene que la Frases Nominales son estructuras exocéntricas donde los dos 
elementos, el determinante y el nombre, se consideran núcleos. Esto es por lo que esta 
teoría se denomina bipolar. Ninguno de los elementos depende del otro. Desde el punto 
de vista semántico el nombre es el elemento más importante. En el caso del sintáctico, 





el determinante es el elemento que permite diferenciar un nombre de un verbo. En esta 
teoría, el significado de la estructura depende de la igual contribución del determinante 
y del nombre. El contenido del nombre se proyecta a través del determinante dado que, 
como categoría léxica que es, no puede crear una categoría sintáctica por si mismo.  
 La seccion 2.5.2 presenta el trabajo de Dryer (2004). La idea central es que las 
Frases Nominales son estructuras sin núcleo. Este análisis parte de la idea de que 
algunas lenguas, aún tendiendo Frases Nominales, no incluyen ningún nombre entre sus 
constituyentes. Dryer considera estos seis enfoques para demostrar su teoría. Así, tiene 
en cuenta la elipsis; el nombre como modificador; que los modificadores son núcleos; 
que el determinante es el núcleo; que son estructuras sin núcleo; y que todas las Frases 
Nominales carecen de núcleo. Considerando todas estas posibilidades, Dryer concluye 
que la última es la más adecuada y que la noción de núcleo no es realmente necesaria.  
 Finalmente, la sección 2.6 incluye el marco del presente estudio. Tomando la 
gramática cognitiva (Langacker 1987a, 1991) y la gramática de la construcción 
(Goldberg 1995, 2006) como marcos de referencia, esta sección defiende la idea de que 
el análisis más adecuado para las Frases Nominales ordinarias es aquel que considera 
que el nombre es el núcleo. Para sentar las bases teóricas de la gramática de la 
construcción (cf. 2.6.1), la sección 2.6.1.1 ofrece algunos preliminares teóricos sobre el 
marco construccional. A continuación, la sección 2.6.1.2, trata la función de grounding 
del determinante en relación con el acto de comunicación. El contexto de la 
comunicación se ve reforzado cuando los participantes comparten una referencia mental 
coordinada (Fauconier 1985), y como ya se ha visto, el uso del determinante asegura 
este compartimiento. Aunque, antes de usar los determinantes, los usuarios de la lengua 
necesitan fijar en sus mentes un cierto número de elementos léxicos que evoquen los 
diferentes tipos dentro de un discurso. Estos se consideran los o stage elements que 





están relacionados con el current discourse space (CDS) (Langacker 2004). Cuando los 
hablantes y los oyentes comparten el mismo CDS, se crea un marco, esto es, el campo 
inmediato de atención para los participantes. Cada vez que un nuevo discurso se crea, el 
campo de discurso se debe actualizar, lo que provoca el uso de tipos lingüísticos 
diferentes, esto es, de nuevos elementos léxicos para crear un nuevo contexto de 
comunicación en las referencias mentales del hablante y del oyente. Como se puede 
apreciar, el contexto es de gran importancia en la creación del significado, y aunque los 
determinantes son esenciales para la función de grounding, non pueden crear 
significado por si solos. El uso del determinante depende de los elementos léxicos que 
construyen el espacio del discurso y proveen al acto de comunicación con significado.  
 Toda esta teoría se pude aplicar a la construcción Frase Nominal si ponemos 
atención al estado informacional de los referentes del contexto. Los constituyentes 
usados en la formación de una Frase Nominal dependen de las características 
informacionales del nombre. Así, el uso del determinante definido o indefinido depende 
de esta información. Como consecuencia, la dirección de codificación va del nombre al 
determinante.  
 La sección 2.6.1.3 trata la noción de significado en relación con la construcción 
Frase Nominal. En términos de la gramática cognitiva, la conceptualización es la 
elaboración del significado de una categoría gramatical o un elemento lingüístico. A 
este respecto, esta sección proporciona una explicación de la organización sintáctica de 
las Frases Nominales haciendo especial hincapié en el significado de la construcción. 
Desde un punto de vista construccionista, la construcción Frase Nominal ofrece un 
significado esquemático, el de una entidad eterminada. Su significado general se ve 
especificado una vez que los elementos léxicos son usados. Esta sección también 
incluye la noción de subcategorización que sirve como apoyo a la idea de que el nombre 





es el núcleo. Siempre que un verbo necesite ser subcategorizado, depende del contenido 
de la palabra léxica que es subcategorizada, no de sus elementos de gr unding. Así que, 
el significado de una expresión depende de los elementos léxicos que crean el marco del 
discurso, que al mismo tiempo seleccionan sus propios dependientes, como es el caso de 
los determinantes.  
 La sección 2.6.2 propone cambios en el modelo cognitivo al respecto de la Frase 
Nominal. Para empezar, la sección 2.6.2.1 trata la posición del nombre en relación con 
los marcos de discurso. Si los marcos de discurso influyen en el significado de los 
determinantes, y si estos son el producto de los nombres sentados en los espacios 
mentales, entonces su uso depende de los nombres. Esto se apoya en el esquema (21) 
(página 88), donde se demuestra que las características semánticas del determinante no 
se proyectan directamente en la Frase Nominal. Esto significa que las características 
semánticas se tienen en cuenta cuando tratamos al nombre, no con la construcción 
Frases Nominal. De modo que, las características semánticas del nombre, influencias 
por las del determinante, al igual que sus características sintácticas, esto es, el núcleo de 
la Frase Nominal, se proyectan en la estructura Frase Nominal.  
 Para concluir este capítulo, la sección 2.6.2.1.1 incluye el análisis individual del 
determinante. Es considerado un esquema, esto es, un mecanismo gramatical de 
descripción. Un esquema es una plantilla que representa un grupo de expresiones, cuyos 
rasgos en común sólo se observa a ciertos niveles de especificidad. Así que, el 
determinante es un rasgo común abstracto del tipo de elemento léxico que requiera tal 
plantilla. Como ya hemos visto, la función de grounding del determinante le 
proporciona el estado de núcleo según autores como Taylor (2002). Pero es difícil 
aceptar que un constituyente esquemático proyecte una estructura tan específica como 
una Frase Nominal. La esquematicidad del determinante podría ser resuelta si tenemos 





en cuenta que, hasta cierto punto, el léxico contiene esquemas más abstractos de los 
cuales los elementos pueden “heredar” propiedades (Jackendoff 2002). Así que, los 
determinantes, teniendo cierto grado de contendido semántico, pueden ser considerados 
como parte del léxico, como complementos adicionales con significado para los 
elementos léxicos propiamente dichos.  
 Las construcciones gramaticales pueden ser expresiones o esquemas abstraídos 
de expresiones con el fin de  capturar sus rasgos en común (Langacker24). D sde el 
punto de vista de la gramática de la construcción, las construcciones necesitan 
especificidad. En el caso de las Frases Nominales, esta especificidad se debe al uso del 
nombre, no al del determinante. Además, los rasgos comunes de una construcción como 
una Frase Nominal es que los nombres usan el determinante como plantilla. Así que, la 
función sintáctica del nombre es la de núcleo dentro de la Frase Nominal.  
  Los rasgos comunes de una construcción pueden reconocerse en elementos no 
tan prototípicos. Así, una Frase Nominal puede contener un adjetivo o una forma en – 
ing en la posición sintáctica del nombre. Esto es posible dado que la construcción [Det 
+ N] se adapta al adjetivo o la forma en –ing proporcionándoles las capacidades 
sintácticas de la Frase Nominal. El significado construccional de las Frases Nominales 
prototípicas se adapta a los nuevos elementos. La no prototipicidad de los nuevos 
elementos, y el hecho de que las estructuras que proyectan son gramaticales, muestra el 
carácter variado de la construcción Frase Nominal. 
 
 Dado que la variedad parece ser una opción para la categoría Frase Nominal, el 
capítulo 3 contiene un estudio de las construcciones apositivas restrictivas. El objetivo 
principal de este capítulo es proporcionar conocimientos teóricos para entender el 
                                                           
24Estas notas han sido tomadas en un curso impartido por Langacker en Madrid, en abril de 2008.  





capítulo 4. Así, después de una breve introducción en la sección 3.1, la sección 3.2 
ofrece una descripción de las mayores diferencias que existen entre aposición restrictiva 
(La escritora Alice Walker) y no restrictiva (La escritora, Alice Walker). La aposición 
no restrictiva es considerada como la aposición por excelencia, pero el presente estudio 
considera que la aposición restrictiva necesita un estudio más pormenorizado y 
exhaustivo. De este modo, la sección 3.3 tiene como finalidad estudiar los diferentes 
puntos de vista que existen sobre la estructura de esta construcción (cf. 3.3.1), en 
particular, cual de los dos nombres es el núcleo. La sección 3.3.2 incluye el análisis de 
Hockett (1955) en el que se considera que la aposición restrictiva es una construcción 
exocéntrica con dos núcleos. En la sección 3.3.3, se debate el análisis de Burton-Roberts 
(1975) quien postula que la estructura [Det + N + N] es una Frase Nominal común. A 
continuación, la sección 3.3.4 refleja el análisis de Matthews (1981) que señala que la 
construcción apositiva restrictiva es una construcción indiferenciada, esto es, que 
muestras rasgos similares a la coordinación, la complementación y la modificación. La 
sección 3.3.5 ofrece el análisis llevado a cabo por Meyer (1991, 1992). La idea principal 
es que la aposición restrictiva es graduable y el mejor modo de analizarla es teniendo en 
cuenta la semántica, la pragmática y la sintaxis de esta construcción. Así, el punto 
principal de este estudio es que la aposición restrictiva es un caso de modificación 
dentro del molde de la Frase Nominal. La sección 3.3.6 contiene el trabajo de Keizer 
(2007a) que propone que en la aposición restrictiva el núcleo se encuentra en el segundo 
nombre dado que el primero no tiene el mismo poder de referencialidad. Otro punto 
importante en este estudio es el papel que desempeña el determinante. Aunque se 
considera que todas las estructuras apositivas tienen la misma estructura, el 
determinante tiene distintas funciones, si en la escritora Alice Walker el determinante 
determina a los dos nombres, en mi hermana Cath el determinante funciona como un 





modificador que modifica solo al primer nombre. Para finalizar este capítulo, la sección 
3.3.7 incluye el análisis de Acuña-Fariña (2009). Desde un punto de vista de la 
gramática de la construcción la estructura el poeta Burns se considera una aposición 
restrictiva prototípica. Esta se incluye dentro de un ‘nicho ecológico rico’ dentro del 
cual se relaciona con el resto de tipos de aposiciones restrictivas.  
 
 El capítulo 4 ofrece un estudio de la aposición restrictiva donde la relaciones 
construccionales ente las Frases Nominales comunes y los diferentes tipos de 
aposiciones restrictivas se resaltan para entender mejor el grupo heterogéneo que 
forman los ejemplos de esta construcción. La sección 4.1 incluye una introducción de la 
heterogeneidad de esta construcción. La sección 4.2 analiza el prototipo de aposición 
restrictiva, la escritora Alice Walker, donde se considera el núcleo de esta estructura se 
encuentra en el N2. Este resultado se ve reforzado por el reference point model 
(Langacker 1993, 2009) que demuestra que el nombre común es el refer nce point que 
tiene como target el nombre propio, esto es, el núcleo de la estructura. La nucleidad del 
N2 también se basa en la organización trajector/landmark de la relaciones gramaticales. 
El N1 sería el trajector y el N2 el landmark. Dado este análisis, las aposiciones 
restrictivas son consideradas híbridos. Estas estructuras emergen de los nudos 
hereditarios y taxonómicos que tienen origen en la Frase Nominal.  
 La sección 4.3 comprende el análisis individual de cada uno del los tipos de 
aposición restrictiva. La sección 4.3.1 trata la estructura mi hermana Cath/ mi hermana 
la bailarina. Estableciendo una línea de comparación entre esta estructura y el 
prototipo, se concluye que en este tipo el núcleo se encuentra en el N1, el nombre 
común. Los principales argumentos a favor de este análisis son que, una vez aplicado el 
reference point model, el determinante posesivo es considerado el ref rence point cuyo 





target es el nombre propio, considerado el núcleo de la estructura. La sección 4.3.2 
incluye el tipo Alice Walker la escritora. La similitud con el prototipo es más que obvia, 
lo cual llevaría a pensar que sus estructuras internas también lo son, pero en este caso de 
aposición restrictiva el núcleo se encuentra en el N1. La sección 4.3.2.1 contiene el 
análisis de Kermit la rana. Esta estructura es prácticamente igual a la anterior con la 
única diferencia de que esta no es reversible. El significado también es un punto clave 
en su análisis dado que no hace referencia a ninguna profesión o rol social, una de las 
principales características de las aposiciones restrictivas. Así, su estructura fija y su 
significado llevan a la conclusión de que el nombre propio es obligatorio en la posición 
de N1. La sección 4.3.3 analiza la estructura King Henry VIII. En este caso el núcleo se 
encuentra en el N2 siendo este el target del reference point King. La sección 4.3.4 
incluye el análisis del tipo la palabra ‘cortesía’. El significado metalingüístico de esta 
estructura favorece al N1 como núcleo. La sección 4.3.5 contiene la estructura ‘a friend 
John [who’s in linguistics with me]’. Este es el único caso de aposición restrictiva 
indefinida. Además está severamente constreñido y las restricciones de selección solo 
afectan al N1 lo que hace que estructura no sea reversible lo cual implica que el N1 sea 
el núcleo. Finalmente, la sección 4.3.6 incluye un último tipo de aposición restrictiva, 
we women, you men. En este caso las características deícticas del pronombre hacen que 
este sea el núcleo de la estructura.  
 La sección 4.4 propone una teoría basada en las construcciones anteriores que 
sostiene que todos los miembros de la aposición restrictiva forman una red. Todas estas 
ejemplos muestras una estructura [N + N] que significa que N1 es N2 y que todas ellas 
establecen una relación estática entre estos dos miembros (Varantola 1993). Además, 
esta red también se caracteriza por sus restricciones semánticas y una estructura nominal 
corta y fija que facilita su reconocimiento y reduce el tiempo de procesamiento. En 





relación a su nucleidad, todos los miembros de la red tienen un solo núcleo que varía 
dependiendo del significado de la estructura. La variación afecta a la posición el núcleo, 
pero dentro de la red también hay ejemplos fijos (Alice Walker la escritora, we women). 
En otras palabras, así como las aposiciones restrictivas difieren en el núcleo, también 
muestran elaboraciones internas diferentes. Van dende un grado importante de 
complejidad interna (la escritora Alice Walker) hasta aquellas que muestran un carácter 
esquemático (we women). Pero aparte de estas diferencias, todas ellas están 
masivamente interconectadas dado que todas contienen varios de los siguientes rasgos: 
expresan una ocupación, contienen un nombre propio, son reversibles y/o tienen una 
estructura esquemática de [N + N].  
 
 El capítulo 5 incluye el análisis de Frases Binominales (your brat of a brother) 
como un ejemplo de la categoría Frase Nominal que aumenta el número de 
construcciones que ‘parecen Frases Nominales’. La sección 5.1 ofrece una introducción 
con las características principales de este tipo de construcción revisados extensamente 
en la sección 5.2. La sección 5.3 incluye un análisis extenso de los distintos estudios 
hechos sobre esta construcción cuyo punto central de discusión es, de nuevo, el núcleo 
de la estructura. Así, las Frases Binominales son consideradas estructuras con un 
modificador (N1) y un núcleo (N2) (McCawley 1988; cf. 5.3.1). También son 
analizadas como si fuesen Frases Nominales comunes (Napoli 1989; cf. 5.3.2). Hay 
quien considera que el N1 forma con el elemento of y con el Det2 una frase 
modificadora que modifica al N2 considerado núcleo de la estructura (Aarts 1998; cf. 
5.3.3). Y otros señalan que las Frases Binominales tiene dos estructuras subyacentes 
diferentes (Keizer 2007a; cf. 5.3.4). 





 Para finalizar, la sección 5.4 muestra que un análisis construccional de la Frases 
Binominales es posible. La sección 5.4.1 trata los paralelismos estructurales que existen 
entre your brat of a brother y hell of a (Brems 2003) como cambios en la morphología 
(helluva y lotta, respectivamente) provocados por una reducción fonológica. Esta 
reducción se explica mediante un proceso de construccionalización que hace que las 
Frase Binominal pase a ser una micro-construcción (Trousdale25). Así, la reducción 
fonológica y el estado de micro-construcción señalan que el análisis N1-modificador-
N2-núcleo es el más adecuado.  
 La sección 5.4.2 estudia el tema de la nucleidad. El problema está en encontrar 
cual de los dos nombre es el núcleo. El presente estudio defiende una que esta 
construcción muestra una estructura de modificador-núcleo. Esta conclusión se base en 
el locus sintáctico de los nombres en la posición N1 y las restricciones que muestran. 
Solo los nombres evaluativos pueden ser utilizados en esta posición aunque se sugiere 
que este carácter evaluativo puede ser proporcionado por la construcción. Al mimo 
tiempo, la Frases Binominales se relacionan con las oraciones copulativas con un 
atributo. La posición del atributo establece una línea de comparación con el Det2. 
Cuando una Frase Binomial se transforma en una frase copulativa el atributo siempre es 
precedido por el artículo indefinido a, el cual aparece en la Frases Binominales 
pospuesto al que sería su núcleo, N1. La referencia de este tipo de estructura también se 
usa como argumento a favor del N2 como núcleo. La Frases Binominales solo se 
utilizan cuando se hace referencia a un referente muy conocido. De modo que, no tiene 
sentido mantener que un artículo indefinido determina a un N2 de carácter definido. 
Así, se concluye que del Det1 especifica al N2 y que el Det2 determina al N1.  
                                                           
25 Notas tomadas en un seminario impartido por el profesor Trousdale en Vigo, en 2012. 





 La sección, 5.4.3 incluye algunos caso excepcionales de Frases Binominales. 
Estructuras como those fools of a crew muestran un plural excepcional que apoya el 
análisis de modificador-núcleo. En este sentido, se estudian la opciones de concordancia 
de esta construcción sobre las cuales se concluye que aunque el Det1 no concuerda con 
el N2 (cf. 5.4.2) se puede demostrar que el Det1 determina al N2 si seguimos la 
jerarquía de concordancia (Corbett 1979, 2004, 2006). Esto se explica si se tiene en 
cuenta el significado plural del N2 que prevalece sobre el orden sintáctico de la 
estructura. De este modo, se debe hablar de concordancia semántica en vez de 
concordancia sintáctica.  
 
 En conclusión, este estudio intenta demostrar que la estructura del lenguaje, y 
la de las Frases Nominales en particular, es más rica y variada de lo que se asume 
normalmente. Todas las construcciones analizadas componen un grupo que se 
caracteriza por los cruces de patrones de similitudes y diferencias que se distinguen 
entre ellos. Aunque estos solo se pueden observar en su complejidad evitando las 
restricciones de prejuicios teóricos y observando este diverso mapa de construcciones 
en su totalidad como lo que es: una red categorial: la Frase Nominal.   
   
 
  
